Introduction
This essay examines the legal position of Charlotte and Arjun, two individuals whose applications for street food licences under the fictitious Street Food (Control) Act 2024 were refused by Riverside Borough Council. The analysis focuses on the potential for judicial review of the Council’s decisions, addressing both procedural fairness and substantive grounds for challenge. Section 1 of the Act empowers the Council to grant licences for selling hot and cold takeaway food, while section 2 allows licence revocation on grounds such as misconduct or food safety concerns. This essay will explore whether the Council’s refusal to provide reasons, lack of opportunity for representations, and potential bias in decision-making constitute breaches of administrative law principles. By drawing on established legal doctrine, primarily from UK case law and academic commentary on judicial review, this piece advises Charlotte and Arjun on their prospects of success. The discussion is structured into procedural issues, substantive grounds, and a concluding summary of their legal options.
Procedural Fairness: Charlotte’s Case and the Right to Reasons and Representations
Procedural fairness, a cornerstone of administrative law, requires public bodies to act in a manner that upholds natural justice. This includes providing reasons for decisions and, in certain circumstances, allowing individuals to make representations. Charlotte’s frustration stems from the Council’s refusal to explain why her licence application was denied, despite her repeated requests over several months. Furthermore, she was not afforded a hearing or the chance to submit written representations.
The duty to give reasons for administrative decisions is not universally mandated in UK law but is often expected where a decision significantly impacts an individual’s rights or interests. In the case of R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Doody (1994), the House of Lords held that fairness may require reasons to be provided, especially where the decision is unexpected or deprives someone of a significant opportunity (Doody, 1994). Applying this to Charlotte’s situation, the refusal of a licence directly affects her ability to operate a business, a matter of considerable personal and financial importance. The Council’s silence, therefore, appears to contravene the principle of fairness, as Charlotte is unable to understand or challenge the basis of the decision.
Additionally, Charlotte’s desire for a hearing or the opportunity to make representations aligns with the rules of natural justice, specifically the right to be heard (audi alteram partem). While not every administrative decision necessitates a formal hearing, case law such as Ridge v Baldwin (1964) establishes that affected individuals should generally be given a chance to present their case, particularly when the decision impacts a legal right or legitimate expectation (Ridge, 1964). Here, the Street Food (Control) Act 2024 implies a right to apply for a licence under section 1, which may create a legitimate expectation of procedural fairness in the application process. The Council’s failure to engage with Charlotte arguably breaches this expectation, strengthening her case for judicial review on procedural grounds.
Procedural Fairness: Evaluating the Council’s Policy on Waste and Litter
Charlotte has also heard that the Council is operating under a policy of refusing new licences due to concerns over waste and litter. If true, this raises further procedural questions about transparency and the lawfulness of the decision-making process. Public bodies must act within the scope of their statutory powers and ensure that policies do not fetter their discretion. The case of *British Oxygen Co Ltd v Minister of Technology* (1971) clarified that while authorities may adopt policies to guide decisions, they must remain open to considering individual circumstances (British Oxygen, 1971). If Riverside Borough Council is applying a blanket refusal policy without assessing Charlotte’s specific application, this could be deemed an unlawful fetter on discretion, providing another procedural ground for judicial review. Moreover, the lack of transparency about such a policy—if it exists—exacerbates the unfairness, as Charlotte cannot address or challenge the basis of the refusal.
Substantive Grounds: Arjun’s Case and Allegations of Bias
Turning to Arjun’s situation, his application for a licence to sell gourmet sandwiches was similarly refused. His concern centres on a potential conflict of interest, as he believes Farah, the head of the Council Committee, has a share in a rival vegan food stall operated by her cousin. This raises the substantive ground of bias, specifically whether the decision-making process was tainted by personal interest or the appearance of unfairness.
In UK administrative law, the test for bias is whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias influencing the decision. This principle was articulated in Porter v Magill (2002), where the House of Lords emphasised that even the perception of bias can undermine the legitimacy of a decision (Porter, 2002). If Farah indeed holds a financial or personal interest in a competing stall, as Arjun suspects, this could constitute actual bias. Even if no direct profit is received, her familial connection to the rival business may still create an appearance of bias, failing the objective test of impartiality. However, Arjun must provide evidence to substantiate his claim, as mere suspicion is insufficient for a successful judicial review. Without concrete proof of Farah’s involvement or financial gain, his challenge may struggle to meet the evidentiary threshold.
Furthermore, public bodies are expected to adhere to the principle of nemo judex in causa sua (no one should be a judge in their own cause). If Farah participated in the decision to refuse Arjun’s licence while holding a conflicting interest, this would likely breach natural justice, providing a strong substantive ground for review. Arjun should seek disclosure of the Council’s decision-making records to establish whether Farah was involved and whether her interest was declared or managed appropriately.
Substantive Legality: Scope of the Council’s Powers under the Act
Beyond bias, a broader substantive issue for both Charlotte and Arjun is whether the Council’s decisions fall within the scope of its powers under the Street Food (Control) Act 2024. Section 1 grants the Council authority to issue licences, while section 2 specifies grounds for revocation, such as misconduct or food safety concerns. However, the Act does not explicitly address grounds for refusing initial applications. In the absence of statutory guidance, the Council must exercise its discretion reasonably, as per the principle of *Wednesbury* unreasonableness established in *Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation* (1948). A refusal based on extraneous factors—like a general policy on litter, if unrelated to Charlotte’s specific case—could be deemed irrational or outside the Council’s lawful discretion (Wednesbury, 1948). Both applicants may argue that their refusals were not based on relevant considerations, providing a potential substantive ground for challenge.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Charlotte and Arjun have viable grounds to pursue judicial review of Riverside Borough Council’s decisions. Charlotte’s case primarily rests on procedural unfairness, given the Council’s failure to provide reasons or allow representations, which likely breaches natural justice principles as established in cases like *Doody* and *Ridge v Baldwin*. The possibility of a blanket policy on waste and litter further suggests a potential fetter on discretion, undermining the legality of the process. Arjun’s challenge hinges on the substantive issue of bias, with the appearance of a conflict of interest involving Farah potentially failing the test in *Porter v Magill*. However, he must substantiate these claims with evidence. Additionally, both applicants may argue that the Council’s decisions exceed the lawful scope of its powers or are Wednesbury unreasonable if based on irrelevant factors. Advising them to seek legal representation, gather evidence (such as decision-making records), and apply for judicial review within the strict time limits (typically three months) is prudent. Successful challenges could result in the quashing of the refusals and a mandate for the Council to reconsider their applications with proper procedural safeguards. This analysis highlights the importance of transparency and impartiality in public decision-making, reinforcing accountability in local governance.
References
- British Oxygen Co Ltd v Minister of Technology (1971) AC 610.
- Porter v Magill (2002) 2 AC 357.
- R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Doody (1994) 1 AC 531.
- Ridge v Baldwin (1964) AC 40.
- Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 KB 223.
