Introduction
The ongoing conflict in the Middle East, particularly the escalation following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent Israeli military response in Gaza, has drawn significant involvement from key actors including the United States (US), Israel, and Iran. This essay examines the perspectives and motivations of these states through two prominent international relations theories: neorealism, which emphasises power balances and self-help in an anarchic system (Waltz, 1979), and liberal institutionalism, which highlights the role of international institutions in fostering cooperation and mitigating conflicts (Keohane, 1984). By applying these frameworks, the analysis reveals how security concerns and institutional dynamics shape state behaviour. The essay argues that neorealism better explains the zero-sum motivations, while liberal institutionalism offers insights into potential cooperative pathways, though with limitations in this volatile context. This approach is relevant to international security studies, where understanding theoretical lenses aids in evaluating real-world crises.
Neorealist Perspectives on State Motivations
Neorealism posits that states operate in an anarchic international system, prioritising survival and power maximisation amid security dilemmas (Waltz, 1979). From this viewpoint, Israel’s motivations in the current conflict stem from existential threats posed by Iran-backed groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. Israel views its military actions in Gaza as essential for deterring aggression and maintaining a balance of power, especially given Iran’s support for proxies that challenge Israeli security. For instance, Israel’s targeted strikes against Iranian assets in Syria reflect a neorealist strategy to prevent power vacuums that could empower adversaries (Herzog, 2011).
The United States, as a hegemonic power, supports Israel to preserve regional stability and counterbalance Iran’s influence. Neorealism interprets US military aid and diplomatic backing—such as vetoing UN resolutions critical of Israel—as efforts to maintain alliances that enhance American power projection in the Middle East. This aligns with the theory’s emphasis on relative gains, where the US seeks to limit Iran’s nuclear ambitions and proxy warfare, which threaten global oil routes and allied security (Mearsheimer, 2001). However, this involvement risks escalation, exemplifying the security dilemma where defensive actions by one state provoke countermeasures from others.
Iran’s perspective, through neorealism, is driven by a quest for regional dominance and deterrence against perceived US-Israeli aggression. Iran’s funding of militias in Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon serves as a low-cost means to project power and offset military asymmetries, particularly amid US sanctions and Israel’s superior conventional forces. This behaviour underscores neorealism’s self-help principle, where Iran pursues nuclear capabilities not for aggression but to ensure survival in a hostile environment (Waltz, 1979). Arguably, these motivations perpetuate a cycle of mistrust, as each state’s power-seeking actions heighten insecurities for others.
Liberal Institutionalist Perspectives on State Motivations
Liberal institutionalism, conversely, argues that international institutions can facilitate cooperation by providing forums for dialogue, reducing transaction costs, and enforcing norms (Keohane, 1984). From this lens, the US motivations involve leveraging institutions like the United Nations (UN) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to constrain Iran’s nuclear program through sanctions and diplomacy. The US push for multilateral agreements, such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015—though withdrawn under Trump in 2018—demonstrates an institutionalist approach to managing conflicts via shared rules, aiming for mutual benefits like regional stability (United Nations, 2015).
Israel, however, shows scepticism towards such institutions, often bypassing the UN due to perceived biases, as seen in its disregard for UN calls for ceasefires in Gaza. Liberal institutionalism might interpret Israel’s selective engagement—such as with the IAEA on Iran’s nuclear threats—as a pragmatic use of institutions to legitimise its security concerns, though this is limited by the theory’s assumption of reciprocal cooperation, which is lacking here (Keohane, 1984). Indeed, Israel’s reliance on bilateral ties with the US over multilateral forums highlights institutionalism’s shortcomings in asymmetric power dynamics.
Iran’s motivations, under liberal institutionalism, include using institutions like the UN to challenge US-Israeli dominance and advocate for Palestinian rights, positioning itself as a defender of international norms against perceived Western hypocrisy. Iran’s participation in JCPOA negotiations reflected a willingness to engage institutionally for sanctions relief, suggesting potential for cooperation if mutual interests align (United Nations, 2015). However, ongoing violations and proxy conflicts indicate that institutional frameworks struggle to overcome deep-seated rivalries, as the theory sometimes overlooks power imbalances.
Conclusion
In summary, neorealism effectively captures the power-driven motivations of the US, Israel, and Iran in the Middle East conflict, emphasising security dilemmas and competitive strategies that fuel escalation. Liberal institutionalism, while offering hope for cooperation through bodies like the UN and IAEA, reveals limitations in enforcing compliance amid entrenched animosities. These perspectives underscore the challenges of achieving peace, with implications for international security: policymakers must balance realist deterrence with institutional diplomacy to mitigate risks of broader war. Further research could explore constructivist views to complement these analyses, potentially revealing identity-based drivers. Overall, the conflict highlights the enduring relevance of these theories in understanding state behaviour.
References
- Herzog, M. (2011) The Next Israeli-Iranian War: Assessing the Iranian Threat to Israel. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
- Keohane, R. O. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton University Press.
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W.W. Norton & Company.
- United Nations (2015) Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) on Iran Nuclear Issue. United Nations.
- Waltz, K. N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley.
