Introduction
This essay critically examines the statement made by Clarke CJ in *Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v Government of Ireland & Ors* [2020] IESC 49 at 8.11, where he described the right to an environment consistent with human dignity or a healthy environment as “impermissibly vague.” Clarke CJ argued that this right either duplicates existing rights such as the right to life or bodily integrity, or lacks a clear definition if it extends beyond these. This analysis will explore three key aspects: (i) the standalone or dependent nature of the right to a healthy environment, (ii) its individual and collective dimensions, and (iii) its justiciability. Drawing on international law instruments and case law, the essay aims to evaluate whether Clarke CJ’s concerns about vagueness hold merit and to consider the broader implications for environmental rights in legal frameworks. By engaging with these dimensions, the discussion seeks to highlight both the challenges and potential of recognising such a right.
The Standalone or Dependent Nature of the Right to a Healthy Environment
The first point of analysis concerns whether the right to a healthy environment operates as a standalone right or is dependent on existing human rights, such as the right to life or bodily integrity, as Clarke CJ suggests. International instruments provide some insight into this debate. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration, for instance, explicitly linked environmental quality to human dignity, stating that “man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being” (United Nations, 1972). However, this declaration is not legally binding, and its language remains broad, arguably supporting Clarke CJ’s view on vagueness.
In contrast, the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters establishes procedural rights that indirectly support a healthy environment through access to environmental information and justice (UNECE, 1998). Yet, it stops short of declaring a substantive standalone right. Case law from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) further complicates the issue. In López Ostra v Spain (1995), the Court found that severe environmental pollution could violate Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which protects the right to private and family life. This suggests that environmental rights are often dependent on other established rights rather than being standalone, aligning with Clarke CJ’s concern that they may not add distinct value beyond existing protections. However, some scholars argue that a standalone right could provide a more direct and comprehensive framework for addressing environmental degradation (Shelton, 1991). Thus, while there is merit in Clarke CJ’s critique, the evolving nature of environmental challenges arguably calls for clearer recognition of an independent right, even if its parameters remain contentious.
Individual and Collective Dimensions of the Right
The second aspect of Clarke CJ’s statement to consider is the individual and collective dimensions of the right to a healthy environment. Environmental harm often transcends individual impacts, affecting entire communities or future generations, which complicates the definition and enforcement of such a right. International instruments like the 1982 World Charter for Nature and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development highlight the collective responsibility to protect the environment for present and future generations (United Nations, 1992). This collective dimension is evident in cases like *Urgenda Foundation v State of the Netherlands* (2019), where the Dutch Supreme Court held that the state had a duty under Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, recognising the collective threat of climate change to society as a whole.
However, Clarke CJ’s concern about vagueness becomes particularly relevant here. If the right to a healthy environment is to be collectively enforced, who bears the responsibility, and how are individual claims balanced against collective needs? For instance, an individual might suffer specific harm from pollution, as seen in López Ostra v Spain (1995), but addressing such harm may require systemic changes that affect broader populations. Furthermore, the collective dimension introduces intergenerational equity, a concept endorsed in international law but difficult to operationalise in legal terms. While the collective aspect underscores the importance of environmental rights, it also amplifies Clarke CJ’s argument that without defined parameters, the right risks becoming unworkable in practice. Therefore, although the dual nature of the right is crucial, it indeed poses definitional challenges that legal systems must address.
Justiciability of the Right to a Healthy Environment
Finally, the justiciability of the right to a healthy environment is central to understanding Clarke CJ’s critique of its vagueness. Justiciability refers to the extent to which a right can be enforced through judicial mechanisms, and Clarke CJ’s statement implies that the lack of a clear definition hinders courts from effectively adjudicating such claims. International law provides mixed guidance on this. While Article 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights explicitly recognises the right to a “general satisfactory environment,” its practical enforcement remains limited due to vague standards and resource constraints (African Union, 1981). Similarly, in South Asia, the Indian Supreme Court in *Subhash Kumar v State of Bihar* (1991) interpreted the right to life under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution to include the right to a healthy environment, demonstrating judicial willingness to engage with environmental rights. However, such rulings often rely on existing rights frameworks, reinforcing Clarke CJ’s point that a standalone right may be redundant or impractical.
Moreover, justiciability raises questions about the role of courts versus legislatures. Environmental issues often involve complex policy decisions, and courts may lack the expertise or authority to set specific environmental standards. For example, in Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v Government of Ireland & Ors (2020), the Irish Supreme Court was cautious about overstepping into policy-making territory, reflecting broader concerns about judicial overreach. On the other hand, proponents argue that justiciability can be achieved through procedural rights, as seen in the Aarhus Convention, which empowers individuals to challenge environmental decisions (UNECE, 1998). Nevertheless, without a substantive right clearly defined, such mechanisms may fall short of addressing systemic environmental harm. Thus, while there are pathways to justiciability, Clarke CJ’s concern about the lack of precise parameters remains a significant barrier.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Clarke CJ’s statement in *Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v Government of Ireland & Ors* [2020] IESC 49 offers a critical perspective on the right to a healthy environment, highlighting its vagueness and potential overlap with existing rights. This essay has explored the standalone versus dependent nature of the right, revealing that while international instruments and case law often tie it to rights like life and bodily integrity, there is a compelling case for its independent recognition to address modern challenges. The individual and collective dimensions further complicate its application, as balancing personal harm with societal and intergenerational needs remains unresolved. Finally, the issue of justiciability underscores the practical difficulties of enforcing an ill-defined right, as courts grapple with both definitional and institutional constraints. While Clarke CJ’s critique holds considerable weight, it also prompts a necessary discussion on how legal systems can refine and operationalise environmental rights to meet pressing global needs. Future developments in international and domestic law must strive to clarify these parameters, ensuring that the right to a healthy environment is neither redundant nor impracticable but a meaningful tool for justice.
References
- African Union (1981) African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. African Union.
- Shelton, D. (1991) Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to Environment. Stanford Journal of International Law, 28, pp. 103-138.
- United Nations (1972) Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration). United Nations.
- United Nations (1992) Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. United Nations.
- UNECE (1998) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention). United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.
