Introduction
This essay examines whether the conduct of Your Health Germany GmbH and No Virus Ltd breaches European Union (EU) competition law, specifically under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Using the IRAC (Issue, Rule, Application, Conclusion) framework, the analysis focuses on the informal agreement made during a Christmas party in December 2024 between directors of these companies to inform each other before altering product pricing, and the subsequent pattern of similar price changes since mid-2025. The purpose is to advise Michael, a director of Your Health Inc, on the legal implications of this conduct within the EU market for antiviral herbal medicines. Key issues include whether this arrangement constitutes a prohibited agreement or concerted practice that restricts competition.
Issue
The central issue is whether the informal agreement between Your Health Germany (holding 39% of the EU market) and No Virus Ltd (holding 30%) to coordinate pricing information, followed by consistent parallel price changes, violates EU competition law under Article 101 TFEU. Specifically, does this conduct amount to an anti-competitive agreement or concerted practice that has the object or effect of restricting competition within the EU internal market?
Rule
Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings, and concerted practices that may affect trade between Member States and have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the internal market (European Union, 2012). Examples include price-fixing or market-sharing arrangements. According to established case law, such as in *T-Mobile Netherlands BV v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit* (Case C-8/08), even informal agreements or exchanges of sensitive information (like pricing intentions) can constitute a concerted practice if they reduce strategic uncertainty between competitors (European Court of Justice, 2009). However, under Article 101(3) TFEU, exemptions may apply if the agreement provides consumer benefits, promotes technical progress, and does not eliminate competition substantially.
Application
Applying the rule to the present case, the informal agreement at the Christmas party in December 2024 appears to be a concerted practice. The directors of Your Health Germany and No Virus Ltd, collectively controlling 69% of the EU market for antiviral herbal medicines, agreed to share sensitive pricing information. This exchange likely reduces uncertainty about each other’s commercial strategies, a key indicator of anti-competitive behavior as outlined in *T-Mobile*. Furthermore, the consistent pattern of similar price increases and reductions since mid-2025 suggests coordination rather than independent market behavior, potentially indicating price-fixing by effect, if not by explicit intent.
Moreover, this conduct likely affects trade between Member States, given that both companies operate across the EU, and Your Health Germany hosts an online platform facilitating sales to pharmacies and hospitals EU-wide. The significant combined market share (69%) further implies a substantial impact on competition, making an exemption under Article 101(3) unlikely, as there is no clear evidence of consumer benefits or innovation deriving from this arrangement. Indeed, parallel pricing typically harms consumers by reducing price competition (Whish and Bailey, 2021).
However, a limitation in this analysis is the lack of specific evidence on whether the price changes directly resulted from the agreement or other market factors. Without concrete proof (e.g., internal communications), establishing causation may be challenging. Nevertheless, EU law places the burden on authorities to demonstrate a plausible link, and the timing and pattern here strongly suggest coordination.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the conduct of Your Health Germany and No Virus Ltd likely breaches Article 101(1) TFEU due to the informal agreement to share pricing information and the subsequent pattern of parallel price changes. This arrangement appears to constitute a concerted practice with the effect of restricting competition within the EU market, given the companies’ dominant positions and the probable impact on inter-State trade. Michael should be advised that this behavior risks investigation and penalties by the European Commission or national competition authorities. To mitigate liability, he should ensure immediate cessation of such coordination and seek legal counsel to assess potential defenses or leniency applications under EU competition rules. The broader implication is the need for strict compliance with competition law, even in informal settings, to avoid severe financial and reputational consequences.
References
- European Court of Justice (2009) T-Mobile Netherlands BV v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, Case C-8/08, ECLI:EU:C:2009:343.
- European Union (2012) Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, C 326/47.
- Whish, R. and Bailey, D. (2021) Competition Law. 9th edn. Oxford University Press.
