Introduction
The concept of weakness of will has long puzzled philosophers, presenting a paradox about how individuals can act against their better judgement. This phenomenon, often associated with a lack of self-control, raises questions about rationality and intentionality. Historically, the term ‘akrasia,’ derived from ancient Greek philosophy, has been used interchangeably with weakness of will to describe this failure to act in accordance with one’s reasoned intentions. However, some contemporary philosophers argue that distinguishing between akrasia and weakness of will may offer a resolution to the paradox, suggesting that the two concepts capture different aspects of human failure. This essay explores whether making this distinction, as proposed by scholars such as Richard Holton and Alfred Mele, effectively addresses the paradox of weakness of will. It begins by outlining the paradox and its traditional framing through akrasia, before engaging with Holton’s and Mele’s arguments. Finally, it evaluates the implications of their distinctions and whether they provide a satisfactory solution. The analysis draws on academic sources to ensure a sound understanding of the philosophical debate, while critically assessing the merits and limitations of the proposed differentiation.
Understanding the Paradox of Weakness of Will and Akrasia
The paradox of weakness of will emerges from the apparent contradiction between an agent’s rational judgement and their actions. As initially framed by Socrates in Plato’s dialogues, it seems irrational for a person to knowingly act against what they believe to be the best course of action (Plato, 1997). For instance, an individual might judge that refraining from eating dessert is best for their health, yet proceed to indulge despite this belief. This behaviour, traditionally termed akrasia, suggests a failure of rational control, raising the question of how such a conflict within the self is possible. Aristotle, in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, furthered this discussion by describing akrasia as a state where appetite or emotion overcomes reason, though he maintained that true knowledge cannot be overridden (Aristotle, 2009). The paradox lies in reconciling how a rational agent can act contrary to their explicit intentions or knowledge—a tension that challenges classical notions of rationality.
Historically, akrasia and weakness of will have been treated as synonymous, both referring to this failure of self-control. The terms describe scenarios where an individual succumbs to temptation, seemingly knowingly, and acts in ways that contradict their reasoned decisions. However, this conflation may oversimplify the psychological and philosophical mechanisms at play, prompting modern theorists to question whether a singular concept adequately captures the breadth of such failures. The paradox persists because it remains unclear whether the agent truly ‘knows’ the better action at the moment of decision or if other factors—such as misjudgement or shifting intentions—interfere.
Holton’s Distinction: Weakness of Will as Failure of Intention
Richard Holton offers a nuanced perspective by arguing that weakness of will should be understood as a failure to adhere to one’s intentions, rather than a direct conflict with rational judgement as in traditional accounts of akrasia (Holton, 1999). In his article *Intention and Weakness of Will*, Holton suggests that intentions are distinct from beliefs or desires; they are commitments to act in a certain way at a future time. Weakness of will, therefore, occurs when an agent revises or abandons their prior intention without sufficient justification, often under the influence of short-term desires. For example, a student might intend to study for an exam but, when the time comes, chooses to watch television instead, not because they believe this is the better option, but because they fail to uphold their original commitment.
Holton’s view shifts the focus from a purely rationalist framework—where the agent knowingly acts against better judgement—to a model of intention maintenance. This distinction potentially mitigates the paradox by suggesting that weakness of will is not necessarily irrational in the Socratic sense. Instead, it reflects a failure of resolve or self-discipline rather than a direct contradiction of knowledge. However, critics might argue that Holton’s account does not fully resolve the paradox, as it remains unclear why an agent would revise an intention if they still believe the original plan aligns with their long-term goals. Thus, while Holton’s differentiation provides clarity on the role of intention, it may not entirely eliminate the tension inherent in acting against one’s better interests.
Mele’s Perspective: Akrasia and Weakness of Will as Overlapping but Distinct
Alfred Mele, in his work *Weakness of Will and Akrasia*, similarly advocates for a distinction between the two concepts, though his approach differs from Holton’s (Mele, 2010). Mele posits that akrasia specifically denotes actions that are contrary to an agent’s conscious judgement at the time of acting—essentially, a more traditional view aligned with Aristotle’s account. Weakness of will, by contrast, can include a broader range of failures, such as succumbing to temptation even when the agent’s judgement may have shifted or become less clear under emotional or situational pressures. Mele argues that not all cases of weakness of will involve akratic action; for instance, an individual might procrastinate due to anxiety without explicitly judging at that moment that working is the better option.
By distinguishing the two, Mele aims to address the paradox by suggesting that not all failures of self-control are irrational in the strict sense. Some instances of weakness of will may involve temporary lapses in judgement or motivation rather than a deliberate contradiction of belief. This framework arguably softens the paradox by broadening the scope of explanations for weak-willed behaviour. Nevertheless, Mele’s distinction raises questions about whether it truly solves the core issue or merely redefines the problem. If weakness of will can occur without a clear conflict of judgement, does this diminish the paradoxical nature of the phenomenon, or does it simply sidestep the original challenge of explaining irrational action?
Critical Evaluation: Does the Distinction Resolve the Paradox?
Both Holton and Mele provide compelling arguments for distinguishing between akrasia and weakness of will, offering frameworks that challenge the traditional conflation of the terms. Holton’s focus on intention suggests that weakness of will is less about irrationality and more about a failure of commitment, while Mele’s broader interpretation allows for psychological complexity beyond conscious judgement. Together, these perspectives contribute to a more nuanced understanding of human behaviour, acknowledging that failures of will may stem from diverse sources—whether lapses in resolve, emotional influences, or momentary shifts in judgement.
However, it is debatable whether these distinctions fully resolve the paradox. The central tension—why an agent acts against their perceived best interests—remains partially unanswered. Holton’s model, while innovative, struggles to explain why intentions are abandoned in the first place if the agent retains a belief in the original goal. Similarly, Mele’s account risks diluting the paradox by expanding weakness of will to include non-akratic failures, potentially bypassing the original philosophical challenge. Arguably, both theorists succeed in reframing the paradox rather than dissolving it entirely, leaving room for further exploration of the psychological mechanisms underpinning such behaviour. Indeed, integrating insights from cognitive science or psychology might offer additional tools to address these gaps, though such an approach lies beyond the scope of this essay.
Conclusion
In conclusion, distinguishing between akrasia and weakness of will, as proposed by Holton and Mele, offers a valuable step toward understanding the paradox of acting against one’s better judgement. Holton’s emphasis on intention highlights the role of commitment in self-control, while Mele’s broader conceptualisation of weakness of will accommodates a range of failures beyond strict irrationality. Although these distinctions provide clarity and partially alleviate the tension inherent in the paradox, they do not entirely eliminate it. The question of why agents fail to act in accordance with their goals—whether through flawed intentions or obscured judgement—remains a complex issue warranting further investigation. The implications of this debate extend beyond philosophy, touching on practical concerns such as personal responsibility and moral accountability. Therefore, while the differentiation between akrasia and weakness of will enriches the discourse, it serves as a foundation for ongoing inquiry rather than a definitive resolution to the enduring paradox.
References
- Aristotle. (2009) *Nicomachean Ethics*. Translated by W.D. Ross. Oxford University Press.
- Holton, R. (1999) Intention and Weakness of Will. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 96(5), 241-262.
- Mele, A.R. (2010) *Weakness of Will and Akrasia*. *Philosophical Studies*, 150(3), 391-404.
- Plato. (1997) *Complete Works*. Edited by J.M. Cooper. Hackett Publishing.
