Introduction
This essay examines whether Emma has a legally enforceable contract with Daniel for the purchase of a used bicycle, focusing on the key elements of contract law: offer, acceptance, and consideration. The scenario involves Daniel’s online post advertising the bicycle for RM300, Emma’s subsequent communications offering to buy it, and Daniel’s eventual sale to another buyer for a higher price. Drawing on foundational principles of English contract law, this analysis will explore whether a binding agreement was formed between Emma and Daniel. The essay will address each component of contract formation in turn, offering a clear evaluation of Emma’s legal position while considering relevant case law and academic perspectives.
Offer: Was Daniel’s Post a Valid Offer?
In contract law, an offer is a clear, definite, and unequivocal expression of willingness by one party to enter into a contract on specified terms, with the intention that it will become binding as soon as it is accepted (Treitel, 2015). Daniel’s online post stating, “Selling used bicycle for only RM300. First come, first served. Call or message by Friday, 6pm,” must be assessed to determine whether it constitutes a valid offer. Typically, advertisements are considered invitations to treat rather than offers, as established in *Partridge v Crittenden* (1968), where a newspaper advertisement was deemed not to be an offer but an invitation for others to make offers. Applying this principle, Daniel’s post is likely an invitation to treat, inviting potential buyers to contact him with offers, rather than a unilateral offer to sell to the first responder. Therefore, Emma cannot claim that the post itself created a binding obligation on Daniel’s part.
Acceptance: Did Emma’s Messages Constitute Valid Acceptance?
Acceptance must mirror the terms of the offer and be communicated to the offeror to be effective (Peel, 2015). Emma’s initial message on Thursday morning, offering RM200, does not constitute acceptance of Daniel’s advertised price of RM300. Instead, it is a counter-offer, which, under the principle established in *Hyde v Wrench* (1840), effectively rejects the original terms and prevents acceptance of them unless revived. Emma’s second message on Friday at 3pm, offering to pay the full RM300, could potentially be seen as an attempt to accept the original terms. However, since Daniel’s post is likely an invitation to treat, Emma’s message represents an offer to buy, requiring Daniel’s acceptance to form a contract. As Daniel did not respond, there is no acceptance on his part. Furthermore, even if the post were construed as an offer, Daniel sold the bicycle to another buyer at noon on Friday, arguably revoking any potential offer before Emma’s message at 3pm.
Consideration: Was There a Promise Supported by Value?
Consideration refers to something of value given by each party to support the contract (Currie v Misa, 1875). Emma’s willingness to pay RM300 could constitute valid consideration if a contract were formed. However, since there was no acceptance by Daniel, the element of consideration remains irrelevant in this context. Without mutual agreement, there can be no binding contract, regardless of Emma’s readiness to provide payment. Indeed, Daniel’s discovery of the bicycle’s higher value and subsequent sale to another buyer for RM1000 further indicates that no contractual obligation existed with Emma.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Emma does not have a legally enforceable contract with Daniel. His online post is best interpreted as an invitation to treat rather than a firm offer, and Emma’s messages, whether as counter-offers or new offers, did not receive acceptance from Daniel. Moreover, the absence of mutual agreement negates the relevance of consideration in this scenario. The principles of English contract law, supported by cases such as *Partridge v Crittenden* and *Hyde v Wrench*, clearly indicate that no binding agreement was formed. This analysis underscores the importance of clear communication and mutual intent in contract formation. Emma, therefore, has no legal recourse against Daniel for the sale of the bicycle to another buyer, highlighting the limitations of informal online dealings in establishing contractual obligations.
References
- Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Ex 153.
- Hyde v Wrench (1840) 49 ER 132.
- Partridge v Crittenden [1968] 1 WLR 1204.
- Peel, E. (2015) Treitel: The Law of Contract. 14th edn. Sweet & Maxwell.
- Treitel, G. H. (2015) The Law of Contract. 14th edn. Sweet & Maxwell.
