Introduction
This essay examines the criminal liability of Lizzie, who is charged with two counts of murder following two separate incidents: the death of a security guard due to a bomb explosion at the US embassy in London, and the death of a US diplomat struck by her car while fleeing the scene. The analysis focuses on the legal principles of murder under English law, specifically the elements of actus reus and mens rea, as well as potential defences or mitigating factors. The essay first addresses Lizzie’s liability for the security guard’s death, evaluating her intention and foresight regarding the explosion. It then considers her liability for the diplomat’s death, assessing whether her actions constitute murder or a lesser offence. Finally, it explores possible defences or alternative charges. Through this structured legal analysis, the essay aims to provide a sound understanding of the applicable law while considering the nuances of Lizzie’s subjective state of mind and the objective consequences of her actions.
Legal Framework for Murder
Under English law, murder is defined as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, encompassing either an intention to kill or an intention to cause grievous bodily harm (GBH) (Moloney, 1985). The prosecution must establish both the actus reus (the act of killing) and the mens rea (the requisite mental state) beyond reasonable doubt. For murder, the actus reus requires that the defendant’s actions caused the victim’s death, while the mens rea necessitates proof of direct or oblique intention to kill or cause GBH. These principles, as clarified in landmark cases such as Woollin (1999), form the backbone of the analysis of Lizzie’s liability.
Liability for the Security Guard’s Death
In the first incident, Lizzie planted a home-made bomb at the US embassy, which exploded at midnight, killing a security guard. The actus reus of murder appears to be satisfied, as her act of planting the bomb directly caused the guard’s death. Causation is straightforward here, as there is no indication of an intervening act breaking the chain of causation (Pagett, 1983). The critical issue, therefore, lies in establishing mens rea.
Lizzie admitted during her police interview that she intended the bomb to explode at midnight but believed there was only a 75% chance of anyone being close enough to suffer serious injury. Furthermore, she expressed doubt about whether the bomb would detonate at all. Under the test for oblique intention established in Woollin (1999), the jury must consider whether death or serious injury was a virtually certain result of her actions and whether she foresaw this outcome as virtually certain. While Lizzie’s belief in a 75% likelihood of injury does not equate to virtual certainty, her act of planting a bomb—a inherently dangerous weapon—could lead a jury to infer that she appreciated the high probability of harm. Indeed, as Lord Bridge noted in Moloney (1985), foresight of consequences can serve as evidence of intention, though it is not synonymous with it.
Additionally, Lizzie’s stated aim was to “scare” the US into changing its policies, suggesting she did not have a direct intention to kill. However, under English law, an intention to cause GBH is sufficient for murder if death results (Cunningham, 1982). Given the nature of a bomb, a reasonable jury might conclude that serious injury was a foreseeable outcome, even if not her primary goal. Therefore, while her subjective doubt about the bomb’s functionality might weaken the prosecution’s case for direct intention, the objective dangerousness of her actions could support a finding of oblique intention. On balance, there is a strong argument that Lizzie satisfies the mens rea for murder in relation to the security guard’s death.
Liability for the US Diplomat’s Death
The second incident involves Lizzie striking a pedestrian—a US diplomat—while speeding away from the embassy. After seeing the injured diplomat bleeding heavily, she drove home without offering assistance, and the diplomat subsequently died of blood loss. Again, the actus reus of murder requires establishing causation. Lizzie’s initial act of hitting the diplomat with her car is a clear cause of injury, but her subsequent failure to assist raises questions about whether this omission contributed to the death. In cases such as Blaue (1975), the courts have held that a defendant remains liable if their initial act sets in motion a chain of events leading to death, provided no novus actus interveniens (new intervening act) breaks the chain. There is no evidence of such an intervening act here, so causation is likely established.
However, the mens rea for murder is less clear-cut. Lizzie’s act of speeding suggests recklessness or negligence, but murder requires intention to kill or cause GBH. Her interview does not indicate any intent to harm the pedestrian; the collision was described as inadvertent. Furthermore, her decision to leave the scene, while morally reprehensible, does not necessarily equate to an intention to cause death. The prosecution might argue that her failure to assist demonstrates a callous disregard for life, but under English law, an omission alone cannot generally establish the mens rea for murder unless a duty of care exists (Stone and Dobinson, 1977). As a stranger to the diplomat, Lizzie arguably owed no legal duty to act, despite the ethical implications of her inaction.
Consequently, it is unlikely that Lizzie can be convicted of murder for the diplomat’s death. A more appropriate charge might be manslaughter, either through an unlawful and dangerous act (the act of dangerous driving) or through gross negligence (failing to stop and assist, if a duty can be established). The case of Adomako (1995) sets the test for gross negligence manslaughter, requiring a breach of duty so serious as to be criminal. While Lizzie’s conduct in speeding and fleeing is certainly negligent, whether it meets the threshold for manslaughter would depend on further factual inquiry, such as the extent of her speeding and the feasibility of providing aid.
Potential Defences and Mitigating Factors
Lizzie might raise defences or mitigating factors to reduce her liability. For the security guard’s death, she could argue a lack of intention, relying on her stated doubt about the bomb’s functionality and her aim to “scare” rather than kill. However, as discussed, the dangerous nature of a bomb makes this defence tenuous under the oblique intention test (Woollin, 1999). No other statutory defences, such as diminished responsibility or loss of control under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, appear applicable based on the facts provided.
For the diplomat’s death, her strongest argument is the absence of mens rea for murder, potentially reducing the charge to manslaughter or a driving-related offence. Additionally, the emotional context of fleeing a bombing she orchestrated might be considered mitigation, though it is unlikely to absolve her of responsibility. Ultimately, while defences may not fully exonerate her, they could influence sentencing or the nature of the charges pursued.
Conclusion
In summary, Lizzie’s liability for two counts of murder presents distinct legal challenges. Regarding the security guard’s death, the prosecution has a strong case for murder, given the objective dangerousness of planting a bomb and the likelihood of a jury inferring oblique intention, despite her subjective doubts. However, for the diplomat’s death, the lack of intention to kill or cause GBH makes a murder conviction improbable; manslaughter or a lesser offence appears more appropriate. This analysis underscores the importance of distinguishing between direct actions and their unintended consequences in criminal law, as well as the nuanced application of intention and causation principles. The implications of this case highlight the courts’ role in balancing subjective mental states with objective harm, ensuring that liability reflects both legal and moral culpability. Further factual evidence, particularly regarding the circumstances of the diplomat’s death, would be necessary to refine these conclusions.
References
- Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171. House of Lords.
- Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411. Court of Appeal.
- Cunningham [1982] AC 566. House of Lords.
- Moloney [1985] AC 905. House of Lords.
- Pagett [1983] 76 Cr App R 279. Court of Appeal.
- Stone and Dobinson [1977] QB 354. Court of Appeal.
- Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82. House of Lords.
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