Ronald Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources represents a significant contribution to contemporary political philosophy, particularly in debates concerning distributive justice and individual responsibility. This essay assesses Dworkin’s distinction between brute luck and option luck, which forms a central element of his approach to equality. The discussion begins by outlining the broader framework of equality of resources before examining the nature of the distinction itself. It then evaluates arguments in support of the distinction and considers key critiques, focusing on whether the division between the two forms of luck can be maintained coherently. The analysis draws primarily on Dworkin’s own writings alongside secondary literature to demonstrate both the strengths and limitations of this aspect of his theory.
Dworkin’s Equality of Resources Framework
Dworkin develops equality of resources as an alternative to both equality of welfare and strict equality of outcome. In his view, a just distribution must be sensitive to the choices individuals make while remaining insensitive to factors beyond their control. The auction and hypothetical insurance market serve as mechanisms to achieve this balance, allowing individuals to bid for resources according to their ambitions while compensating for unchosen disadvantages. This framework underpins the luck egalitarian project, in which luck is divided into categories that carry different moral weight. Dworkin argues that justice requires neutralising the effects of certain types of luck but not others, thereby preserving space for personal responsibility.
Defining Brute Luck and Option Luck
The distinction between brute luck and option luck is introduced to separate circumstances that warrant redistribution from those that do not. Brute luck refers to outcomes that arise independently of any deliberate gamble or choice on the part of the individual; examples include genetic endowments or the social position into which one is born. Option luck, by contrast, describes the results of risks that a person has chosen to accept after reflection. Gambling provides the standard illustration: a person who voluntarily places a bet accepts the possibility of loss as part of the activity. Dworkin maintains that inequalities traceable to brute luck should be remedied through redistributive mechanisms, whereas those stemming from option luck should generally be allowed to stand. This division is presented as both morally intuitive and practically workable within the equality of resources scheme.
Strengths of the Distinction
One strength lies in its capacity to reconcile egalitarian commitments with respect for individual agency. By insulating persons from the arbitrary effects of brute luck, the distinction upholds the principle that people should not suffer disadvantage merely because of factors they could not influence. At the same time, it avoids the implausible implication that all inequalities must be eliminated, thereby recognising that voluntary decisions carry consequences. The hypothetical insurance market further illustrates this point: individuals behind a veil of ignorance would purchase coverage against brute bad luck but would not necessarily insure against every chosen risk. This approach therefore supplies both a normative rationale and an institutional device for addressing disadvantage without undermining responsibility.
Challenges and Critiques
Nevertheless, the distinction encounters difficulties when examined closely. Critics contend that the boundary between brute and option luck is often blurred in practice. Many apparently chosen risks occur against backgrounds already shaped by brute luck; a person born into poverty may have fewer real alternatives when deciding whether to gamble or invest, rendering the voluntariness of the choice questionable. Furthermore, Dworkin’s account assumes that individuals can reasonably foresee the outcomes of their decisions, yet information asymmetries and cognitive limitations complicate this assumption. Elizabeth Anderson has argued that luck egalitarianism, including Dworkin’s variant, risks treating certain individuals with insufficient respect by focusing too narrowly on the classification of luck rather than on ensuring citizens can participate as equals in society. These objections suggest that the distinction may be too rigid to accommodate the complex interplay between choice and circumstance.
Implications for Distributive Justice
The assessment of Dworkin’s distinction carries wider implications for theories of distributive justice. If the division between brute and option luck cannot be drawn with sufficient clarity, then policies relying on this distinction for determining compensation may produce arbitrary results. Conversely, retaining a version of the distinction, perhaps modified to account for background conditions, could still advance egalitarian aims while acknowledging agency. The debate thus highlights a persistent tension within luck egalitarianism between the demands of equality and the value placed on individual choice.
Conclusion
Dworkin’s distinction between brute luck and option luck offers a coherent way to integrate considerations of responsibility into an egalitarian theory. While it provides a persuasive justification for compensating unchosen disadvantages, the distinction faces significant challenges concerning the identification of genuine choice and the influence of prior brute luck. These difficulties do not entirely undermine the framework but indicate that refinements are required if the approach is to guide practical policy. Ultimately, the distinction remains a valuable, if contested, contribution to discussions of justice and personal responsibility.
References
- Anderson, E.S. (1999) ‘What is the Point of Equality?’, Ethics, 109(2), pp. 287-337.
- Dworkin, R. (1981) ‘What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 10(4), pp. 283-345.
- Dworkin, R. (2000) Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
