Introduction
This essay explores the reconciliation of the ‘thin skull rule’ with the legal principles established in the case of R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95 through the application of the theory of concurrent causes. The ‘thin skull rule’—a fundamental principle in tort and criminal law—holds that a defendant must take their victim as they find them, bearing liability for the full extent of harm caused, even if the victim’s pre-existing condition exacerbates the injury. In contrast, R v Roberts introduced considerations of causation and foreseeability in assessing liability for subsequent harm. By examining the theory of concurrent causes, which addresses situations where multiple factors contribute to an outcome, this essay aims to demonstrate how these seemingly divergent principles can be harmonised. The discussion will cover the legal foundations of both concepts, their application in R v Roberts, and the role of concurrent causes in bridging interpretative gaps.
The ‘Thin Skull Rule’ and Its Legal Significance
The ‘thin skull rule,’ often encapsulated by the Latin maxim *novus actus interveniens*, underscores that a wrongdoer is responsible for the consequences of their actions, regardless of a victim’s pre-existing vulnerabilities. This principle ensures that defendants cannot escape liability by arguing that a victim’s peculiar frailty—be it physical, such as a fragile skull, or otherwise—caused the extent of the harm. For instance, in the case of Smith v Leech Brain & Co Ltd [1962] 2 QB 405, the court held that an employer was liable for an employee’s death from cancer triggered by a burn, as the pre-existing condition did not break the chain of causation (Smith, 1962). This establishes a broad scope of liability, prioritising justice for victims by holding defendants accountable for unforeseen consequences. However, this expansive approach can conflict with principles of fairness when subsequent events or actions complicate causation, as seen in R v Roberts.
R v Roberts (1971) and Causation Challenges
In R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95, the defendant assaulted a woman, who subsequently jumped from a moving car to escape further harm, sustaining injuries. The court had to determine whether the defendant’s initial act caused the injuries or if the victim’s actions constituted a break in the chain of causation. The Court of Appeal ruled that the defendant remained liable, as the victim’s response was a reasonably foreseeable reaction to the initial wrongdoing (Ashworth, 2009). This case introduced a nuanced approach to causation, focusing on foreseeability and the victim’s conduct. Unlike the strict application of the ‘thin skull rule,’ R v Roberts suggests a limit to liability if the victim’s actions are deemed wholly unreasonable. This tension raises questions about reconciling absolute liability with contextual fairness.
Concurrent Causes as a reconciliatory Framework
The theory of concurrent causes offers a framework to harmonise these principles by recognising that multiple factors can independently contribute to an outcome without negating legal responsibility. In cases involving the ‘thin skull rule,’ concurrent causes can explain how a pre-existing condition and a defendant’s act together produce harm, maintaining the defendant’s liability as a substantial cause. Similarly, in R v Roberts, the theory accommodates the possibility that both the defendant’s assault and the victim’s reaction contributed to the injury, without absolving the initial wrongdoer, provided the reaction was foreseeable (Hart and Honoré, 1985). Therefore, concurrent causes provide a balanced approach, ensuring that neither the absolute liability of the ‘thin skull rule’ nor the contextual limitations of R v Roberts are undermined. This approach arguably promotes fairness by acknowledging complex causal relationships while upholding accountability.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the theory of concurrent causes serves as an effective mechanism to reconcile the ‘thin skull rule’ with the principles established in R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95. By allowing for multiple contributing factors to be considered in determining causation, it preserves the strict liability imposed by the ‘thin skull rule’ while integrating the foreseeability considerations central to R v Roberts. This framework not only addresses the legal complexities of causation but also ensures a more equitable application of the law in cases of harm exacerbated by pre-existing conditions or subsequent actions. The implications of adopting concurrent causes as a standard approach could further refine judicial interpretation, providing clearer guidance on balancing victim protection with defendant fairness in criminal and tort law.
References
- Ashworth, A. (2009) Principles of Criminal Law. 6th ed. Oxford University Press.
- Hart, H.L.A. and Honoré, T. (1985) Causation in the Law. 2nd ed. Oxford University Press.
- Smith v Leech Brain & Co Ltd [1962] 2 QB 405.
