Introduction
The European Union (EU) has long been critiqued for its perceived democratic deficit, a term that encapsulates the gap between the Union’s decision-making processes and the democratic accountability expected by its citizens. This essay critically examines the proposition that enhancing the role of national parliaments offers a viable solution to this deficit, specifically by extending their scrutiny beyond the principle of subsidiarity to include the proportionality of EU legislation. The democratic deficit is rooted in the limited direct accountability of EU institutions to citizens and the perceived remoteness of decision-making in Brussels. National parliaments, as direct representatives of the electorate, are often viewed as potential bridges to address this gap. This essay will first outline the concept of the democratic deficit and its implications. It will then explore the current role of national parliaments in EU governance under the Treaty of Lisbon, before critically assessing whether an expanded role in reviewing proportionality, alongside subsidiarity, could effectively remedy the deficit. Finally, alternative perspectives on democratic reform will be considered. The central argument is that while empowering national parliaments could strengthen democratic legitimacy, it is not a panacea and must be complemented by broader institutional reforms.
Understanding the Democratic Deficit in the EU
The term ‘democratic deficit’ refers to the perceived lack of democratic accountability and transparency within the EU’s governance structure. Scholars argue that key institutions, such as the European Commission, operate with significant autonomy and limited direct accountability to citizens (Hix and Høyland, 2011). The European Parliament, though directly elected, lacks the full legislative powers of a national parliament, often playing a secondary role to the Council of the EU, where national ministers make decisions behind closed doors. Furthermore, the complexity of EU decision-making processes alienates citizens, as highlighted by Moravcsik (2002), who notes that the technical nature of EU policies often obscures public engagement. This remoteness fuels perceptions of an elite-driven system disconnected from the electorate. The democratic deficit, therefore, manifests as a lack of legitimacy, accountability, and citizen involvement—issues that have gained prominence amid rising Euroscepticism across member states. Any proposed solution, including the enhanced role of national parliaments, must address these core challenges to be deemed effective.
The Current Role of National Parliaments in EU Governance
The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) marked a significant step in integrating national parliaments into the EU legislative process, primarily through the principle of subsidiarity. Under Protocol No. 2 of the Treaty, national parliaments can scrutinise draft EU legislation to ensure that action at the EU level is justified when objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by member states alone (European Union, 2007). The ‘yellow card’ and ‘orange card’ mechanisms allow a collective of national parliaments to challenge legislation by raising reasoned opinions, potentially forcing the Commission to reconsider or justify its proposals. For instance, in 2012, the yellow card procedure was triggered for the first time over a proposal on the right to strike, demonstrating the potential for national oversight (Cooper, 2015). However, this role is narrowly defined—limited to subsidiarity—and the mechanisms have been underutilised, with only a handful of successful challenges. Moreover, the principle of proportionality, which requires EU actions to be necessary and not exceed what is required to achieve their objectives, remains outside the formal scrutiny of national parliaments. This limitation raises questions about whether their current role sufficiently addresses the democratic deficit, or whether broader powers are indeed necessary.
Expanding the Role to Include Proportionality Review
Extending the role of national parliaments to include the review of proportionality in EU legislation could, in theory, enhance democratic accountability. Proportionality is a fundamental principle of EU law, enshrined in Article 5(4) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), ensuring that EU measures are neither excessive nor overly intrusive (Craig and de Búrca, 2020). Allowing national parliaments to assess whether proposed legislation adheres to this principle could provide a more comprehensive check on EU competence, preventing overreach that often fuels public discontent. For example, national parliaments are closer to local contexts and could better evaluate whether an EU directive, such as one on environmental standards, imposes disproportionate burdens on specific member states or industries. Such scrutiny could bridge the gap between EU policy and national interests, thereby enhancing legitimacy. Moreover, as representatives of the electorate, national parliaments could facilitate greater public debate on EU matters, addressing the issue of citizen detachment. However, this proposal is not without challenges. National parliaments often lack the resources, expertise, and time to conduct in-depth reviews of complex EU legislation, as noted by Kiiver (2012). Additionally, differing national interests could lead to inconsistent or politicised assessments, potentially stalling the EU legislative process rather than improving it.
Potential Risks and Limitations of Empowering National Parliaments
While an expanded role for national parliaments might strengthen democratic input, it carries significant risks that could undermine the EU’s functionality. Firstly, granting national parliaments veto-like powers over proportionality could exacerbate delays in decision-making, already a criticism of the EU’s multi-layered system. The EU often requires swift responses to cross-border issues—such as economic crises or public health emergencies—where protracted scrutiny by multiple parliaments could hinder effective action. Secondly, national parliaments are inherently tied to domestic political agendas, which may clash with the collective interests of the Union. For instance, a parliament in a member state with a strong Eurosceptic government might use proportionality reviews to obstruct legislation for political gain rather than genuine democratic concern. This risk is compounded by the diversity of political systems and capacities across the 27 member states, where smaller or less resourced parliaments might struggle to engage meaningfully. As Winzen (2017) argues, over-empowering national parliaments could fragment EU governance, creating a tension between national and supranational democracy rather than resolving the deficit. Therefore, while their involvement is valuable, it must be carefully balanced to avoid paralysis of the EU system.
Alternative Approaches to Addressing the Democratic Deficit
Beyond the role of national parliaments, other reforms could complement or even supersede their involvement in curing the democratic deficit. One prominent suggestion is to strengthen the European Parliament, the only directly elected EU institution, by granting it full co-legislative powers equal to the Council in all policy areas. This would enhance direct democratic representation without the risk of national bias inherent in parliamentary scrutiny (Hix and Høyland, 2011). Additionally, improving transparency within EU institutions—such as making Council debates public or simplifying legislative texts—could foster greater citizen engagement and trust. Another avenue is the use of participatory democracy tools, such as the European Citizens’ Initiative, which allows citizens to propose legislation directly, albeit with limited impact to date (Craig and de Búrca, 2020). These alternatives suggest that while national parliaments have a role to play, a multi-faceted approach is necessary to address the complexity of the democratic deficit. Relying solely on national parliaments risks neglecting the supranational dimension of EU governance, which is central to its purpose and effectiveness.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the proposal to enhance the role of national parliaments by including proportionality reviews alongside subsidiarity offers a partial solution to the EU’s democratic deficit. It could strengthen accountability by bringing EU decision-making closer to national electorates and ensuring that legislation does not overstep necessary boundaries. However, this essay has argued that such a reform is not without limitations, including the risk of inefficiency, inconsistency, and the prioritisation of national over supranational interests. Furthermore, the broader context of the democratic deficit—encompassing transparency, citizen engagement, and the powers of the European Parliament—suggests that a singular focus on national parliaments is insufficient. Instead, a balanced approach combining parliamentary scrutiny with institutional reforms and participatory mechanisms is likely to be more effective. The implications of this analysis are clear: while national parliaments can play a more important role, they are not the sole cure for the EU’s democratic challenges. Future discussions must consider how to integrate multiple reforms to achieve a truly democratic Union, ensuring both legitimacy and functionality in an increasingly complex political landscape.
References
- Cooper, I. (2015) A yellow card for the striker: National parliaments and the defeat of EU legislation on the right to strike. Journal of European Public Policy, 22(10), pp. 1406-1425.
- Craig, P. and de Búrca, G. (2020) EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials. 7th ed. Oxford University Press.
- European Union (2007) Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community. Official Journal of the European Union, C 306/1.
- Hix, S. and Høyland, B. (2011) The Political System of the European Union. 3rd ed. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kiiver, P. (2012) The Early Warning System for the Principle of Subsidiarity: Constitutional Theory and Empirical Reality. Routledge.
- Moravcsik, A. (2002) In defence of the ‘democratic deficit’: Reassessing legitimacy in the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(4), pp. 603-624.
- Winzen, T. (2017) Constitutional Preferences and Parliamentary Reform: Explaining National Parliaments’ Adaptation to European Integration. Oxford University Press.
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1 Note: All references to specific EU legislative examples, such as the 2012 yellow card on the right to strike, are based on documented cases in academic literature. If further primary documentation is required beyond the scope of this essay, consult official EU records.
2 The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) and its Protocols are accessible via the Official Journal of the European Union for precise legal provisions on subsidiarity and proportionality.
