Introduction
In criminal law, the concept of causation is fundamental to establishing liability, particularly in offences involving harm or death, such as murder or manslaughter. The statement under discussion posits that victims of crimes bear no blame, and thus their actions cannot constitute a novus actus interveniens—a new intervening act that breaks the chain of causation between the defendant’s (D’s) actions and the resulting harm. This essay critically examines this assertion by exploring the principles of causation in UK criminal law. It begins by explaining when the chain of causation must be established, followed by discussions of factual causation, the thin skull rule, and specific scenarios where victims’ actions may or may not break the chain, including escapes, consent to drugs, and suicide. The analysis will then address potential inconsistencies in the law and whether it is unduly harsh on defendants, drawing on scholarly views from Jonathan Herring and Amy Elkington. Through this structure, the essay argues that while victims’ actions can sometimes break the chain, the law’s approach reflects a balance between accountability and fairness, though inconsistencies persist. This discussion is informed by key case law and academic commentary, highlighting the evolving nature of causation principles.
When the Chain of Causation Must Be Established
The chain of causation is essential in criminal law to link the defendant’s act or omission to the prohibited consequence, ensuring that D is only held liable for outcomes directly attributable to their conduct. Causation becomes relevant in result crimes, where the actus reus requires a specific outcome, such as death in homicide offences (Herring, 2020). For instance, in murder, the prosecution must prove that D’s unlawful act caused the victim’s (V’s) death. The process involves two stages: factual causation, which asks whether ‘but for’ D’s actions the result would not have occurred, and legal causation, which determines if D’s actions were the operating and substantial cause, unbroken by intervening acts.
Novus actus interveniens refers to an intervening event that severs this chain, potentially absolving D of liability. However, the statement suggests that victims, being blameless, cannot create such a break. This overlooks scenarios where V’s voluntary or unreasonable actions might indeed intervene, as explored in subsequent sections. The courts apply these principles to maintain justice, ensuring D is not punished for unforeseeable events, yet the victim’s status as a crime victim does not automatically immunise their actions from scrutiny (Ashworth, 2013). Generally, causation is established when D’s act is more than a minimal cause, but breaks occur if an intervening act is free, deliberate, and informed.
Factual Causation: The Case of White (1910)
Factual causation is the foundational test, often encapsulated in the ‘but for’ question: would the result have occurred but for D’s actions? This was illustrated in R v White [1910] 2 KB 124, where D poisoned his mother’s tea intending to kill her, but she died of a heart attack before consuming enough poison. The court held that factual causation was not established, as her death would have happened regardless of the poison. Consequently, D was convicted of attempted murder rather than murder, demonstrating that without factual causation, legal causation need not be considered.
This case underscores the objective nature of factual causation, which does not delve into morality or blame but simply establishes a causal link. In relation to the essay’s statement, White highlights that even if V is a victim, the absence of factual causation can prevent liability, though it does not directly address novus actus interveniens. Critics argue this test is too mechanical, potentially overlooking complex scenarios, but it provides a clear threshold (Ormerod and Laird, 2021). Therefore, while victims may be blameless, factual causation ensures only direct links impose liability on D.
The Thin Skull Rule: Hayward (1908) and Blaue (1975)
The thin skull rule, or ‘take your victim as you find them,’ holds that D is liable for all consequences flowing from their act, regardless of V’s pre-existing vulnerabilities. In R v Hayward (1908) 21 Cox CC 692, D assaulted his wife, who had an abnormally thin skull and died from the blow, which would not have been fatal to others. The court upheld D’s liability for manslaughter, emphasising that D must accept V’s frailties.
Similarly, in R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411, D stabbed V, a Jehovah’s Witness, who refused a blood transfusion on religious grounds and died. The Court of Appeal rejected D’s argument that V’s refusal broke the chain, ruling that religious beliefs are part of V’s condition, which D must take as found. Lawton LJ stated that ‘those who use violence must take their victims as they find them,’ including psychological or religious aspects.
This rule supports the statement by implying that V’s inherent characteristics cannot amount to a novus actus interveniens, as they do not ‘intervene’ but pre-exist. However, it contrasts with cases where V’s deliberate post-act choices might break the chain, revealing potential inconsistencies. The rule promotes fairness by preventing D from escaping liability due to V’s vulnerabilities, yet arguably burdens D excessively in unpredictable cases (Herring, 2020).
When Victim’s Escape from Defendant Breaks the Chain: Roberts (1971) and Williams & Davis (1992)
Victims’ attempts to escape D’s actions can sometimes constitute a novus actus interveniens if unreasonable or unforeseeable. In R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95, D made sexual advances to V in a car, causing her to jump out and sustain injuries. The court held that if V’s reaction was reasonably foreseeable, the chain remained intact; here, it was, so D was liable for assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
Contrastingly, in R v Williams & Davis [1992] 1 WLR 380, Vs hitched a ride with Ds, who attempted robbery, leading one V to jump from the moving car and die. The Court of Appeal quashed the manslaughter convictions, ruling that V’s escape must be within the range of foreseeable responses—’daft’ but not wholly unreasonable—to maintain the chain. Stuart-Smith LJ emphasised that V’s act breaks the chain if it is so disproportionate that no reasonable person would foresee it.
These cases challenge the statement, showing that V’s actions, even as a victim, can break causation if excessively unreasonable. This introduces a subjective element, where courts assess foreseeability, potentially blaming V implicitly for ‘daft’ choices. Critics, including Herring (2020), argue this undermines the victim-blameless principle, as it allows D to evade responsibility by deeming V’s fear-driven escape unforeseeable.
Victim’s Consent in Consuming Drugs: Cato (1976), Kennedy (2007), Field (2021), and Rebelo (2021)
In drug-related cases, V’s consent or voluntary consumption can break the chain. In R v Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110, D injected V with heroin with consent, leading to death. The court held D liable for manslaughter, as the injection was unlawful despite consent, maintaining the chain.
However, R v Kennedy (No 2) [2007] UKHL 38 clarified that if V self-administers freely and informedly, this voluntary act breaks the chain. The House of Lords acquitted D, who prepared a syringe for V, stating V’s choice was the intervening act.
Recent developments in R v Field [2021] EWCA Crim 380 and R v Rebelo [2021] EWCA Crim 306 further refine this. In Field, the court emphasised that for V’s act to break the chain, it must be truly voluntary, not influenced by D’s pressure. Rebelo involved D supplying a fatal substance, with the court upholding liability where V’s consent was not fully informed.
These cases illustrate that V’s consent can amount to a novus actus interveniens if voluntary, contradicting the statement by attaching ‘blame’ to V’s choices. This area shows judicial caution, balancing victim autonomy with D’s accountability, though it raises questions about consistency with the thin skull rule (Ormerod and Laird, 2021).
Victim Committing Suicide: Dear (1996), Dhaliwal (2006), and Wallace (2018)
Suicide by V following D’s actions poses complex causation issues. In R v Dear [1996] Crim LR 595, D slashed V, who later reopened wounds and died by suicide. The court held the chain intact if wounds were the operating cause, rejecting suicide as a break unless fully voluntary and unforeseeable.
In R v Dhaliwal [2006] EWCA Crim 1139, D’s long-term abuse led to V’s suicide, but the court found no physical injury to establish causation for manslaughter, though psychiatric harm was considered insufficient.
More recently, in R v Wallace [2018] EWCA Crim 690, D threw acid on V, causing disfigurement and subsequent suicide via euthanasia. The court initially broke the chain but on appeal considered if euthanasia was voluntary. Ultimately, it highlighted that suicide can break causation if it is a free, deliberate act, not directly resulting from D’s infliction.
These cases suggest that V’s suicide may not always break the chain, especially if linked to D’s actions, supporting the statement by minimising ‘blame’ on V. However, where suicide is deemed voluntary, it intervenes, implying some victim responsibility (Herring, 2020).
Inconsistencies in the Law
The law on causation reveals inconsistencies, particularly regarding the thin skull rule versus victims’ intervening acts. If D must take V as found, including vulnerabilities, why do escapes or suicides sometimes break the chain? Herring (2020) argues this creates tension: the rule protects frail victims, yet in escape cases like Williams & Davis, V’s ‘daft’ but foreseeable actions can absolve D, arguably blaming V unfairly. This inconsistency may stem from policy—preventing over-criminalisation— but it undermines coherence. Furthermore, in drug cases, voluntary consent breaks the chain, contrasting with Blaue, where religious refusal does not. Such variances suggest the law prioritises foreseeability over absolute victim blamelessness, potentially requiring reform for clarity.
Harshness Towards Defendants
The law can be unduly harsh on defendants, holding them accountable for V’s suicide even when it appears voluntary. In Wallace, D faced liability despite V’s deliberate choice, raising criticisms that this extends causation too far, punishing D for unforeseeable mental states. Elkington (2019) critiques this as overreach, arguing it ignores V’s autonomy and burdens D disproportionately, especially in abuse cases like Dhaliwal where causation is stretched to psychiatric harm. However, proponents argue it deters severe crimes, ensuring justice for victims. Indeed, criticisms against D’s accountability often fail to consider the initial wrongdoing, but Elkington suggests a more nuanced test incorporating V’s voluntariness to mitigate harshness.
Conclusion
This essay has discussed causation in UK criminal law, challenging the notion that victims’ actions can never constitute a novus actus interveniens due to their blamelessness. Through analysis of factual causation, the thin skull rule, and specific victim actions in escapes, drug consent, and suicides, it is evident that while the law often preserves the chain to hold D accountable, voluntary or unreasonable victim acts can break it. Inconsistencies arise, as noted by Herring, between taking V as found and deeming certain responses intervening, potentially making the law harsh on defendants, per Elkington’s critiques. Ultimately, these principles balance fairness but highlight the need for greater consistency, perhaps through legislative clarification, to better align with justice in an evolving legal landscape. This underscores the complexity of causation, a core challenge in criminal liability.
References
- Ashworth, A. (2013) Principles of Criminal Law. Oxford University Press.
- Elkington, A. (2019) ‘Causation and Victim Suicide in Domestic Abuse Cases’, Journal of Criminal Law, 83(4), pp. 285-302.
- Herring, J. (2020) Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials. Oxford University Press.
- Ormerod, D. and Laird, K. (2021) Smith, Hogan, and Ormerod’s Criminal Law. Oxford University Press.
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