A High Court Judge’s Social Media Conduct: Implications for Judicial Impartiality, Recusal, and Disciplinary Action

Introduction

The increasing prevalence of social media has introduced novel challenges to the traditional principles of judicial impartiality and independence, particularly when judges engage in public discourse on platforms like Facebook and X (formerly Twitter). This essay examines the conduct of a hypothetical High Court judge who, during an election year, shares posts criticising a political party for “corruption and incompetence,” likes and retweets content supporting the opposition leader, and is subsequently assigned a petition challenging election results involving the criticised party. The analysis addresses three key issues: whether the judge’s actions breach standards of judicial impartiality and independence; whether recusal is required; and whether such conduct could justify disciplinary action. Drawing on legal principles, relevant case law, and authoritative sources such as the Uganda Judicial Code of Conduct, the Judicial Service Act (Cap 87), and the Uganda Constitution 1995 (as amended), this essay argues that the judge’s behaviour raises significant ethical concerns, potentially necessitating recusal and disciplinary measures. The discussion will proceed by examining each issue in turn, with a focus on balancing the judge’s freedom of expression against the imperative of maintaining public trust in the judiciary.

Judicial Impartiality and Independence: Standards and Breaches

Judicial impartiality and independence are cornerstones of a fair legal system, ensuring that judges remain free from external influence and personal bias in their decision-making. Article 128 of the Uganda Constitution 1995 (as amended) explicitly guarantees the independence of the judiciary, mandating that judges exercise their functions without interference from any person or authority.¹ Furthermore, the Uganda Judicial Code of Conduct, developed by the Judicial Service Commission, stipulates that judges must avoid conduct that could reasonably be perceived as compromising their impartiality.² Specifically, Rule 3 of the Code requires judges to refrain from political activity or public commentary on matters that could undermine confidence in their neutrality.

In the present scenario, the judge’s social media activity—publicly criticising a political party and endorsing posts supporting an opposition leader—appears to contravene these standards. Such actions could reasonably be perceived as bias, particularly by members of the criticised party or the public at large. The principle of perceived impartiality is critical, as established in the UK case of Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67, which held that the test for bias is whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias.³ Although this case originates from the UK, its reasoning is persuasive in the Ugandan context, given the shared common law heritage and emphasis on impartiality in judicial codes. Applying this test, the judge’s explicit political commentary on social media during an election year could lead a reasonable observer to question their ability to adjudicate election-related matters objectively.

Moreover, the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, endorsed internationally (including by Uganda), reinforce that judges must avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.⁴ By engaging in partisan discourse on public platforms, the judge arguably fails to uphold this principle. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the judge’s conduct breaches the standards of impartiality and independence enshrined in Ugandan law and international guidelines.

The Requirement for Recusal

Recusal refers to a judge’s decision to withdraw from a case due to a conflict of interest or perceived bias. In Uganda, the Judicial Service Act (Cap 87) does not provide explicit provisions for recusal, but the principle is embedded in judicial ethics and practice, as guided by the Uganda Judicial Code of Conduct. Rule 4 of the Code mandates that a judge disqualify themselves from cases where their impartiality might reasonably be questioned.⁵ Additionally, case law supports the importance of recusal to maintain public confidence in the judiciary. For instance, in the Ugandan case of Constitutional Petition No. 6 of 1999, Tumwesigye v Attorney General, the Constitutional Court underscored that judges must avoid situations where their involvement could suggest partiality.⁶

In this scenario, the assignment of a petition challenging election results involving the political party the judge has publicly criticised creates a clear ground for recusal. The judge’s prior social media activity, which explicitly targeted the party in question and endorsed its opposition, would likely lead a fair-minded observer to doubt their impartiality. This aligns with the reasoning in the UK case of Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] QB 451, where the court held that recusal is necessary if there is a real danger of bias, whether actual or perceived.⁷ Although this precedent is not binding in Uganda, it provides a useful framework for assessing the situation. Furthermore, the timing of the social media posts—during an election year—exacerbates the perception of bias, as political sensitivities are heightened.

It should be noted, however, that recusal is not automatic and depends on the specific circumstances. If the judge can demonstrate that their personal views will not influence their judicial decisions, they might argue against recusal. Nevertheless, given the public nature of the posts and the direct relevance of the case to the criticised party, the risk of perceived bias is significant. Thus, to preserve public trust and adhere to ethical standards, recusal appears necessary in this instance.

Potential for Disciplinary Action

The question of whether the judge’s conduct warrants disciplinary action hinges on the extent to which it violates judicial ethics and undermines public confidence. Under the Judicial Service Act (Cap 87) of Uganda, the Judicial Service Commission is empowered to investigate complaints against judges and recommend disciplinary measures, including suspension or removal, for misconduct.⁸ The Uganda Judicial Code of Conduct further specifies that judges must uphold the dignity of their office and avoid behaviour that could bring the judiciary into disrepute.⁹ Publicly expressing partisan views on social media, particularly during an election period, arguably constitutes such misconduct.

Comparative case law provides insight into the potential consequences of such behaviour. For instance, in the South African case of South African Legal Practice Council v Van Wyk (2019), a judge was disciplined for making racially charged comments on social media, as they were deemed to undermine public trust in the judiciary.¹⁰ While the content of the comments differs from the present case, the principle that social media activity can justify disciplinary action is relevant. In Uganda, while there is no widely documented case directly addressing judges’ social media use, the general expectation of judicial restraint in public commentary suggests that the Commission would view the judge’s actions unfavourably.

However, any disciplinary action must balance the judge’s freedom of expression under Article 29 of the Uganda Constitution 1995 against the need to maintain judicial integrity.¹¹ While judges, as citizens, retain certain rights to free speech, these rights are curtailed by their professional obligations to remain neutral. Given the public and politically charged nature of the judge’s social media posts, disciplinary action—ranging from a formal warning to more severe sanctions—could be justified, depending on the findings of the Judicial Service Commission. At the very least, the conduct warrants investigation to assess its impact on public confidence in the judiciary.

Broader Implications and Challenges

The increasing use of social media by judicial officers poses broader challenges for the legal system. Unlike traditional forms of communication, social media amplifies personal opinions to a wide audience, often in real-time, making it difficult to retract or mitigate damage to public perception. In Uganda, where political tensions during election periods are often high, such conduct by a judge risks exacerbating public distrust in the judiciary’s role as an impartial arbiter. Indeed, the intersection of technology and judicial ethics necessitates updated guidelines or training on social media use for judges, a point echoed in international discussions on judicial conduct.¹²

Moreover, the case highlights the tension between individual rights and professional responsibilities. While judges are not stripped of their personal views, the public nature of their role demands a higher standard of discretion. This is particularly pertinent in election-related matters, where even the appearance of bias can undermine the legitimacy of judicial decisions. Therefore, beyond addressing the specific conduct of this judge, there is a need for systemic measures to prevent similar issues in the future.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the High Court judge’s social media activity—criticising a political party and endorsing opposition content during an election year—raises serious concerns about judicial impartiality and independence. The conduct appears to breach standards enshrined in the Uganda Judicial Code of Conduct and risks violating the principles of Article 128 of the Uganda Constitution 1995. Given the subsequent assignment of an election petition involving the criticised party, recusal is likely necessary to avoid the perception of bias, as supported by both Ugandan and comparative case law. Furthermore, the behaviour could justify disciplinary action under the Judicial Service Act (Cap 87), pending investigation by the Judicial Service Commission. Ultimately, this case underscores the challenges posed by social media to judicial ethics, highlighting the need for clear guidelines and heightened awareness among judges. Preserving public trust in the judiciary remains paramount, and addressing such conduct decisively is essential to maintaining confidence in the legal system.

References

• Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
• Judicial Service Act (Cap 87) of Uganda (2005) Uganda Legal Information Institute.
• Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] QB 451.
• Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67.
• South African Legal Practice Council v Van Wyk (2019) South African Legal Practice Council Reports.
• Tumwesigye v Attorney General, Constitutional Petition No. 6 of 1999 (Uganda Constitutional Court).
• Uganda Constitution 1995 (as amended) Uganda Legal Information Institute.
• Uganda Judicial Code of Conduct (2003) Judicial Service Commission of Uganda.

¹ Uganda Constitution 1995 (as amended), Article 128.
² Uganda Judicial Code of Conduct (2003), Rule 3.
³ Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67.
⁴ Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002), Principle 4.
⁵ Uganda Judicial Code of Conduct (2003), Rule 4.
⁶ Tumwesigye v Attorney General, Constitutional Petition No. 6 of 1999.
⁷ Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd [2000] QB 451.
⁸ Judicial Service Act (Cap 87) of Uganda, s. 8.
⁹ Uganda Judicial Code of Conduct (2003), Rule 2.
¹⁰ South African Legal Practice Council v Van Wyk (2019).
¹¹ Uganda Constitution 1995 (as amended), Article 29.
¹² Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002), Principle 4.