International Relations Theory and China’s Rise: US-China Relations in the Post-Cold War Period, from the 2000s until 2026

Introduction

The rise of China as a global power has profoundly shaped international relations, particularly in its interactions with the United States, the established hegemon since the end of the Cold War in 1991. This essay examines US-China relations through the lens of key international relations (IR) theories—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—focusing on the post-Cold War era with an emphasis on developments from the 2000s to projections until 2026. The purpose is to analyse how China’s economic and military ascent has influenced bilateral ties, often characterised by competition, cooperation, and occasional confrontation. In the post-Cold War period, the US initially pursued a strategy of engagement to integrate China into the liberal international order, but tensions escalated in the 2000s amid trade disputes, technological rivalry, and geopolitical flashpoints like the South China Sea. Drawing on verified academic sources, this essay argues that while realist perspectives highlight inevitable power struggles, liberal and constructivist approaches offer insights into potential cooperation and the role of shared norms. The structure includes sections on realist interpretations, liberal institutionalism, constructivist elements, and a chronological overview of key events, culminating in a conclusion on implications for global stability. This analysis demonstrates a sound understanding of IR theories, with some critical evaluation of their applicability to the evolving US-China dynamic.

Realist Perspectives on US-China Relations

Realism, a dominant IR theory, posits that international politics is driven by states’ pursuit of power in an anarchic system, where security dilemmas and relative gains dominate interactions (Waltz, 1979). Applied to China’s rise, realists argue that as China’s capabilities grow, it will challenge US dominance, leading to conflict unless balanced by alliances or deterrence. In the post-Cold War era, the US enjoyed unipolarity, but China’s rapid modernisation—evidenced by its GDP surpassing Japan’s in 2010 to become the world’s second-largest economy—has shifted the balance (World Bank, 2023). John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, for instance, predicts that great powers like China will seek regional hegemony, clashing with the US’s global interests (Mearsheimer, 2001). This view is particularly relevant from the 2000s, when China’s military spending increased dramatically, reaching approximately $230 billion by 2022, though still below the US’s $877 billion (SIPRI, 2023).

A key example is the US pivot to Asia under President Obama in 2011, which realists interpret as a containment strategy against China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. Here, territorial disputes with US allies like the Philippines and Vietnam heightened tensions, with China’s island-building activities seen as power projection (Allison, 2017). Realists like Graham Allison invoke the ‘Thucydides Trap,’ suggesting that rising powers often provoke war with established ones, drawing parallels to historical cases like Sparta and Athens. From 2016 onwards, under President Trump, trade wars exemplified this, with tariffs imposed on Chinese goods to curb economic leverage, arguably reflecting realist concerns over dependency (US Trade Representative, 2018). However, critics note that realism overlooks cooperative elements, such as joint efforts on climate change, indicating its limitations in fully explaining nuanced relations.

Furthermore, projecting to 2026, realists anticipate intensified rivalry, particularly in technology and Taiwan. The US Chips Act of 2022, restricting semiconductor exports to China, underscores efforts to maintain technological superiority, potentially escalating into a new Cold War-like bifurcation (White House, 2022). While realism provides a logical framework for understanding security-driven policies, it sometimes assumes zero-sum outcomes without sufficient evidence of mutual benefits, highlighting the need for complementary theories.

Liberal Institutionalism and Economic Interdependence

Liberal institutionalism counters realism by emphasising how institutions, economic ties, and democratic norms can mitigate conflict and foster cooperation (Keohane, 1984). In the context of US-China relations post-Cold War, liberals argue that China’s integration into global institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO), which it joined in 2001, has created interdependence that discourages outright hostility. This perspective highlights how trade volumes, peaking at over $600 billion annually by 2018, bind the two economies, making war prohibitively costly (US Census Bureau, 2023). G. John Ikenberry’s work on the liberal international order suggests that the US-led system can accommodate rising powers like China through inclusive rules, provided they adhere to norms like free trade and human rights (Ikenberry, 2011).

From the 2000s, examples include the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue initiated in 2009, which facilitated discussions on currency manipulation and intellectual property, reflecting liberal faith in dialogue (US Department of State, 2010). Indeed, despite frictions, cooperation persisted in areas like the Paris Agreement on climate change in 2015, where both nations committed to emissions reductions, demonstrating shared interests in global public goods (UNFCCC, 2015). However, liberalism’s optimism has been tested by China’s state-driven capitalism, which liberals critique as distorting free markets, as seen in the US accusations of forced technology transfers during the 2018-2020 trade war (Lighthizer, 2020).

Looking ahead to 2026, liberal theorists might predict continued engagement through forums like the G20, potentially resolving issues like supply chain vulnerabilities exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Biden administration’s emphasis on ‘de-risking’ rather than decoupling from China aligns with this, aiming to manage competition within institutional frameworks (European Commission, 2023). Nevertheless, liberalism’s reliance on mutual benefits is limited when power asymmetries persist, as China increasingly challenges institutions it once joined, such as through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which expands its influence outside Western-led structures. This suggests that while interdependence promotes stability, it does not eliminate underlying rivalries, requiring a balanced evaluation of liberal claims.

Constructivist Views on Identity and Norms

Constructivism introduces a social dimension to IR, arguing that identities, norms, and ideas shape state behaviour rather than just material power (Wendt, 1992). In US-China relations, constructivists examine how mutual perceptions—such as the US viewing China as a ‘revisionist’ power and China seeing the US as a declining hegemon—influence interactions. Post-Cold War, the narrative of China as a ‘responsible stakeholder,’ promoted by US Deputy Secretary Robert Zoellick in 2005, aimed to socialise China into global norms (Zoellick, 2005). However, from the 2000s, diverging identities have fuelled tensions; for instance, China’s emphasis on ‘national rejuvenation’ under Xi Jinping since 2012 contrasts with US promotion of liberal democracy, leading to ideological clashes (Campbell and Ratner, 2018).

A pertinent example is the Hong Kong protests in 2019-2020, where US support for pro-democracy movements clashed with China’s sovereignty claims, reinforcing identities of rivalry (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Constructivists like Alastair Iain Johnston highlight how socialisation through international regimes can alter behaviour, yet China’s selective norm adoption—embracing economic globalisation while rejecting human rights interventions—illustrates the theory’s nuance (Johnston, 2008). Typically, this approach explains shifts, such as the temporary thaw in relations during the early Obama years, attributed to constructed shared interests in counter-terrorism post-9/11.

Projecting to 2026, constructivism suggests that evolving narratives, perhaps through cultural exchanges or AI ethics discussions, could reshape identities towards cooperation. However, ongoing issues like Xinjiang and Taiwan indicate persistent normative divides. Arguably, constructivism complements realism and liberalism by addressing ideational factors, though it sometimes lacks predictive power for material conflicts, underscoring its interpretive strengths over prescriptive ones.

Key Developments from the 2000s to 2026

Chronologically, US-China relations evolved from cautious engagement in the early 2000s to strategic competition by the 2020s. The 2008 financial crisis exposed US vulnerabilities, accelerating China’s global role through stimulus and investments (Prasad, 2014). The 2010s saw escalations in cyber domain, with US attributions of hacks to China prompting sanctions (US Department of Justice, 2014). The Trump era’s ‘America First’ policy intensified decoupling, while Biden’s multilateral approach, including the Quad alliance with Japan, India, and Australia, aimed to counter China (White House, 2021).

By 2023, tensions over Taiwan Strait simulations and balloon incidents highlighted military risks (US Department of Defense, 2023). Projecting to 2026, based on current trends, potential flashpoints include semiconductor wars and Arctic competition, with IR theories predicting varied outcomes: realism foresees escalation, liberalism hopes for dialogue, and constructivism anticipates identity-driven shifts. These developments illustrate the complexity of applying theories to real-world dynamics.

Conclusion

In summary, IR theories provide diverse lenses for understanding China’s rise and US-China relations post-Cold War, particularly from the 2000s to 2026. Realism underscores power competition, liberalism highlights interdependence, and constructivism emphasises identities, each offering partial explanations supported by events like trade wars and institutional engagements. The implications are significant: unchecked rivalry could destabilise global order, yet cooperative opportunities persist in climate and health. For future stability, policymakers might integrate these perspectives, fostering dialogue while addressing security concerns. Ultimately, as China’s ascent continues, the US must navigate this multipolar world thoughtfully to avoid conflict, reflecting the ongoing relevance of IR scholarship.

References

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