Introduction
Constructivist theory in international relations emphasises the role of norms and ideas in shaping state identities and interests, rather than treating them as fixed by material power alone (Wendt, 1999). This essay examines the political idea of democracy through the case of China, exploring how interpretations of this norm have evolved since the late twentieth century and whether corresponding shifts in state behaviour have occurred. The analysis focuses on the transition from limited participatory experiments to the promotion of “whole-process people’s democracy,” while assessing implications for China’s domestic governance and international conduct. Drawing on constructivist insights, the discussion considers how contested meanings of democracy have allowed the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to adapt the concept to legitimise its rule, with state behaviour reflecting both engagement and resistance to liberal democratic norms.
The Evolution of Democratic Ideas in China
Following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the reform era under Deng Xiaoping introduced modest experiments with grassroots participation that reflected an instrumental engagement with democratic ideas. Village elections, formalised in the 1987 Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees, permitted direct voting for local leaders in rural areas as a mechanism to improve governance efficiency and reduce corruption without threatening central party control (O’Brien, 1990). These measures drew on a pragmatic reading of democracy as a tool for stability rather than a liberal value centred on individual rights or multiparty competition. The approach aligned with the CCP’s emphasis on “socialist democracy,” which subordinated political liberalisation to economic development and party leadership.
Under subsequent leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, interpretations of democracy remained cautious and contained. Official discourse continued to stress the leading role of the CCP while permitting incremental administrative reforms. The 2007 Seventeenth Party Congress report endorsed “intra-party democracy” as an internal mechanism for improving accountability, yet explicitly rejected Western-style electoral competition (Fewsmith, 2012). This period saw limited expansion of consultative processes, such as public hearings on legislation, framed as expressions of “democratic centralism.” Such adaptations illustrate how the idea of democracy was reshaped to reinforce regime legitimacy amid rapid socio-economic change, rather than to diffuse liberal norms.
Since 2012, Xi Jinping has promoted a more assertive redefinition through the concept of “whole-process people’s democracy.” This formulation claims that Chinese democracy encompasses electoral, consultative and deliberative channels that operate continuously under party guidance, contrasting it with what CCP documents portray as the intermittent and elite-driven nature of Western systems (Xi, 2021). The 2021 white paper “China: Democracy That Works” presents this model as superior for a large developing country, thereby contesting the universality of liberal democratic norms. The shift demonstrates constructivist dynamics whereby ideas are not static; domestic actors actively reinterpret international norms to fit local identities and interests.
Changes in State Behaviour and Continuity
Corresponding adjustments in state behaviour have been evident domestically. The early reform period witnessed a modest decentralisation of authority to village committees, enabling limited popular input into local affairs and reducing overt coercion in rural administration. Yet these behavioural changes remained bounded; higher-level appointments continued through party nomination, and independent political organisation stayed prohibited. Behaviour therefore adapted to accommodate a narrow interpretation of democratic participation while preserving authoritarian structures.
In the Xi era, state behaviour has become more centralised and assertive in defining acceptable democratic practice. The 2019 Hong Kong protests prompted the imposition of a National Security Law that curtailed electoral competition and civil liberties, justified by Beijing as necessary to safeguard “democracy with Chinese characteristics” against foreign interference (Lee, 2022). Similarly, tightened controls over civil society and digital platforms reflect an effort to align behaviour with the party’s curated version of democracy. These actions suggest that the reinterpreted norm has shaped conduct by prioritising stability and sovereignty over liberal standards, consistent with constructivist arguments that norms influence preferences once internalised or strategically deployed.
Internationally, China’s behaviour shows selective engagement rather than wholesale transformation. Participation in UN human-rights mechanisms continues, yet official statements routinely defend sovereign interpretations of democracy against external criticism (Kinzelbach, 2012). Initiatives such as the Belt and Road have been accompanied by rhetoric presenting China as an alternative model for developing states, implicitly challenging liberal democratic conditionality. While material interests remain significant, the normative contestation over democracy supplies an ideational rationale for this outward projection of the Chinese model.
Nevertheless, substantial continuity persists. Core features of one-party rule, suppression of dissent and rejection of multiparty elections have endured across leadership generations. The CCP has adapted the language of democracy to changing circumstances without relinquishing monopoly control, indicating that norm reinterpretation serves to reinforce rather than erode established behavioural patterns.
Conclusion
The Chinese case illustrates how constructivist processes of norm contestation allow states to reshape dominant ideas to suit domestic identities. Democracy has evolved from a limited administrative device in the reform era to a comprehensive, party-led model under Xi Jinping, producing corresponding behavioural adjustments that strengthen regime resilience while resisting liberal diffusion. Although modest participatory openings occurred, fundamental authoritarian practices remain intact, suggesting that ideational change in this instance has reinforced continuity in state conduct. This dynamic underscores the malleability of norms and the agency of states in determining their meaning and influence within international society.
References
- Fewsmith, J. (2012) ‘Social order in the wake of the 18th Party Congress’, China Leadership Monitor, 38, pp. 1–9.
- Kinzelbach, K. (2012) ‘The EU and China’s human rights diplomacy: The persistent gap between rhetoric and practice’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 17(4), pp. 517–536.
- Lee, C.K. (2022) ‘Hong Kong and the new security paradigm’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 52(1), pp. 1–18.
- O’Brien, K.J. (1990) Reform without liberalization: China’s National People’s Congress and the politics of institutional change. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wendt, A. (1999) Social theory of international politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Xi, J. (2021) ‘Speech at the ceremony marking the centenary of the Communist Party of China’, Beijing, 1 July.
