Introduction
Cultural relativism is a prominent theory in moral philosophy that posits ethical standards are not universal but instead derived from the cultural norms of a society. This essay critically examines whether cultural relativism renders the concept of ‘moral progress’ logically impossible, and if so, how this limitation undermines its viability as a practical guide for ethics. Drawing from key philosophical critiques, particularly those outlined by James Rachels, the discussion will define cultural relativism, explore the paradox of moral progress, analyse the reformer’s dilemma, and address the absence of an objective yardstick for ethical evaluation. By focusing on these weak spots, the essay argues that while cultural relativism promotes tolerance, its denial of objective moral standards ultimately weakens its functionality in guiding ethical decision-making. This analysis is approached from the viewpoint of a philosophy student grappling with the implications of relativism in a diverse, globalised world, supported by academic sources to ensure a sound understanding of the topic.
Defining Cultural Relativism
Cultural relativism, as a meta-ethical theory, asserts that moral truths are relative to the cultural context in which they arise. According to this view, what is considered right or wrong is determined solely by the prevailing norms and values of a given society, with no overarching, objective standard to judge between cultures (Rachels, 2019). James Rachels, in his seminal work on moral philosophy, defines it concisely: “Cultural Relativism says, in effect, that there is no such thing as universal truth in ethics; there are only the various cultural codes, and nothing more” (Rachels, 2019, p. 16). This perspective emerged prominently in the early 20th century through anthropological work, such as that of Ruth Benedict, who argued that cultures shape morality much like they shape customs, making cross-cultural judgments inherently biased (Benedict, 1934).
The appeal of cultural relativism lies in its promotion of tolerance and cultural sensitivity. In an increasingly interconnected world, it discourages ethnocentrism—the tendency to view one’s own culture as superior—and encourages respect for diverse practices. For instance, rituals that might seem unusual or even abhorrent in one culture, such as certain funerary practices in Tibetan Buddhism, are deemed morally acceptable within their cultural framework (Herskovits, 1972). However, this tolerance comes at a cost. As a student studying philosophy, I find this appealing on the surface, as it aligns with modern ideals of multiculturalism. Yet, upon closer examination, it raises significant issues, particularly regarding the possibility of moral improvement over time. If morality is entirely culture-bound, then evaluating changes in ethical standards becomes problematic, leading to the central critique of this essay: the moral progress paradox.
This definition sets the stage for critiquing cultural relativism not as an outright dismissal but as an identification of its limitations. Indeed, while it fosters understanding, it arguably fails to account for universal human experiences that transcend cultural boundaries, such as the intuitive rejection of extreme injustices.
The Moral Progress Paradox
One of the most compelling attacks on cultural relativism is its apparent incompatibility with the notion of moral progress. Moral progress implies advancement towards a better ethical state, measured against some objective criterion of improvement. However, under cultural relativism, there is no such objective standard; morality is merely what a society deems acceptable at a given time (Rachels, 2019). Consequently, societal changes in moral views cannot be seen as genuine progress but only as shifts in cultural preferences, akin to evolving fashions or tastes.
A stark example illustrates this paradox: the abolition of slavery in Western societies. In the 18th and 19th centuries, slavery was widely accepted and legally sanctioned in many cultures, including Britain and the United States. According to cultural relativism, slavery was morally right within those societies because it aligned with their prevailing norms (Donnelly, 1984). Yet, today, we view its abolition as a profound moral advancement, reflecting a deeper commitment to human dignity and equality. If relativism holds, we cannot logically claim this was an improvement; it was simply a change in societal opinion. Rachels highlights this issue, noting that relativism “implies that it is impossible for a society to have a ‘wrong’ moral code,” which contradicts our intuitive sense that some historical practices were unjust (Rachels, 2019, p. 19).
This paradox stings because it clashes with basic human intuitions about justice and ethics. As a philosophy student, I encounter this in discussions of historical events, where we often praise advancements like the civil rights movement as true progress. Relativism undermines this by reducing such changes to mere cultural evolution, without any yardstick to deem one era’s morals superior to another’s. Furthermore, empirical evidence from global human rights reports suggests that societies do perceive moral progress; for instance, the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) implies a shared ethical framework that transcends cultures, challenging relativism’s core tenet (United Nations, 1948). Thus, the theory’s denial of objective progress reveals a logical flaw, making it difficult to apply as a functional ethical guide in contexts where improvement is sought, such as policy reform.
The Reformer’s Dilemma
Building on the progress paradox, cultural relativism creates a profound dilemma for social reformers, who are often hailed as ethical heroes but would be deemed immoral under this framework. If moral rightness is equated with the majority’s beliefs or the established cultural code, then any individual or minority challenging the status quo is inherently wrong (Rachels, 2019). This logic turns reformers into villains, as their actions defy the prevailing norms of their society.
Consider Martin Luther King Jr., whose civil rights activism in the 1950s and 1960s opposed the segregated norms of American society. Under cultural relativism, King’s defiance of laws like Jim Crow would be immoral because it contradicted the dominant cultural code of the time (Donnelly, 1984). Rachels articulates this critique sharply: “Cultural Relativism would not only forbid criticizing other societies; it would also stop us from criticizing our own” (Rachels, 2019, p. 21). The result is a theory that stifles ethical innovation and social change, rendering reformers not as progressives but as ethical outliers or even criminals.
This dilemma is logically and practically broken, as it contradicts the historical role of reformers in driving what we perceive as moral advancements. In philosophical terms, it highlights relativism’s internal inconsistency: if a society evolves through reform, the initial dissent must retroactively become ‘right,’ but this requires an objective standard that relativism denies (Herskovits, 1972). As someone studying this topic, I see this as a weak spot because it fails to accommodate the dynamic nature of ethics. Typically, ethical theories should guide action, yet relativism paralyzes potential change-makers by labeling their efforts as wrong. Therefore, this undermines relativism’s functionality, as it cannot support the ethical guidance needed for societal improvement without contradicting itself.
The “No Yardstick” Problem
The absence of an objective yardstick further exacerbates cultural relativism’s issues, making genuine moral comparison or progress impossible. Without a fixed, universal standard, evaluating ethical systems is like measuring objects with a ruler that changes length arbitrarily (Rachels, 2019). Societies might drift in their moral views, but without an external reference point, there is no way to determine if they are moving forward or regressing.
This problem is evident in cross-cultural debates, such as those over practices like female genital mutilation, which some cultures defend as traditional while others condemn as human rights violations (Donnelly, 1984). Relativism offers no mechanism to resolve such conflicts, leading to ethical paralysis. Analytically, this lack of a yardstick means relativism cannot function as a guide for ethics in pluralistic societies, where competing norms require adjudication.
In conclusion to this section, while relativism encourages tolerance, it is possible to respect cultural differences without abandoning objective standards. For example, universalist approaches, like those in human rights philosophy, allow for critique of practices such as genocide or slavery as objectively wrong, regardless of cultural context (United Nations, 1948). This critique reveals relativism’s practical shortcomings.
Conclusion
In summary, cultural relativism indeed makes moral progress a logical impossibility by denying objective standards, reducing ethical changes to mere cultural shifts. This is evident in the progress paradox, where advancements like slavery’s abolition cannot be deemed improvements; the reformer’s dilemma, which vilifies ethical pioneers; and the no-yardstick problem, which leaves ethics adrift without measurement. These weaknesses undermine relativism as a functional guide for ethics, as it fails to support reform, resolve conflicts, or align with intuitive notions of justice. As a philosophy student, I argue that while relativism fosters tolerance, its rejection of universality limits its applicability in a world demanding ethical progress. Future discussions might explore hybrid models that balance cultural sensitivity with objective principles, but relativism alone proves inadequate.
References
- Benedict, R. (1934) Patterns of Culture. Houghton Mifflin.
- Donnelly, J. (1984) ‘Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights’, Human Rights Quarterly, 6(4), pp. 400-419.
- Herskovits, M. J. (1972) Cultural Relativism: Perspectives in Cultural Pluralism. Random House.
- Rachels, J. (2019) The Elements of Moral Philosophy. 9th edn. McGraw-Hill Education.
- United Nations (1948) Universal Declaration of Human Rights. United Nations.
