Introduction
The United Kingdom’s First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system has long been heralded as a mechanism for delivering strong and stable single-party governments with workable parliamentary majorities. This claim is rooted in the system’s design, which tends to amplify the seat share of the leading party, thereby facilitating decisive governance. However, recent political developments suggest that such outcomes are not guaranteed, with elections producing hung parliaments and coalition governments. Furthermore, when large majorities are secured, there is a risk that governments may exploit their dominance in ways that undermine accountability to Parliament. This essay critically evaluates the asserted advantage of FPTP by examining evidence from general elections and governmental operations since 2010. It explores whether the system consistently delivers stability, and assesses the implications of large majorities for democratic accountability within the UK’s constitutional framework.
The Theoretical Advantage of First Past the Post
The primary argument in favour of FPTP is its capacity to produce single-party governments with clear parliamentary majorities, thereby ensuring stability and effective governance. Under FPTP, voters in each constituency select one candidate, and the candidate with the most votes wins, even without an absolute majority. This system often results in a disproportionate allocation of seats to larger parties, enabling the leading party to form a government without the need for coalitions (Curtice, 2010). Historically, this has been seen as a strength, as it avoids the protracted negotiations and potential fragility associated with coalition governments, which are more common in proportional representation systems.
Indeed, supporters argue that FPTP fosters accountability by creating a direct link between voter choice and government formation. A clear majority allows the governing party to implement its manifesto commitments without compromise, providing voters with a transparent basis to judge performance at the next election (Johnston and Pattie, 2011). However, while this theoretical advantage holds in some instances, recent electoral outcomes challenge the assumption that FPTP reliably delivers stability.
Recent Electoral Outcomes: Stability Under Strain
Since 2010, the UK has experienced a series of general elections that cast doubt on the inevitability of strong single-party governments under FPTP. The 2010 election resulted in a hung parliament, with no party securing an overall majority. The Conservative Party, led by David Cameron, formed a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, marking the first coalition government since the Second World War (Quinn et al., 2011). This outcome contradicted the expectation of decisive results under FPTP, as negotiations and compromises were necessary to form a government, arguably weakening policy coherence and stability.
Similarly, the 2017 election, called by Prime Minister Theresa May to strengthen her mandate during Brexit negotiations, also produced a hung parliament. The Conservatives lost their majority and were forced to rely on a confidence-and-supply agreement with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) to govern (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2018). These examples illustrate that FPTP does not always guarantee a clear majority, particularly in a political landscape marked by increasing fragmentation and the rise of smaller parties. The growing support for parties such as the Scottish National Party (SNP) and, at times, the Liberal Democrats, further complicates the system’s ability to deliver single-party dominance, undermining the central claim of stability.
Large Majorities and Accountability Challenges
When FPTP does produce large majorities, as seen in the 2019 election when Boris Johnson’s Conservative Party secured an 80-seat majority, new concerns arise regarding accountability to Parliament. A substantial majority can empower a government to push through legislation with minimal opposition, potentially sidelining scrutiny and debate (Russell and Gover, 2020). This was evident in the handling of Brexit-related legislation, where the government used its majority to limit parliamentary oversight on key decisions, such as the triggering of Article 50 and the passage of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020. Critics argue that such actions weaken the constitutional principle of parliamentary sovereignty, as the executive can dominate the legislative agenda without sufficient checks (Hazell and Yong, 2019).
Moreover, large majorities may encourage governments to adopt populist or controversial policies without adequate consultation. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Johnson government faced criticism for using emergency powers under the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 to impose restrictions with limited parliamentary debate (House of Commons Library, 2021). While the urgency of the situation necessitated swift action, the reliance on statutory instruments—often subject to minimal scrutiny—raised concerns about the erosion of accountability. This suggests that FPTP’s tendency to produce large majorities, while stabilising in theory, can sometimes enable executive overreach, particularly in times of crisis.
Counterarguments and Alternative Perspectives
It is worth noting that not all observers view the outcomes of FPTP as inherently problematic. Some scholars argue that hung parliaments and coalitions can foster compromise and moderation in policymaking, preventing the kind of unchecked power associated with large majorities (Bogdanor, 2011). The 2010-2015 coalition, for instance, saw the Liberal Democrats temper certain Conservative policies, such as on tuition fees, although their influence was limited and often controversial. Additionally, proponents of FPTP contend that accountability is maintained through other mechanisms, such as select committees and judicial review, which can restrain executive power regardless of majority size.
However, these counterarguments have their limits. Select committees, while increasingly influential, lack the authority to block legislation, and judicial review remains a reactive rather than proactive check on government action. Furthermore, the political reality is that large majorities often reduce the incentive for governments to engage constructively with opposition or backbenchers, as seen in the marginalisation of dissenting Conservative MPs during Brexit debates (Russell and Gover, 2020). This reinforces the concern that FPTP can, under certain conditions, undermine effective accountability.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while the First Past the Post system is designed to produce strong and stable single-party governments, recent experience since 2010 demonstrates that this outcome is not guaranteed. Hung parliaments in 2010 and 2017 highlight the potential for political fragmentation to disrupt the expected stability of FPTP, resulting in coalitions or minority governments that require compromise. Conversely, when large majorities are achieved, as in 2019, there is a risk that governments may exploit their dominance to weaken parliamentary accountability, as evidenced by limited scrutiny over Brexit and COVID-19 measures. These developments suggest that the primary advantage of FPTP is contingent on specific electoral and political contexts, and that alternative systems, such as proportional representation, might offer a more balanced approach to representation and accountability. Ultimately, the UK’s experience underscores the need for ongoing debate about electoral reform to address the tensions between stability and democratic oversight within the constitutional framework.
References
- Bogdanor, V. (2011) The Coalition and the Constitution. Hart Publishing.
- Cowley, P. and Kavanagh, D. (2018) The British General Election of 2017. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Curtice, J. (2010) So What Went Wrong with the Electoral System? The 2010 Election Result and the Debate About Electoral Reform. Parliamentary Affairs, 63(4), pp. 623-638.
- Hazell, R. and Yong, B. (2019) Westminster and Brexit: Process and Power. The Political Quarterly, 90(1), pp. 24-31.
- House of Commons Library (2021) Coronavirus: A History of English Lockdown Laws. UK Parliament.
- Johnston, R. and Pattie, C. (2011) The British General Election of 2010: A Case Study in Electoral Geography. Geographical Journal, 177(2), pp. 97-103.
- Quinn, T., Bara, J. and Bartle, J. (2011) The UK Coalition Agreement of 2010: Who Won? Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 21(2), pp. 295-312.
- Russell, M. and Gover, D. (2020) Legislation at Westminster: Parliamentary Actors and Influence in the Making of British Law. Oxford University Press.
