Introduction
This essay critically examines the contemporary natural law theory as articulated by John Finnis, a prominent legal philosopher whose work has revitalized natural law discourse in modern jurisprudence. Finnis’s approach, notably presented in his seminal text *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (1980), reinterprets classical natural law through a framework of basic human goods and practical reasonableness. The essay will first outline the foundational concepts of basic human goods and practical reasonableness, exploring their role in Finnis’s theory. It will then assess how Finnis departs from classical natural law theorists, such as Thomas Aquinas, while still preserving core elements of the natural law tradition. Through this analysis, the essay aims to evaluate the strengths and limitations of Finnis’s contributions to legal philosophy, offering a balanced perspective on his relevance in addressing contemporary moral and legal questions.
Basic Human Goods in Finnis’s Theory
Central to Finnis’s natural law theory is the concept of basic human goods, which he identifies as intrinsic values that are universally desirable for human flourishing. Unlike classical natural law, which often grounded morality in a metaphysical or theological order, Finnis proposes seven basic goods: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability (friendship), practical reasonableness, and religion (understood as concern for ultimate meaning) (Finnis, 1980). These goods are deemed self-evident and incommensurable, meaning they cannot be ranked hierarchically or reduced to one another. For instance, the pursuit of knowledge is not inherently superior to the value of friendship; each serves a distinct aspect of human well-being.
Finnis argues that these goods are not derived from empirical observation or subjective desires but are instead graspable through human reason as fundamental to a fulfilled life. This rational identification of goods underpins his assertion that they form the basis for moral and legal norms. However, a limitation arises in the lack of specificity regarding how these goods should be prioritized in conflicting situations. For example, in a legal context, should the preservation of life override societal demands for justice (a form of sociability)? Finnis’s framework offers little guidance on resolving such practical dilemmas, which could be seen as a weakness when applied to complex legal disputes (George, 1999).
Practical Reasonableness as a Guiding Principle
Closely linked to the concept of basic human goods is Finnis’s principle of practical reasonableness, which serves as a methodological tool for moral and legal decision-making. Practical reasonableness involves the exercise of reason to pursue basic goods in a coherent and consistent manner, avoiding arbitrary or contradictory actions. Finnis outlines several requirements for practical reasonableness, including a commitment to a coherent life plan, respect for all basic goods without irrational preference, and a consideration of the common good (Finnis, 1980). This principle is particularly significant in legal contexts, where lawmakers and judges must balance individual rights with societal needs.
For instance, in the formulation of laws regarding healthcare, practical reasonableness might demand that the state prioritize life (as a basic good) while also ensuring equitable access to resources (reflecting sociability). Finnis’s emphasis on reasonableness as a universal standard offers a structured approach to ethical deliberation, distinguishing his theory from more relativistic or utilitarian perspectives. Nevertheless, critics argue that the principle remains somewhat vague, as it relies heavily on subjective interpretations of what constitutes a ‘reasonable’ pursuit of goods (MacCormick, 1981). This ambiguity might limit its applicability in diverse cultural or legal settings, where notions of reasonableness can vary widely.
Departure from Classical Natural Law Theorists
While Finnis retains the core natural law tradition—namely, the belief that law and morality are intrinsically connected—his approach marks a significant departure from classical theorists like Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas grounded natural law in a theological framework, deriving moral principles from divine will and eternal law, as articulated in his *Summa Theologiae* (Aquinas, 1947). In contrast, Finnis adopts a more secular perspective, focusing on human reason as the basis for identifying basic goods and moral norms. This shift is evident in his rejection of a direct reliance on metaphysical or divine foundations, making his theory more accessible to a pluralistic, modern audience (Finnis, 1980).
Furthermore, Finnis diverges in his methodology. Classical natural law often emphasized the hierarchical ordering of goods based on human nature’s teleological ends, with reason subservient to divine purpose. Finnis, however, treats goods as incommensurable and prioritizes practical reasonableness as an autonomous process of rational deliberation. This departure arguably modernizes natural law, aligning it with contemporary ethical discourse. Yet, some critics, such as Russell Hittinger, contend that Finnis’s secularization risks diluting the normative force of natural law, as it lacks the authoritative grounding provided by theological underpinnings (Hittinger, 1987). This critique highlights a tension between innovation and fidelity to tradition in Finnis’s work.
Retention of the Core Natural Law Tradition
Despite these departures, Finnis remains firmly within the natural law tradition by maintaining that positive law (human-made law) must be evaluated against objective moral standards. Like Aquinas, he asserts that an unjust law—one that fundamentally contradicts the pursuit of basic goods—lacks the full authority of law (Finnis, 1980). This principle is particularly relevant in debates over issues like human rights, where Finnis’s theory can be invoked to challenge oppressive legislation. For example, laws that systematically deny individuals access to life or knowledge could be deemed invalid under Finnis’s framework, echoing Aquinas’s view that unjust laws are a perversion of true law.
Moreover, Finnis preserves the natural law focus on human flourishing as the ultimate aim of legal and moral systems. His identification of basic goods, though distinct in content and justification, aligns with the classical emphasis on law as a means to promote the common good. Therefore, while Finnis adapts natural law to a modern context, his theory retains the tradition’s foundational commitment to the inseparability of law and morality—a hallmark that continues to distinguish natural law from positivist or purely procedural theories of law (Hart, 1958).
Critical Evaluation and Implications
Finnis’s contemporary natural law theory offers a robust framework for understanding the moral dimensions of law, particularly through its focus on universal human goods and rational deliberation. Its secular orientation broadens its appeal, making it a valuable tool for legal scholars and policymakers in pluralistic societies. However, the theory’s reliance on abstract principles like practical reasonableness and incommensurable goods can pose challenges in practical application, as it often lacks concrete guidance for resolving conflicts (MacCormick, 1981). Additionally, by distancing itself from theological roots, Finnis’s approach may struggle to provide the normative certainty that classical natural law offered to its adherents.
Indeed, the implications of Finnis’s work extend to ongoing debates in jurisprudence, particularly regarding the legitimacy of laws in areas such as bioethics, human rights, and social justice. His framework encourages legal systems to reflect on the moral purposes of law, a perspective that remains critical in an era of rapid social change. However, the theory’s abstract nature suggests a need for supplementary tools or criteria to address specific legal dilemmas effectively.
Conclusion
In conclusion, John Finnis’s contemporary natural law theory represents a significant evolution of classical natural law thought, adapting it to modern sensibilities through the concepts of basic human goods and practical reasonableness. While departing from the theological foundations of thinkers like Aquinas, Finnis retains the core natural law principle that law must align with objective moral standards to achieve human flourishing. Although his framework provides a compelling basis for linking law and ethics, its vagueness in practical application and potential loss of normative force due to secularization remain points of contention. Ultimately, Finnis’s contributions enrich jurisprudential discourse, offering a nuanced perspective on the moral underpinnings of law, though further refinement may be needed to address complex contemporary challenges. His work encourages legal scholars to critically reflect on the purpose of law, ensuring its relevance in promoting the common good.
References
- Aquinas, T. (1947) *Summa Theologiae*. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Benziger Bros.
- Finnis, J. (1980) *Natural Law and Natural Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- George, R. P. (1999) *In Defense of Natural Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hart, H. L. A. (1958) Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals. *Harvard Law Review*, 71(4), pp. 593-629.
- Hittinger, R. (1987) *A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- MacCormick, N. (1981) *H.L.A. Hart and the Concept of Law*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
