Introduction
This essay addresses the question of whether it is disappointing if being a morally good person involves following rules that humans invented to solve problems. Drawing from Plato’s Republic, where Glaucon and Socrates express dissatisfaction with such an account of justice, and contrasting it with David Hume’s perspective in his works on moral philosophy, I argue in favour of Hume’s view. Hume sees human invention in morality as a positive achievement, not a second best. The essay takes Hume’s side, asserting that it is not disappointing but rather appealing that moral standards emerge from human creation rather than innate nature or soul structure. I will first outline the positions of Glaucon, Socrates, and Hume, then defend why Hume’s approach is preferable, using textual evidence and philosophical analysis. This structure allows a systematic defence of the thesis that human-invented moral rules enhance rather than diminish the value of goodness.
Glaucon and Socrates’ Dissatisfaction with Invented Justice
In Plato’s Republic, Glaucon presents a social contract theory of justice to challenge Socrates. He describes justice as a human invention, arising from a compact to avoid harming others and being harmed (Plato, 1997). People agree to rules because living without them leads to chaos, where the strong exploit the weak. Glaucon uses the Ring of Gyges thought experiment to illustrate this point. A shepherd finds a ring that makes him invisible, allowing him to commit injustices without consequence. Glaucon argues that anyone in this position would act unjustly, suggesting that justice is not naturally desirable but a compromise enforced by society (Plato, 1997, Book II).
Socrates and Glaucon agree that if justice is merely this invented set of rules, it becomes a “second best.” They view it as something done unwillingly, like a necessary evil to prevent worse outcomes. Socrates seeks a deeper justification, arguing that true justice resides in the harmonious structure of the soul, not external conventions. For them, genuine goodness must be intrinsic, tied to human nature or rational order, rather than a pragmatic invention. This dissatisfaction stems from a belief that invented rules lack inherent value, making moral goodness less noble.
This perspective reflects a broader Platonic idealism, where eternal forms provide the basis for virtues. If morality is human-made, it seems contingent and less authoritative, potentially undermining motivation to be good. For instance, if justice is just a tool for social stability, why pursue it beyond self-interest? Socrates counters by linking justice to personal flourishing, but the initial account from Glaucon highlights the perceived disappointment in artificial morality.
Hume’s Account of Artificial Virtues
David Hume offers a contrasting view in his Treatise of Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. He distinguishes between natural virtues, like benevolence, which arise from innate sentiments, and artificial virtues, such as justice and fidelity, which humans invent to address social problems (Hume, 2000). Hume explains justice through a hypothetical origin story. In a state of nature, scarcity and self-interest lead to conflicts over property. Humans recognise that stable possession benefits everyone, so they create rules of justice through convention (Hume, 2000, Book III).
Similarly, fidelity to promises solves coordination problems. Hume describes how people invent the practice of promising to ensure reliable cooperation, as seen in his example of two farmers agreeing to help each other harvest crops (Hume, 1978). These virtues are artificial because they depend on human artifice, not immediate natural inclinations. Yet, Hume does not find this disappointing. He celebrates it as evidence of human ingenuity. In the Enquiry, he notes that these conventions expand moral sentiments, allowing society to flourish beyond natural limits (Hume, 1975).
Hume’s empiricism grounds this positivity. Morality, for him, derives from human experience and emotions, not abstract forms. Artificial virtues gain value through their utility in promoting happiness and social harmony. Unlike Plato’s characters, Hume sees no need for morality to be “found” in nature; its invention demonstrates human capacity for improvement. This makes morality dynamic and adaptable, which Hume views as “pretty cool,” in the prompt’s terms.
Defending Hume: Why Human-Invented Morality Is Appealing
I argue that Hume is correct: it is not disappointing but attractive that moral goodness involves human-invented rules. First, this view empowers humans as active creators of their ethical world. Socrates and Glaucon worry that invented rules make goodness a compromise, done unwillingly. However, Hume shows that once established, these rules integrate with natural sentiments. People internalise justice, feeling genuine disapproval for injustice, not just fear of punishment (Hume, 2000). This evolution from convention to sentiment makes artificial virtues feel natural, enhancing their appeal.
Consider a modern example: environmental ethics. Rules against pollution are human inventions to solve resource depletion, much like Hume’s justice. Societies create laws and norms for sustainability, and over time, individuals develop genuine care for the environment. This is not second best; it shows morality adapting to new challenges, which is empowering. Data from psychological studies support this. Research by Haidt (2012) on moral foundations theory indicates that fairness and harm avoidance, akin to Hume’s justice, emerge from social interactions and can be cultivated, aligning with Hume’s idea of artificial virtues becoming habitual.
Critically, Plato’s alternative risks elitism. Socrates ties justice to the soul’s rational order, implying that only philosophers achieve true goodness (Plato, 1997). This makes morality inaccessible for many, whereas Hume’s account democratises it. Anyone can participate in and benefit from invented rules, fostering inclusive societies. Hume’s optimism contrasts with Platonic dissatisfaction, arguably making his view more practical for real-world ethics.
Furthermore, if morality were solely innate, it might stagnate. Human invention allows progress, as seen in historical shifts like the abolition of slavery. Initially, slavery fit some natural hierarchies, but invented moral rules, driven by empathy and utility, deemed it unjust. Hume’s framework explains this as extending artificial virtues (Korsgaard, 1996). This adaptability is attractive, not disappointing.
Addressing potential objections, one might argue that invented rules lack objective grounding, leading to relativism. Socrates feared this, seeking eternal truths. Yet Hume counters that utility provides a stable basis, rooted in shared human needs. Empirical evidence from cross-cultural studies shows convergence on rules like property rights, supporting Hume’s universality through convention (Henrich, 2020). Thus, invention does not imply arbitrariness but thoughtful response to problems.
In terms of philosophical contribution, this defence highlights Hume’s relevance today. While Plato influences idealist ethics, Hume’s approach better suits secular, pluralistic societies where morality evolves through dialogue.
Comparing the Views: Limitations of Platonic Dissatisfaction
Glaucon and Socrates’ dissatisfaction assumes that true value must be discovered, not made. This echoes metaphysical realism, where morals exist independently. However, Hume’s sentimentalism challenges this, positing that value arises from human affections. If morality is invented, it is no less real; it is tailored to human flourishing.
A key limitation in Plato is the unwillingness aspect. Glaucon claims people follow justice reluctantly, but Hume demonstrates that education and habit make it willing. In the Treatise, Hume explains how sympathy extends to artificial virtues, creating moral motivation (Hume, 1978). Experimental philosophy supports this: studies show that repeated cooperative interactions build trust, mirroring Hume’s conventions (Rand, 2016).
Plato’s view also overlooks cultural variation. If justice is soul-inherent, why do societies differ? Hume accounts for this: inventions vary by context, yet core problems like scarcity yield similar rules. This explanatory power makes Hume’s account superior.
Conclusion
This essay has defended Hume’s positive stance on human-invented aspects of morality against the dissatisfaction expressed by Glaucon and Socrates in Plato’s Republic. By outlining their positions, analysing Hume’s artificial virtues, and arguing for their appeal through empowerment, adaptability, and empirical support, I have shown that such invention is not a second best but an attractive feature of moral goodness. This does not fully resolve all debates in moral philosophy, such as the role of reason versus sentiment, but it establishes that human creation enhances rather than diminishes morality’s value. Ultimately, embracing Hume’s view encourages a proactive approach to ethics in contemporary society.
References
- Haidt, J. (2012) The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. Pantheon Books.
- Henrich, J. (2020) The WEIRDest People in the World: How the West Became Psychologically Peculiar and Particularly Prosperous. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Hume, D. (1975) Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Oxford University Press.
- Hume, D. (1978) A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
- Hume, D. (2000) A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by D. F. Norton and M. J. Norton. Oxford University Press.
- Korsgaard, C. M. (1996) The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
- Plato. (1997) Republic. Translated by G. M. A. Grube, revised by C. D. C. Reeve. Hackett Publishing.
- Rand, D. G. (2016) Cooperation, Fast and Slow: Meta-Analytic Evidence for a Theory of Social Heuristics and Self-Interested Deliberation. Psychological Science, 27(9), pp. 1192-1206.
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