Introduction
This essay explores the question of whether understanding the origins of one’s knowledge makes individuals more inclined to question or alter their perspectives. Situated within the framework of Theory of Knowledge, the discussion will consider how the context of knowledge claims influences critical thinking and openness to change. Specifically, it will examine this issue through the lenses of human sciences, particularly psychology, and the role of ethics in shaping attitudes towards knowledge. While recognizing the source of knowledge can foster intellectual humility and encourage scepticism, this essay will argue that human emotions, moral frameworks, and identity often act as barriers to questioning or revising beliefs, as evidenced by phenomena such as cognitive dissonance. The analysis will draw on philosophical foundations, psychological research, and real-world examples to evaluate the extent to which knowledge origins impact belief revision, ultimately suggesting that while awareness of knowledge sources can prompt questioning, deeply ingrained biases and emotional factors frequently hinder substantial change.
Perception and Intellectual Humility in Psychology
The exploration begins with the human science of psychology, where knowledge is often understood as rooted in perception and judgement. As Theaetetus, in Plato’s dialogue of the same name, argued, knowledge emerges from perception coupled with true belief (Plato, trans. 1997). In psychological terms, perception is the active process of selecting, organizing, and interpreting sensory information to construct a coherent understanding of reality (Goldstein, 2014). This process is inherently subjective, shaped by an individual’s motivations, expectations, and cognitive frameworks. However, knowing that our knowledge stems from such a subjective process can cultivate intellectual humility—the recognition that one’s understanding may be incomplete or flawed (Leary et al., 2017). This awareness theoretically encourages questioning and openness to alternative viewpoints.
Yet, psychological mechanisms like confirmation bias often counteract this potential. Confirmation bias refers to the tendency to seek, interpret, and recall information in a way that affirms pre-existing beliefs (Nickerson, 1998). For instance, a 2016 study by Kahan et al. demonstrated that even when presented with evidence contradicting their views on climate change, individuals with strong prior beliefs interpreted the data selectively to reinforce their original stance. This suggests that while knowing the perceptual basis of knowledge might prompt initial questioning, entrenched biases can prevent meaningful shifts in perspective. Furthermore, real-world examples, such as the polarized debates on social media platforms, illustrate how individuals often filter information through pre-existing beliefs, even when aware of the constructed nature of their knowledge. Thus, while psychology highlights the importance of perception, it also reveals significant barriers to changing views despite awareness of knowledge origins.
Cognitive Dissonance and Emotional Barriers
Beyond perception, the theory of cognitive dissonance provides a deeper understanding of why knowledge origins might fail to provoke questioning or change. Cognitive dissonance, a concept developed by Leon Festinger in the 1950s, describes the mental discomfort experienced when holding two conflicting beliefs or when new information challenges established views (Festinger, 1957). When individuals become aware of the source of their knowledge—particularly if it reveals bias or unreliability—they may experience dissonance. However, rather than questioning their beliefs, people often resolve this discomfort by rejecting the new information or rationalizing their original stance.
A classic real-life experiment supporting this theory is Festinger’s study of a doomsday cult in the 1950s. When the prophesied apocalypse failed to occur, many members, instead of abandoning their beliefs, reinterpreted the event to align with their expectations, claiming their faith had prevented the disaster (Festinger et al., 1956). This illustrates how emotional attachment to beliefs can override the potential for questioning, even when the origin of knowledge is demonstrably flawed. In contemporary contexts, similar patterns emerge in political discourse, where individuals cling to partisan views despite evidence of misinformation. Therefore, while understanding the origins of knowledge might theoretically promote scepticism, cognitive dissonance often acts as a psychological barrier, prioritizing emotional comfort over critical reflection.
Ethical Considerations and Identity
Turning to ethics, the origin of knowledge can also intersect with moral values and personal identity, further complicating the likelihood of questioning or changing views. Ethical frameworks often underpin deeply held beliefs, and knowledge tied to moral convictions is typically resistant to revision. For example, if an individual’s understanding of a controversial issue, such as capital punishment, stems from cultural or religious teachings, recognizing that this knowledge is context-dependent may not prompt questioning. Instead, the knowledge is often seen as integral to their identity, making any challenge appear as a personal attack rather than an intellectual exercise (Haidt, 2012).
A relevant study by Graham et al. (2009) on moral foundations theory highlights how ethical beliefs are shaped by innate and cultural factors, which vary across individuals. Their research found that people are more likely to defend knowledge tied to their moral foundations—such as fairness or loyalty—than to question it, even when presented with conflicting evidence. This resistance is particularly evident in debates over issues like abortion or immigration, where ethical stances often override the influence of knowing the source of one’s knowledge. Hence, while awareness of knowledge origins might encourage reflection in less personal domains, ethical and identity-related knowledge frequently remains unshaken, illustrating the limits of critical engagement.
Counterarguments and the Role of Education
Nevertheless, it is worth considering counterarguments suggesting that knowing the source of one’s knowledge can indeed foster questioning and change under certain conditions. Education plays a critical role here, as structured environments that teach critical thinking skills can help individuals overcome biases. For instance, programmes that emphasize source evaluation and reflective practices have been shown to increase intellectual humility and openness to alternative perspectives (Porter, 2013). A study by Kuhn (1991) on argumentation skills found that students trained to assess the origins and reliability of information were more likely to revise their views when faced with contradictory evidence.
However, such outcomes are not universal and often depend on the individual’s willingness to engage critically. In practice, educational interventions may have limited impact on deeply ingrained beliefs tied to emotion or identity, as discussed earlier. Thus, while education demonstrates that awareness of knowledge origins can promote questioning, its effectiveness is constrained by psychological and ethical factors, suggesting a nuanced rather than absolute influence.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this essay has examined whether knowing the origin of one’s knowledge makes individuals more likely to question or change their views, drawing on insights from psychology and ethics within the framework of Theory of Knowledge. While awareness of knowledge sources can theoretically encourage intellectual humility and scepticism, as supported by psychological understandings of perception, barriers such as confirmation bias, cognitive dissonance, and ethical identity often prevent meaningful questioning or revision of beliefs. Real-world studies, such as those on political polarization and moral foundations, underscore the persistence of these barriers, even in the face of contradictory evidence. Although educational interventions offer some potential for fostering critical reflection, their impact remains limited by emotional and cultural factors. Ultimately, this suggests that while knowing the source of knowledge can prompt initial questioning, it is rarely sufficient to drive substantial change, raising broader implications for how we address entrenched beliefs in society. Future exploration might consider how targeted psychological strategies could mitigate these barriers, enhancing openness to new perspectives in an increasingly polarized world.
References
- Festinger, L. (1957) A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford University Press.
- Festinger, L., Riecken, H. W., & Schachter, S. (1956) When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological Study of a Modern Group that Predicted the Destruction of the World. University of Minnesota Press.
- Goldstein, E. B. (2014) Sensation and Perception. Cengage Learning.
- Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009) Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(5), 1029-1046.
- Haidt, J. (2012) The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. Pantheon.
- Kahan, D. M., Peters, E., Wittlin, M., Slovic, P., Ouellette, L. L., Braman, D., & Mandel, G. (2016) The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on perceived climate change risks. Nature Climate Change, 2(10), 732-735.
- Kuhn, D. (1991) The Skills of Argument. Cambridge University Press.
- Leary, M. R., Diebels, K. J., Davisson, E. K., Jongman-Sereno, K. P., Isherwood, J. C., Raimi, K. T., Deffler, S. A., & Hoyle, R. H. (2017) Cognitive and interpersonal features of intellectual humility. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 43(6), 793-813.
- Nickerson, R. S. (1998) Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review of General Psychology, 2(2), 175-220.
- Plato (trans. 1997) Theaetetus. Translated by M. J. Levett. Hackett Publishing.
- Porter, T. (2013) Intellectual humility and openness to the opposing view. Self and Identity, 12(2), 139-162.
