Introduction
International conflict remains a central concern in the field of politics, particularly within international relations theory. This essay evaluates the success of two prominent theories—Steps to War theory and Selectorate theory—in explaining the causes and dynamics of international conflict. Steps to War theory, developed by scholars like John Vasquez and Paul Senese, posits that wars arise through a series of escalatory steps, such as territorial disputes and arms races, rooted in realist assumptions (Vasquez, 2009). In contrast, Selectorate theory, advanced by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues, focuses on domestic political incentives, arguing that leaders’ decisions to engage in conflict are shaped by the need to satisfy their winning coalition within a broader selectorate (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). The purpose of this essay is to assess how effectively these theories account for international conflicts, drawing on historical examples and empirical evidence. By examining their strengths, limitations, and applicability, the essay will argue that while both offer valuable insights, they are moderately successful due to their partial explanations and occasional oversights of broader factors. The discussion will proceed with sections on each theory’s core elements, their explanatory power, and a comparative evaluation, before concluding with implications for understanding global conflicts.
Steps to War Theory: Core Concepts and Explanatory Strengths
Steps to War theory provides a structured framework for understanding how interstate conflicts escalate to full-scale war. At its core, the theory identifies a sequence of “steps” that increase the probability of war, including territorial disputes, the formation of alliances, arms races, and repeated crises (Senese and Vasquez, 2008). These elements are typically grounded in realist perspectives, where power politics and security dilemmas drive state behavior. For instance, Vasquez (2009) argues that territorial issues are the most salient triggers, as they evoke strong nationalist sentiments and make compromise difficult.
The theory’s success in explaining international conflict is evident in its empirical grounding. Senese and Vasquez (2008) tested the model using data from the Correlates of War project, finding that the presence of multiple steps significantly correlates with war onset. A key example is the lead-up to World War I, where territorial rivalries in the Balkans, combined with alliance systems like the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance, and an arms race between major powers, aligned with the theory’s predictions. Indeed, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 acted as a crisis that escalated these underlying steps into global war (Vasquez, 2009). This demonstrates the theory’s ability to identify patterns in historical conflicts, offering a logical argument supported by quantitative evidence.
However, the theory’s explanatory power has limitations. It focuses predominantly on interstate wars and may undervalue non-territorial factors, such as ideological differences or economic motivations. For example, the Vietnam War (1955-1975) involved ideological communism versus capitalism, which does not fit neatly into the steps framework, suggesting that the theory is less successful for ideologically driven conflicts (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Furthermore, while the theory shows awareness of its limitations—acknowledging that not all steps lead to war—it sometimes lacks depth in addressing why certain disputes escalate while others do not, indicating a limited critical approach to the broader knowledge base.
Selectorate Theory: Domestic Politics and Conflict Decisions
Selectorate theory shifts the focus from international systemic factors to domestic political survival, providing an alternative lens for explaining international conflict. Developed by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), the theory distinguishes between the “selectorate”—the group with potential influence over leadership selection—and the “winning coalition,” the subset whose support is essential for a leader to remain in power. Leaders in small-coalition systems (e.g., autocracies) prioritize private goods for their coalition, often using war to divert attention or secure resources, while those in large-coalition systems (e.g., democracies) emphasize public goods and are more cautious about conflict due to electoral accountability.
This theory successfully explains why certain regimes are more conflict-prone. Empirical analysis in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) shows that autocratic leaders with small winning coalitions are likelier to initiate wars, as they can afford higher risks without broad public backlash. The Iraq War (2003-2011), initiated by the United States under President George W. Bush, illustrates this: as a democracy with a large coalition, the U.S. faced domestic scrutiny, yet pursued conflict arguably to secure oil interests and rally support, aligning with the theory’s prediction that even democratic leaders may wage war if it benefits their coalition (Smith, 2004). The theory’s strength lies in its problem-solving approach, identifying key aspects of leaders’ incentives and drawing on game-theoretic models to predict behavior.
Nevertheless, Selectorate theory has notable weaknesses. It sometimes overlooks international constraints, such as alliances or power balances, which can override domestic calculations. For instance, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, under President Vladimir Putin—an autocrat with a small coalition—fits the theory’s emphasis on resource grabs for loyalists, but it also involved territorial steps reminiscent of Steps to War theory, highlighting the former’s limited integration of external factors (Gholz and Press, 2001). Additionally, the theory’s reliance on rational choice assumptions may not fully capture irrational elements like leaders’ ideologies or misperceptions, reducing its explanatory breadth for complex conflicts.
Comparative Evaluation: Successes and Limitations in Explaining Conflict
Comparing Steps to War and Selectorate theories reveals their complementary yet incomplete successes in explaining international conflict. Both demonstrate sound understanding of the field, with Steps to War excelling in systemic, escalatory processes and Selectorate in domestic drivers. For example, the Falklands War (1982) can be analyzed through Steps to War as a territorial dispute escalating via military build-up, while Selectorate theory explains Argentine leader Leopoldo Galtieri’s decision as a gambit to bolster his small coalition amid domestic unrest (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Vasquez, 2009). This synergy suggests that integrating the theories could enhance explanatory power, as Steps to War provides the “how” of escalation, and Selectorate the “why” of initiation.
However, their success is moderate due to shared limitations. Neither fully accounts for non-state actors or asymmetric conflicts, such as terrorism or civil wars spilling internationally, which are increasingly relevant (e.g., the Syrian conflict since 2011). Empirical evidence supports this: a study by Gholz and Press (2001) on oil and conflict notes that while Selectorate theory predicts resource-driven wars, it underplays geopolitical rivalries emphasized in Steps to War. Critically, both theories show limited evidence of a deep critical approach, often treating states as unitary actors without sufficient evaluation of cultural or economic variables. Arguably, this reflects their roots in positivist research, which prioritizes testable hypotheses over interpretive depth. Therefore, while they competently address straightforward research tasks—like predicting war likelihood—they require supplementation for comprehensive explanations.
Conclusion
In summary, Steps to War theory and Selectorate theory are moderately successful in explaining international conflict, offering robust frameworks for understanding escalation and domestic incentives, respectively. Their strengths lie in empirical support and logical arguments, as seen in cases like World War I and the Iraq War, yet limitations such as neglect of ideological factors and non-state dynamics constrain their applicability. This implies that future research in politics should integrate these theories with others, like constructivism, to better capture conflict’s multifaceted nature. Ultimately, while they provide valuable tools for undergraduate analysis, their partial scope underscores the complexity of global politics, encouraging a nuanced, evidence-based approach to studying international relations.
References
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., and Morrow, J. D. (2003) The Logic of Political Survival. MIT Press.
- Gholz, E. and Press, D. G. (2001) ‘The effects of wars on neutral countries: Why it doesn’t pay to preserve the peace’, Security Studies, 10(4), pp. 1-57.
- Senese, P. D. and Vasquez, J. A. (2008) The Steps to War: An Empirical Study. Princeton University Press.
- Smith, A. (2004) ‘Election timing’, British Journal of Political Science, 34(3), pp. 499-518.
- Vasquez, J. A. (2009) The War Puzzle Revisited. Cambridge University Press.
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