Introduction
In the field of political philosophy, particularly within government studies, libertarianism presents a compelling framework that emphasises minimal state intervention and individual freedoms. Michael Huemer’s argument for libertarianism, grounded in ethical intuitionism, posits that libertarian policies logically stem from uncontroversial moral intuitions shared by reasonable people across ideologies. This essay provides a detailed explanation of Huemer’s core argument, focusing on its application to taxpayer-funded social welfare programs. Drawing from Huemer’s provided text, it explores how he uses commonsense morality to challenge government authority. Finally, it evaluates whether Huemer’s arguments are convincing, offering a critical analysis from the perspective of government studies. The discussion highlights the strengths of his intuition-based approach while noting limitations in addressing real-world complexities.
Huemer’s Ethical Intuitionism and Moral Realism
Huemer’s defence of libertarianism begins with ethical intuitionism, a metaethical theory that combines moral realism with the role of intuitions in moral knowledge. Moral realism asserts that there are objective evaluative truths independent of observers’ attitudes (Huemer, n.d.). For instance, Huemer uses the example of Ted Bundy’s murders to illustrate that such actions are objectively wrong, not merely because society disapproves, but as an inherent fact. This rejects alternatives like relativism, subjectivism, noncognitivism, and nihilism, which tie morality to cultural or personal views.
Central to intuitionism is the idea that ethical knowledge arises from intuitions—initial intellectual appearances that seem true upon reflection without needing inference (Huemer, n.d.). These are akin to sensory or mnemonic appearances but focus on evaluative propositions, such as pleasure being intrinsically good. Huemer argues that rational beliefs are based on such appearances, and they are justified if there is no reason to doubt them. This antitheoretical stance prioritises concrete, specific judgments over abstract theories, as general theories often err while specific intuitions are more reliable.
In applying this to politics, Huemer advocates starting from commonsense ethical intuitions that are widely shared and uncontroversial. He emphasises seeking premises acceptable to reasonable people of various ideologies, avoiding divisive intuitions like those on wealth inequality. This methodological caution stems from moral realism: conflicting intuitions mean some are wrong, but without bias toward one’s own, we should build on the least controversial ones (Huemer, n.d.). Thus, Huemer’s framework in government studies challenges us to treat state actions by the same moral standards as individual actions, questioning any special authority.
The Argument from Skepticism about Authority
Huemer’s primary argument for libertarianism is skepticism about political authority, which he claims non-libertarians assume to justify expansive government actions. He argues that libertarians apply uniform ethical standards to all agents, including the government, while others exempt the state from constraints binding private individuals (Huemer, n.d.).
To illustrate, Huemer uses analogies where private actions mirroring government policies appear intuitively wrong. For drug prohibition, he imagines kidnapping and imprisoning villagers for consuming unhealthy substances—behaviour most would deem unacceptable, regardless of ideology. Similarly, for gun control, he posits a private individual forbidding and punishing gun ownership, which seems wrongful unless directly preventing harm. For immigration, blocking a hungry person from a marketplace where others are willing to trade is intuitively immoral, analogous to border restrictions (Huemer, n.d.).
This creates a presumption against non-libertarian policies: if such actions are wrong for private agents, they are presumptively wrong for governments unless a compelling difference is shown. Huemer critiques attempts to justify authority, such as implicit social contract theory, which fails due to lack of opt-out options and mutual obligations; hypothetical contract theory, irrelevant since actual consent matters; and democratic authority, ineffective as majority will does not obligate minorities, per his bar bill analogy (Huemer, n.d.). Without a satisfactory account, skepticism holds, supporting libertarian policies like minimal or no state.
Huemer ties this to moral progress, noting historical liberalisation—abolition of slavery, reduced wars, expanded democracy—as evidence of objective moral truths accessed via intuition. Libertarianism, as coherent liberalism valuing equality, individual dignity, and anti-coercion, fits this trend better than authority-embracing views (Huemer, n.d.). He distinguishes minimal statism from anarchism, noting the latter requires empirical evidence of feasible private security, beyond ethical intuitions.
Application to Taxpayer-Funded Social Welfare Programs
Huemer applies his argument directly to taxpayer-funded social welfare programs, using a village charity analogy. Imagine demanding contributions for the poor and imprisoning refusers at gunpoint—intuitively wrong, despite the laudable goal (Huemer, n.d.). This mirrors taxation for welfare, where non-payers face arrest. The burden shifts to defenders to explain why government coercion is permissible, perhaps by disanalogy or justification, but Huemer argues they fail.
Traditional libertarian arguments, like those from Rothbard or Rand, claim taxation always violates rights. Huemer’s is more modest: it establishes a presumption based on intuitive wrongness, open to rebuttal but strengthened by failed authority defences (Huemer, n.d.). Even if welfare aids the poor, private forcible collection remains wrong; thus, government versions presumptively are too. This fits government studies by questioning redistributive policies’ legitimacy without denying poverty’s moral urgency—libertarians might support voluntary charity.
Huemer addresses egalitarianism, noting welfare expansion as potential progress under assumed authority, shifting from indifference to concern for the poor. However, true progress requires rejecting authority for full liberalism (Huemer, n.d.). In a libertarian society, inequalities might persist, but they are less offensive than authority’s inegalitarian coercion.
Evaluation: Are Huemer’s Arguments Convincing?
Huemer’s arguments are partially convincing, offering a sound, intuitive foundation for libertarianism that aligns with government studies’ focus on authority’s limits. His use of uncontroversial intuitions avoids ideological bias, providing a broad appeal—e.g., the charity analogy resonates widely, challenging welfare without dismissing compassion (Huemer, n.d.). The skepticism about authority is compelling, as critiques of contract and democratic theories highlight their inconsistencies, echoing real-world government accountability issues.
However, limitations exist. Huemer’s antitheoretical stance may undervalue general principles in complex governance, where abstract theories like utilitarianism guide policy (Barry, 1995). His analogies, while intuitive, oversimplify: governments provide public goods taxation enables, unlike private agents. For welfare, scale matters—individual kidnappings differ from systemic taxation with democratic oversight. Empirical claims, like private security’s feasibility for anarchism, require more evidence, as Huemer admits, but this weakens absolute libertarian conclusions (Nozick, 1974).
Pro-authority biases, evidenced by Milgram’s experiments, support distrusting intuitive government exceptionalism (Huemer, n.d.). Yet, some intuitions favour authority for stability, and Huemer’s dismissal might ignore collective action problems in libertarian societies. Overall, while convincing in critiquing overreach, Huemer’s case is less persuasive for fully dismantling welfare without addressing practical inequalities.
Conclusion
Huemer’s ethical intuitionist argument for libertarianism effectively uses commonsense morality to presume against non-libertarian policies, exemplified in his critique of taxpayer-funded welfare as analogous to wrongful private coercion. By skepticism toward authority and alignment with moral progress, he builds a coherent case. Though convincing in its intuitive appeal and logical structure, it faces challenges in empirical robustness and theoretical depth. In government studies, this prompts reflection on balancing individual rights with collective needs, suggesting libertarianism as a valuable, if not exhaustive, perspective on just institutions. Further exploration could integrate Huemer’s insights with pragmatic governance models.
References
- Barry, B. (1995) Justice as Impartiality. Oxford University Press.
- Huemer, M. (n.d.) An Ethical Intuitionist Case for Libertarianism. [Extract provided in query; original source from Huemer’s writings, likely The Routledge Handbook of Libertarianism or similar].
- Nozick, R. (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books.
