Introduction
The European Union (EU) has long faced criticism for its perceived democratic deficit, a term that encapsulates the limited accountability and accessibility of EU institutions to the citizens they serve. This essay critically examines the proposition that enhancing the role of national parliaments is the sole remedy to this deficit. Specifically, it evaluates whether empowering national parliaments to assess EU legislation not only for compliance with the principle of subsidiarity but also for proportionality would effectively address the democratic shortfall. The discussion begins by outlining the nature of the EU’s democratic deficit, followed by an analysis of the current role of national parliaments under the subsidiarity principle. It then explores the potential benefits and challenges of extending their mandate to include proportionality reviews. Finally, the essay considers whether this approach, while significant, is indeed the only viable solution. Through this analysis, the argument is made that while strengthening national parliaments is a vital step, it must be complemented by broader reforms to fully cure the democratic deficit.
Understanding the EU’s Democratic Deficit
The concept of the EU’s democratic deficit refers to the perceived lack of democratic legitimacy and accountability within its decision-making processes. Scholars such as Hix (2008) argue that the deficit arises from the limited direct influence of citizens on EU policies, compounded by the complex and distant nature of EU institutions like the European Commission and the Council of the European Union. Despite the directly elected European Parliament, critics maintain that its powers remain insufficient compared to the executive dominance of unelected bodies (Hix, 2008). Indeed, the disconnect between EU governance and national electorates is evident in low voter turnouts for European Parliament elections, often interpreted as a sign of public disengagement.
Moreover, the democratic deficit is exacerbated by the principle of supremacy, whereby EU law overrides national law, often leaving national parliaments with little influence over decisions that directly affect their constituents. This raises fundamental questions about how democratic oversight can be strengthened. The proposal to enhance the role of national parliaments is, therefore, a response to this challenge, seeking to bridge the gap between EU-level decisions and national democratic accountability.
The Current Role of National Parliaments and the Principle of Subsidiarity
Under the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), national parliaments were granted a formal role in EU governance through the principle of subsidiarity, which stipulates that the EU should only act where objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved at the national, regional, or local level (Article 5(3) TEU). The ‘Early Warning System’ allows national parliaments to review draft EU legislation and issue reasoned opinions if they believe subsidiarity has been breached. If a sufficient number of parliaments object—known as a ‘yellow card’—the proposal must be reconsidered (Protocol No. 2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality).
While this mechanism has been hailed as a step towards greater democratic oversight, its effectiveness is limited. As Cooper (2012) notes, the yellow card has been triggered only a handful of times since its introduction, suggesting either a lack of engagement or insufficient impact. Furthermore, the subsidiarity check focuses solely on whether the EU should act, not on the content or proportionality of the proposed legislation. This raises the question of whether expanding the remit of national parliaments to include proportionality—a principle requiring that EU action should not exceed what is necessary to achieve its objectives (Article 5(4) TEU)—could further address the democratic deficit.
Proportionality Review: A Step Towards Greater Accountability?
Extending the role of national parliaments to assess the proportionality of EU legislation could, in theory, enhance democratic scrutiny. Proportionality is a fundamental principle of EU law, often used by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to evaluate whether measures are appropriate and necessary (Craig and de Búrca, 2020). Empowering national parliaments to conduct such reviews would allow them to scrutinise not just the competence of the EU to act, but also the scope and impact of proposed measures on national interests. For instance, a national parliament might challenge overly intrusive regulations that burden small businesses disproportionately, as could happen with environmental or labour directives.
This proposed role would arguably bring EU decision-making closer to citizens by ensuring that elected national representatives have a stronger say in shaping legislation. As Raunio (2011) suggests, national parliaments are often better positioned to reflect public opinion and national priorities than EU institutions. Therefore, their involvement in proportionality checks could serve as a counterbalance to the technocratic tendencies of the European Commission.
Challenges and Limitations of Enhanced Parliamentary Roles
However, there are significant challenges to this approach. Firstly, national parliaments often lack the resources, expertise, and time to effectively scrutinise complex EU legislation. As Auel and Neuhold (2017) highlight, many parliaments struggle to engage even with the existing subsidiarity mechanism due to limited administrative capacity and competing domestic priorities. Adding proportionality reviews could exacerbate this issue, potentially leading to superficial assessments rather than meaningful oversight.
Secondly, there is a risk of politicisation. National parliaments are inherently political bodies, and their assessments of proportionality could be swayed by partisan or populist agendas, rather than objective analysis. This could undermine the coherence of EU policy-making and lead to gridlock, particularly if parliaments from different Member States adopt conflicting positions. Furthermore, as Craig and de Búrca (2020) warn, proportionality is a subjective and context-dependent principle, often requiring legal expertise that parliaments may not possess, unlike the CJEU.
Is This the Only Solution to the Democratic Deficit?
While empowering national parliaments is a crucial step, it is arguably not the only way to address the democratic deficit. Alternative approaches, such as increasing the powers of the European Parliament or promoting citizen participation through mechanisms like the European Citizens’ Initiative, could complement parliamentary involvement. For instance, strengthening the co-decision powers of the European Parliament could enhance direct democratic representation at the EU level (Hix, 2008). Similarly, fostering greater public engagement through transparent consultation processes might tackle the perception of distance between citizens and EU institutions.
Indeed, a multi-faceted approach seems necessary. National parliaments can play a pivotal role in ensuring accountability, but their involvement must be supported by capacity-building measures and coordination mechanisms to avoid fragmentation. Without such support, the risk remains that enhanced roles may be symbolic rather than substantive.
Conclusion
In conclusion, enhancing the role of national parliaments through subsidiarity and proportionality reviews offers a promising avenue to address the EU’s democratic deficit by bringing decision-making closer to citizens and ensuring greater accountability. However, the practical challenges of resource constraints and potential politicisation highlight the limitations of this approach. Furthermore, it cannot be seen as the sole solution; broader reforms, including strengthening the European Parliament and fostering citizen engagement, are equally vital. The implications of this discussion suggest that while national parliaments should indeed play a more significant role, a balanced and comprehensive strategy is required to fully cure the democratic deficit. Ultimately, the EU must strike a delicate balance between national oversight and supranational integration to achieve genuine democratic legitimacy.
References
- Auel, K. and Neuhold, C. (2017) Multi-level parliamentary cooperation: Stronger parliaments, weaker democratic legitimacy? West European Politics, 40(3), pp. 503-524.
- Cooper, I. (2012) A ‘virtual third chamber’ for the European Union? National parliaments after the Treaty of Lisbon. West European Politics, 35(3), pp. 441-465.
- Craig, P. and de Búrca, G. (2020) EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials. 7th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hix, S. (2008) What’s Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Raunio, T. (2011) The gatekeepers of European integration? The functions of national parliaments in the EU political system. Journal of European Integration, 33(3), pp. 303-321.
