Introduction
The question of whether the existence of evil disproves the notion of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and benevolent God has been a central issue in philosophical and theological debates for centuries. This essay explores the problem of evil as a challenge to the traditional theistic conception of God, particularly within the context of Western philosophy. Often attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus and later developed by thinkers such as David Hume, the argument posits that the prevalence of suffering and moral wrongdoing in the world is incompatible with the existence of a deity possessing omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. This discussion will first outline the classical formulation of the problem of evil, then examine key theistic responses, and finally evaluate the extent to which these responses mitigate the argument that evil disproves God’s existence. While the essay aims to provide a balanced analysis, it will argue that, despite counterarguments, the problem of evil presents a significant challenge to traditional theism, though not an entirely conclusive disproof.
The Problem of Evil: A Philosophical Challenge
The problem of evil is most famously articulated in what is known as the ‘logical problem of evil,’ which questions the compatibility of evil with the characteristics traditionally ascribed to God. As Hume (1779) succinctly put it, “Is [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?” (Hume, 1779, p. 66). This trilemma captures the core of the argument: if God is all-powerful, He could eliminate evil; if He is all-knowing, He is aware of it; and if He is all-good, He should desire to prevent it. Yet, evil—both natural (e.g., earthquakes, diseases) and moral (e.g., acts of cruelty)—persists in the world. Therefore, the argument suggests, such a God cannot exist.
A more contemporary restatement of this problem comes from J.L. Mackie, who argued that the existence of evil constitutes a logical contradiction with the theistic view of God. Mackie (1955) contends that the propositions “God is omnipotent,” “God is wholly good,” and “evil exists” cannot all be true simultaneously (Mackie, 1955, p. 200). This logical inconsistency challenges believers to either abandon one of these claims or provide a justification for the coexistence of evil with a benevolent deity. Arguably, this places the burden of proof on theists to reconcile their belief with observable reality, a task that has led to various defensive strategies, or theodicies.
Theistic Responses: Free Will and Greater Good
One of the most prominent responses to the problem of evil is the Free Will Defence, most notably advanced by Alvin Plantinga. Plantinga (1974) argues that the existence of moral evil—evil resulting from human actions—is compatible with God’s nature because it arises from the gift of free will. According to this view, God could not create beings who are genuinely free while simultaneously ensuring they never choose to act wrongly. Freedom, by its very nature, entails the possibility of misuse; thus, moral evil is a necessary risk of granting humans autonomy (Plantinga, 1974, p. 30). This defence suggests that the value of free will outweighs the negative consequences of evil acts, preserving God’s goodness and power.
Additionally, the concept of a ‘greater good’ is often invoked in theodicies to explain both moral and natural evils. Theologians such as John Hick propose a ‘soul-making’ theodicy, wherein the world is designed as a place of challenge and suffering to enable moral and spiritual growth. Hick (1966) argues that a world without pain or hardship would not allow for the development of virtues such as compassion, courage, or perseverance (Hick, 1966, p. 255). Therefore, evil serves a purpose in God’s plan, aligning with His benevolence despite initial appearances to the contrary. These arguments attempt to shift the perspective on evil from an insurmountable problem to a necessary component of a divinely ordered world.
Critiques of Theistic Responses
While the Free Will Defence and greater good theodicies offer compelling explanations, they are not without significant criticism. Regarding free will, critics argue that it fails to account for natural evils—suffering caused by events beyond human control, such as tsunamis or terminal illnesses. If free will justifies moral evil, it cannot easily explain why an omnipotent God permits the immense suffering caused by natural disasters, which appear gratuitous and devoid of purpose (Rowe, 1979, p. 335). Furthermore, even if free will is deemed valuable, one might question why God could not have created beings with a predisposition to freely choose good over evil, thereby reducing suffering without compromising autonomy.
The soul-making theodicy also faces challenges, particularly concerning the distribution and intensity of suffering. Critics such as William Rowe highlight instances of ‘pointless’ evil—suffering that seems to serve no discernible greater good. For example, the intense agony of a child dying from a painful disease might not plausibly contribute to soul-making in a way that justifies such torment (Rowe, 1979, p. 337). Indeed, the sheer scale of suffering in the world raises doubts about whether the proposed greater good is proportionate to the evils endured. These critiques suggest that while theistic responses provide partial explanations, they do not fully resolve the tension between evil and the traditional concept of God.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the problem of evil presents a formidable challenge to the belief in an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good God. As articulated by Hume and Mackie, the logical incompatibility between the existence of evil and the classical theistic conception of God raises profound questions that remain difficult to answer conclusively. The Free Will Defence and soul-making theodicy offer insightful ways to reconcile this apparent contradiction, suggesting that evil may serve a purpose within a broader divine plan. However, these responses are limited in addressing the full scope of evil—particularly natural and seemingly gratuitous suffering—leaving significant gaps in the theistic framework. While evil does not definitively prove there is no God, it casts substantial doubt on the coherence of traditional theistic claims, prompting further philosophical inquiry into the nature of divinity and morality. Ultimately, this debate underscores the complexity of reconciling empirical reality with metaphysical beliefs, a tension that continues to shape philosophical discourse.
References
- Hick, J. (1966) Evil and the God of Love. London: Macmillan.
- Hume, D. (1779) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Edinburgh: William Blackwood.
- Mackie, J.L. (1955) Evil and Omnipotence. Mind, 64(254), pp. 200-212.
- Plantinga, A. (1974) God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
- Rowe, W.L. (1979) The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism. American Philosophical Quarterly, 16(4), pp. 335-341.
