There is a growing debate that the world is gradually abandoning the rules-based international order established after 1945. Validate this statement in reference to recent global developments while assessing future challenges facing major International Organisations

Introduction

The rules-based international order, forged in the aftermath of World War II, has long served as the cornerstone of global governance. Established through institutions such as the United Nations (UN) in 1945, the Bretton Woods system including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and later the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) evolving into the World Trade Organization (WTO), this framework aimed to promote peace, economic stability, and cooperation among nations (Ikenberry, 2011). However, a growing debate suggests that this order is being gradually abandoned, driven by rising nationalism, geopolitical rivalries, and unilateral actions by major powers. This essay validates this statement by examining recent global developments, such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict, US-China tensions, and the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, while assessing future challenges for key international organisations (IOs) like the UN, WTO, and European Union (EU). Drawing on international relations theory, particularly realism and liberalism, the analysis will highlight how these events underscore a shift towards a more fragmented world order. The essay is structured into sections on the historical context, validation through recent events, and future challenges, concluding with implications for global stability.

Historical Context of the Rules-Based International Order

The post-1945 international order was designed to prevent the recurrence of devastating conflicts and economic depressions that plagued the interwar period. Rooted in liberal institutionalism, it emphasised multilateralism, where states adhere to shared rules and norms to achieve collective security and prosperity (Keohane, 1984). The UN Charter, for instance, enshrined principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, and peaceful dispute resolution, while economic institutions like the IMF facilitated financial stability through cooperative mechanisms.

This order has faced criticisms for being Western-centric, often reflecting the interests of the United States and its allies. Nevertheless, it arguably contributed to unprecedented global economic growth and a relative decline in interstate wars during the Cold War and beyond (Mearsheimer, 2019). Realist scholars, however, have long argued that such systems are inherently fragile, dependent on hegemonic power, and prone to erosion when that power wanes. Indeed, the end of the Cold War in 1991 initially seemed to strengthen this order through the expansion of institutions like NATO and the EU. Yet, as globalisation accelerated, cracks began to appear, exacerbated by the 2008 financial crisis, which exposed inequalities and fuelled populist backlashes against multilateralism (Walt, 2018).

In recent years, this erosion has become more pronounced, validating the debate on abandonment. States increasingly prioritise national interests over collective rules, challenging the liberal foundations of the order. This shift is not absolute—cooperation persists in areas like climate agreements—but it signals a gradual retreat, as evidenced by specific global developments.

Validation Through Recent Global Developments

Recent events provide compelling evidence that the world is moving away from the post-1945 rules-based order. One prominent example is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which flagrantly violated international norms enshrined in the UN Charter. By annexing territories and disregarding sovereignty, Russia challenged the principle of territorial integrity, a bedrock of the post-war order (United Nations, 2022). This action not only highlighted the UN Security Council’s paralysis—due to Russia’s veto power—but also prompted Western sanctions and a reconfiguration of global alliances, such as strengthened NATO unity. However, it also revealed divisions, with countries like India and China abstaining from UN condemnations, suggesting a multipolar world where rules are selectively applied (Allison, 2022). This development validates the abandonment thesis, as it demonstrates how great powers can act unilaterally, undermining multilateral enforcement mechanisms.

Furthermore, the US-China trade war, initiated under the Trump administration in 2018, exemplifies economic decoupling from established trade rules. The imposition of tariffs on Chinese goods bypassed WTO dispute settlement processes, weakening the organisation’s authority (Bown and Kolb, 2021). This move, continued in various forms under Biden, reflects a broader trend of protectionism, where national security concerns trump free trade principles. Realist perspectives interpret this as a power struggle in a transitioning hegemonic landscape, where the US seeks to contain China’s rise, eroding the liberal economic order (Mearsheimer, 2019). Indeed, the WTO’s appellate body has been dysfunctional since 2019 due to US blocking of judge appointments, further illustrating institutional decay.

The COVID-19 pandemic, emerging in 2020, also accelerated this trend by exposing vulnerabilities in global health governance. While the World Health Organization (WHO) coordinated responses, vaccine nationalism—where wealthy nations hoarded supplies—undermined equitable distribution efforts like COVAX (World Health Organization, 2021). This not only contravened the spirit of international cooperation but also highlighted inequalities in the rules-based system, as developing countries faced delayed access. Moreover, disinformation and blame-shifting, such as US accusations against China and the WHO, eroded trust in IOs (Kickbusch et al., 2020). These examples collectively validate the debate, showing a pattern of states prioritising self-interest over collective rules, often justified by emergencies or security imperatives.

Brexit, finalised in 2020, offers another lens, representing a retreat from regional multilateralism. The UK’s withdrawal from the EU challenged the post-war vision of European integration as a bulwark against nationalism (Adler-Nissen et al., 2017). While not a complete abandonment, it symbolises a broader populist wave, seen in movements like America’s “America First” policy, which questions the value of entangling alliances. Such developments align with constructivist theories, where identities and norms shift, leading to redefined international commitments (Wendt, 1992).

In assessing these events, it is clear that while the order is not entirely dismantled—evidenced by ongoing UN peacekeeping or WTO negotiations—the cumulative effect is a weakening of its rules-based nature. This validation is not without counterarguments; liberals might argue that adaptations, such as the Paris Climate Agreement, indicate resilience (Keohane and Victor, 2016). However, the preponderance of evidence suggests a gradual erosion, driven by geopolitical shifts.

Future Challenges Facing Major International Organisations

Looking ahead, major IOs face significant challenges that could further entrench the abandonment of the rules-based order. The UN, as the primary guardian of international peace, grapples with structural flaws like the veto power in the Security Council, which hampers responses to crises involving permanent members (United Nations, 2023). Future conflicts, such as potential escalations in the South China Sea, may exacerbate this, as rising powers like China push for reforms favouring multipolarity over Western dominance. Climate change poses another hurdle; the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change struggles with enforcement, as seen in uneven compliance with Paris targets, potentially leading to environmental unilateralism (Falkner, 2016).

The WTO confronts obsolescence in a digital age, where issues like data flows and e-commerce fall outside traditional trade rules. With ongoing disputes, such as those over subsidies in green technologies, the organisation risks irrelevance if members continue bypassing it for bilateral deals (Hoekman and Nelson, 2020). Economic fragmentation, amplified by supply chain disruptions post-COVID, could deepen this, challenging the WTO’s ability to foster inclusive growth.

For the EU, internal divisions—fuelled by migration, economic disparities, and populist governments in countries like Hungary—threaten cohesion (Börzel and Risse, 2018). External pressures, including energy dependencies exposed by the Ukraine war, may force a reevaluation of its rules-based approach, possibly towards more strategic autonomy. Globally, the rise of non-state actors, such as tech giants in cyber governance, complicates IOs’ roles, as traditional state-centric models fail to address transnational threats like cyberattacks (Nye, 2017).

These challenges demand adaptive strategies, such as digital reforms or inclusive decision-making, but resistance from nationalists could hinder progress. Realists warn of a return to power politics, while optimists see potential for hybrid orders blending rules with flexibility (Acharya, 2017). Ultimately, without reform, IOs risk marginalisation, accelerating the debated abandonment.

Conclusion

In summary, the growing debate on abandoning the post-1945 rules-based international order is validated by recent developments like the Ukraine invasion, US-China trade tensions, COVID-19 responses, and Brexit, which illustrate a shift towards unilateralism and selective adherence to norms. These events, analysed through realist and liberal lenses, reveal institutional frailties amid geopolitical changes. Future challenges for IOs such as the UN, WTO, and EU—including structural inefficiencies, climate imperatives, and technological disruptions—underscore the need for reinvention to preserve global stability. The implications are profound: a fragmented order could heighten conflicts and inequalities, urging states to balance national interests with multilateral revival. While the order’s complete demise is not inevitable, its gradual erosion demands urgent scholarly and policy attention to mitigate emerging risks.

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