Introduction
This essay examines whether a follower of Kantian ethics would support the proposed legalisation of assisted dying. It explores Kant’s deontological moral theory, outlines his method for moral decision-making, applies these ideas to the suggested change in law, and evaluates the strengths and limitations of a Kantian stance. The discussion draws on primary and secondary sources to maintain a balanced assessment suitable for undergraduate analysis.
Kant’s Moral Theory
Kantian ethics is fundamentally deontological, emphasising duty rather than consequences. In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant (1997) argues that moral actions must be performed from a sense of duty derived from pure practical reason. Central to this theory are the formulations of the categorical imperative. The first requires that one act only according to maxims that can be willed as universal laws. The second insists that persons must always be treated as ends in themselves and never merely as means. These principles establish morality as objective and independent of personal desires or outcomes.
Making Moral Decisions According to Kant
Kant maintains that moral decisions arise through testing proposed maxims against the categorical imperative. An agent formulates the rule underlying an action and asks whether it could consistently be adopted by all rational beings. If the maxim produces a contradiction when universalised, the action is impermissible. Moreover, decisions must respect the inherent dignity of rational agents; any policy that instrumentalises individuals fails this test. This procedure is rational and a priori, avoiding appeals to emotion or empirical circumstances (Kant, 1997).
Application of Kantian Ethics to the Proposed Change in Law
Applying these criteria to assisted dying reveals significant tensions. A person requesting assistance might frame their maxim as: “When facing unbearable terminal suffering, I may end my life with medical help to avoid pain.” Universalising this maxim generates difficulties. If everyone in similar circumstances adopted the rule, the practice of medicine would shift from preserving life to facilitating death, potentially undermining the rational agency Kant prizes. Furthermore, the second formulation prohibits treating oneself or others merely as a means; seeking death to eliminate suffering risks viewing the self as a dispensable instrument rather than an end (Cholbi, 2011). Consequently, a strict Kantian would likely regard the action as morally wrong and therefore oppose legal change that sanctions it.
Evaluation of Kantian Ethics in Relation to Assisted Dying
Kant’s framework offers a clear, principled rejection of assisted dying that protects the intrinsic value of persons. Its emphasis on consistency and respect for autonomy—understood as adherence to rational law—provides a robust defence against potentially coercive social pressures. However, critics note that Kantian ethics may appear overly rigid in terminal care contexts where suffering is intense and unavoidable. The absolute prohibition on suicide, articulated in the Lectures on Ethics, does not always accommodate modern distinctions between killing and allowing to die (Wood, 1999). Moreover, the theory’s focus on perfect duties leaves limited room for compassionate responses that some contemporary Kantians attempt to develop through “Kantian constructivism” (O’Neill, 2002). While these limitations highlight the theory’s inflexibility, they also underscore its value in resisting utilitarian calculations that might erode safeguards for vulnerable patients.
Conclusion
A follower of Kantian ethics would probably vote against the proposed legal change. The categorical imperative demonstrates that assisted dying cannot be consistently universalised and risks treating persons merely as means. Although the theory’s absolutism invites criticism, it supplies a coherent and defensible position that prioritises human dignity over the alleviation of suffering. This analysis illustrates both the strength of duty-based reasoning and the challenges it faces when confronting contemporary bioethical dilemmas.
References
- Cholbi, M. (2011) Suicide: The Philosophical Dimensions. Peterborough: Broadview Press.
- Kant, I. (1997) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated and edited by M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- O’Neill, O. (2002) Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wood, A. W. (1999) Kant’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
