Introduction
This essay argues against the proposition that duress should be a defence to murder, focusing on the fundamental principles of criminal law and moral accountability. The long-standing prohibition of duress as a defence to murder in English common law, as established in cases like R v Howe [1987] AC 417, reflects a deliberate policy to prioritise the sanctity of life. By drawing on the analyses of Arenson (2014) and Elkington (2023), alongside relevant case law, this essay will contend that allowing duress as a defence undermines justice and public policy. The discussion will address the current legal position, the moral paradox of excusing murder under coercion, and counterarguments advocating for reform, ultimately reinforcing the need to maintain the prohibition.
The Current Legal Position on Duress and Murder
Under English common law, duress is not available as a defence to murder, a principle firmly established in R v Howe [1987] AC 417, where the House of Lords ruled that even under severe coercion, individuals must not be absolved of the gravest crime. This position stems from the belief that the sanctity of human life outweighs personal threats, expecting individuals to resist coercion at all costs. Arenson (2014) supports this stance, arguing that allowing duress as a defence would erode the absolute moral and legal condemnation of murder. He suggests that excusing such acts due to external pressure risks creating a dangerous precedent where accountability is diminished (Arenson, 2014). This legal framework prioritises societal protection over individual circumstances, reflecting a broader policy to deter intentional killings.
The Moral Paradox of Duress in Murder Cases
The moral implications of permitting duress as a defence to murder are profound. Arenson (2014) highlights the paradox inherent in absolving a defendant who, under threat, takes an innocent life to save their own. This act, while arguably driven by self-preservation, violates the fundamental principle that no one’s life should be sacrificed for another’s benefit. Indeed, allowing such a defence could normalise a utilitarian approach to life, undermining the intrinsic value of each individual. Furthermore, as seen in R v Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412, the law’s rejection of duress for attempted murder reinforces the notion that even preparatory acts towards murder are inexcusable. The moral weight of taking life, therefore, demands that duress remain unavailable.
Counterarguments and Rebuttal
Proponents of reform, such as Elkington (2023), argue that denying duress as a defence disregards the psychological reality of coercion, particularly in extreme circumstances where resistance seems impossible. Elkington (2023) traces the historical rigidity of this rule, suggesting it fails to account for human vulnerability and the evolving understanding of mental pressure. However, while her argument holds emotional appeal, it overlooks the potential for abuse; a broadened defence could be exploited, weakening legal deterrents against murder. Moreover, public policy must prioritise collective safety over individual plight, as leniency risks encouraging criminal coercion (Arenson, 2014). Thus, the current prohibition remains justified despite these critiques.
Conclusion
In conclusion, duress should not be a defence to murder due to the overriding importance of protecting life and maintaining moral accountability. The legal precedent in R v Howe, supported by Arenson’s (2014) analysis, underscores the necessity of this prohibition to deter grave crimes and uphold justice. Although Elkington (2023) raises valid concerns about human vulnerability, the risk of abuse and erosion of societal values outweighs the case for reform. Ultimately, maintaining this rule ensures that the law reflects an unwavering commitment to the sanctity of life, a principle that must remain paramount in criminal justice.
References
- Arenson, K.J. (2014) ‘The Paradox of Disallowing Duress as a Defence to Murder’, Journal of Criminal Law, 78, pp. 65-79.
- Elkington, A. (2023) ‘The Historical Development of Duress and the Unfounded Result of Denying Duress as a Defence to Murder’, Journal of Criminal Law, 87, pp. 207-220.
