Introduction
This essay provides legal advice to Aisha regarding the termination of her marriage to Bryn, which took place in July 2024. Aisha, aged 19 at the time, married under significant familial pressure, having met Bryn only twice prior to the ceremony. After living together for three months and subsequently separating in October 2024, Aisha now seeks to end the marriage as of January 2026, with the additional motivation of wishing to marry someone else. This analysis will explore her options under UK family law, specifically focusing on the grounds for nullity and divorce, as governed by the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and related legislation. Furthermore, it will consider how the advice might differ if (a) the marriage had never been consummated, or (b) Aisha had been 17 at the time of the ceremony. The essay aims to provide a clear, structured evaluation of the legal pathways available to Aisha, supported by relevant statutory provisions and case law, while acknowledging the limitations of a critical approach due to the straightforward nature of the legal principles involved.
Option 1: Seeking a Nullity Decree
A nullity decree declares a marriage void or voidable, meaning it either never legally existed or can be set aside under specific circumstances. Under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, marriages can be deemed void under Section 11 if certain conditions are not met, such as being ineligible due to age or prohibited degrees of relationship. Alternatively, a marriage can be voidable under Section 12 if specific grounds, such as lack of consent or non-consummation, apply (Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s.11-12).
In Aisha’s case, the marriage appears to meet the basic legal requirements under Section 11, as she was 19 at the time—above the legal age of 18 for marriage in England and Wales following the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Minimum Age) Act 2022. However, a potential ground for nullity arises under Section 12(c), which allows a marriage to be voidable if consent was not valid due to duress, mistake, or unsoundness of mind. Aisha’s situation suggests duress, as she married under significant pressure from her parents, who threatened disownment and familial shame if she refused. Case law, such as Hirani v Hirani (1983), establishes that duress can invalidate consent if it overbears an individual’s free will. In this precedent, a marriage was annulled due to parental pressure akin to Aisha’s experience (Hirani v Hirani, 1983). However, proving duress requires demonstrating that the pressure was sufficient to negate true consent, which may involve subjective assessment by the court.
A significant limitation for Aisha is the time bar under Section 13 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which stipulates that proceedings for nullity on grounds of lack of consent must generally be initiated within three years of the marriage. As it is now January 2026, less than three years have passed since July 2024, so this option remains open. Yet, Aisha must act promptly to avoid further delays, as any additional lapse could weaken her case, especially if the court perceives her inaction as acquiescence to the marriage. Additionally, the fact that the marriage was consummated and Aisha lived with Bryn for three months may suggest to the court that she accepted the marriage, potentially undermining her claim of duress. Therefore, while nullity is a viable option, success is not guaranteed and depends heavily on evidentiary support for her claim of coercion.
Option 2: Pursuing a Divorce
If nullity proves unattainable or undesirable, Aisha can seek a divorce under the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020, which reformed divorce law in England and Wales to introduce a ‘no-fault’ system. Since April 2022, either party can apply for a divorce by stating that the marriage has irretrievably broken down, without needing to prove fault or separation periods (Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020). This simplifies the process for Aisha, as she does not need to provide reasons beyond the breakdown of the relationship, which is evident from her separation from Bryn since October 2024.
However, a key procedural requirement is that the marriage must have lasted at least one year before a divorce application can be made. As Aisha married in July 2024, she became eligible to apply for divorce in July 2025. Given that it is now January 2026, this requirement is satisfied. The process involves submitting an application, followed by a 20-week ‘reflection period’ before a conditional order is granted, and a further 6-week period before a final order can be issued, formally ending the marriage. Therefore, divorce presents a straightforward and less contentious route compared to nullity, especially as it avoids the need to prove duress or other grounds. Aisha could initiate this process immediately, enabling her to move forward with her intention to remarry.
Alternative Scenarios: Impact of Non-Consummation or Age
The advice to Aisha would differ under the alternative scenarios provided. First, if the marriage had never been consummated, an additional ground for nullity under Section 12(a) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 would be available. A marriage can be voidable if it has not been consummated due to the incapacity of either party or the wilful refusal of the respondent. If Aisha could demonstrate either incapacity or Bryn’s refusal, she could seek nullity on this basis, subject to the same three-year time limit under Section 13. This ground would provide a stronger case for nullity compared to duress alone, as it avoids the subjective assessment of consent. However, as with duress, her delay in seeking legal remedy could be interpreted as acceptance of the marriage, potentially weakening her position.
Second, if Aisha had been 17 at the time of the ceremony in July 2024, the marriage would be void under Section 11(a)(ii) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, as amended by the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Minimum Age) Act 2022, which raised the minimum age for marriage to 18 in England and Wales. Consequently, the marriage would have no legal standing, and Aisha could apply for a declaration of nullity without needing to prove additional grounds such as duress or non-consummation. This would be the most straightforward resolution, as void marriages are treated as never having existed in law, eliminating the need for divorce proceedings.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Aisha has two primary options to end her marriage to Bryn as of January 2026. Pursuing a nullity decree on the grounds of duress under Section 12(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 remains viable within the three-year time limit, though it carries evidential challenges due to the consummation of the marriage and her delay in taking action. Alternatively, divorce under the no-fault provisions of the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020 offers a simpler and more certain route, as she meets the one-year eligibility criterion and need not prove fault. The advice shifts notably if the marriage was unconsummated, strengthening her nullity case, or if she was under 18 at the time of marriage, rendering the union void. Ultimately, Aisha is recommended to pursue divorce for its procedural simplicity unless she has compelling evidence of duress, while acting promptly to avoid further legal complications. This analysis underscores the importance of timely legal action and the nuanced interplay of statutory provisions in family law, ensuring Aisha can make an informed decision aligned with her future intentions.
References
- Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020. UK Public General Acts.
- Hirani v Hirani [1983] 4 FLR 232.
- Marriage and Civil Partnership (Minimum Age) Act 2022. UK Public General Acts.
- Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. UK Public General Acts.
