Introduction
In the realm of political science, particularly within Middle Eastern studies, the dynamics of Saudi-Israeli relations represent a fascinating case of strategic pragmatism clashing with ideological and domestic pressures. The prediction in question posits that Saudi Arabia, following the cessation of hostilities in the Israel-Hamas war initiated by the October 7, 2023, attack, will swiftly pursue normalization with Israel, potentially compromising Palestinian rights in exchange for a robust alliance against Iran. This view, echoed by various analysts, assumes a return to pre-war diplomatic trajectories, driven by mutual interests in security and economic diversification. However, Israel’s military response in Gaza has elicited strong Saudi condemnation, prompting a freeze on normalization talks and gestures of solidarity with Palestinians, such as tolerating pro-Palestinian protests within the kingdom (Lynch, 2023).
As a political science student examining international relations theories like realism—which emphasize state interests over moral considerations—I find this prediction rational and logical to a degree, as it aligns with Saudi Arabia’s strategic imperatives. Nevertheless, it overlooks the transformed regional landscape post-October 7, including heightened public opposition and shifted diplomatic priorities. This essay evaluates the plausibility of the prediction by drawing on provided materials and verifiable sources. It identifies three reasons supporting its feasibility, grounded in shared anti-Iran interests, U.S.-mediated incentives, and Saudi economic ambitions, followed by three counterarguments highlighting demands for Palestinian statehood, domestic backlash, and Saudi-Iranian détente. Through this balanced analysis, the essay argues that while underlying motivations persist, new obstacles render the prediction less straightforward than assumed, reflecting the complexities of alliance formation in a volatile region.
Reasons Why the Prediction is Plausible
The prediction that Saudi Arabia will normalize relations with Israel post-hostilities, potentially sidelining Palestinian rights for an anti-Iran alliance, holds considerable strategic logic. Realism in international relations suggests states prioritize survival and power balances, often at the expense of ideological commitments (Waltz, 1979). In this context, several factors make such a development plausible, even amid current tensions.
Firstly, a shared strategic interest in countering Iran serves as a compelling driver. Both Saudi Arabia and Israel view Iran as a primary threat due to its nuclear ambitions, proxy networks, and regional influence. The provided materials note that during Iran’s April 2024 missile and drone attacks on Israel, a nascent regional Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) network was effectively tested. Remarkably, Saudi Arabia contributed by sharing radar data and deploying its air force to intercept Iranian drones, despite lacking formal ties with Israel. This de facto cooperation underscores a functional security alliance against common foes, as highlighted in analyses of U.S.-led coalitions (Pollack, 2024). Such actions demonstrate that pragmatic security needs can override public rhetoric, making post-war normalization a logical extension. For instance, Saudi participation in defending Israeli airspace, even indirectly, signals that Riyadh is willing to align with Israel when Iranian threats escalate, potentially paving the way for formal agreements once Gaza hostilities subside.
Secondly, unattainable American “carrots” incentivize Saudi Arabia to pursue normalization. Riyadh seeks high-level concessions from the U.S., including a formal defense pact, support for a civilian nuclear program with domestic uranium enrichment, and access to advanced weaponry like F-35 jets. These benefits require U.S. Congressional approval, which is improbable without Israeli consent, given the influence of pro-Israel lobbies in Washington (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007). The materials emphasize that these incentives remain unchanged post-October 7, positioning normalization as Riyadh’s key to unlocking them. Arguably, this creates a rational calculus for Saudi leaders: trading vague commitments on Palestinian issues for tangible security gains aligns with balance-of-power strategies. Historical precedents, such as the Abraham Accords where the UAE and Bahrain normalized with Israel for similar U.S. perks, suggest Saudi Arabia could follow suit once the immediate humanitarian crisis in Gaza fades, reinforcing the prediction’s plausibility.
Thirdly, Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation under Vision 2030 bolsters the case for normalization. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) pursues a hyper-nationalist agenda to diversify the economy beyond oil, necessitating foreign investment and regional stability. Integrating Israel’s expertise in technology, cybersecurity, and energy could accelerate projects like the Neom city and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). The materials indicate that normalization is seen as a gateway to these synergies, which are vital for Vision 2030’s success (Vision 2030, 2016). In a post-war scenario, economic imperatives might outweigh solidarity with Palestinians, especially if protests diminish. This reflects neorealist perspectives where economic interdependence fosters alliances, making it logical for Saudi Arabia to “trade” Palestinian rights for strategic gains against Iran, provided the regional context stabilizes.
Reasons Why the Prediction is Not Plausible
Despite the strategic merits, the prediction faces significant hurdles, exacerbated by the October 7 attack and ensuing war. Constructivist theories in political science highlight how identities, norms, and public opinion shape state behavior, often constraining rationalist pursuits (Wendt, 1992). These elements introduce formidable obstacles, rendering the swift “trading” of Palestinian rights unlikely.
Firstly, the hardened Saudi demand for Palestinian statehood represents a non-negotiable barrier. Pre-October 7, Riyadh might have accepted ambiguous statements on Palestinian issues for normalization. However, the materials reveal a shift to an unwavering insistence on a state along 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as capital. Saudi officials now deem diplomatic ties off the table without irreversible steps toward a two-state solution, a concession the Netanyahu-led Israeli government staunchly opposes (Henderson, 2024). This escalation, driven by the Gaza war’s humanitarian toll, elevates the “price” of normalization. Consequently, assuming a quick deal post-hostilities ignores this evolved stance, as Saudi Arabia’s position aligns with broader Arab norms of Palestinian solidarity, making any “trade” politically unfeasible without major Israeli compromises.
Secondly, overwhelming domestic and Arab public opposition poses a severe risk to regime legitimacy. Polling data shows 96-99% of Saudis opposing normalization with Israel amid the Gaza conflict (Washington Institute, 2023). The materials note MBS’s concerns about assassination risks, invoking Anwar Sadat’s fate after his 1979 peace with Israel. This domestic backlash, amplified by social media and protests, forces Saudi leaders to prioritize internal stability over external alliances. From a political science lens, this illustrates how audience costs—potential backlash from unpopular decisions—can deter leaders (Fearon, 1994). Thus, “trading” Palestinian rights could undermine MBS’s authority, making the prediction implausible unless public sentiment shifts dramatically post-war, which seems unlikely given the war’s lasting imagery of Palestinian suffering.
Thirdly, the Saudi-Iranian détente reduces the urgency for an anti-Iran alliance with Israel. Since the 2023 Beijing-brokered deal, Riyadh has maintained open channels with Tehran, adopting a neutral stance in the Israel-Iran conflict to avoid direct targeting. The materials describe this as “sitting on the fence,” including resistance to U.S.-led actions against Iranian proxies like the Houthis. This rapprochement diminishes the immediate need for Israeli partnership, as keeping Iran “close” offers a lower-risk security strategy (Juneau, 2023). In this context, the prediction overestimates anti-Iran motivations, as Saudi Arabia’s hedging—balancing between powers—reflects a sophisticated approach to regional security, potentially delaying or derailing normalization even after hostilities end.
Conclusion
In summary, the prediction of Saudi Arabia normalizing with Israel and “trading” Palestinian rights for an anti-Iran alliance post-hostilities is plausible due to shared threats from Iran, U.S. incentives, and Vision 2030 ambitions, which embody realist state interests. However, it is undermined by demands for Palestinian statehood, public opposition, and Saudi-Iranian détente, highlighting normative and domestic constraints. As a political science student, I agree the prediction is rational in theory, given persistent motivations, but formidable obstacles post-October 7 make it less likely without significant shifts, such as Israeli concessions or reduced tensions. This underscores the interplay of power and identity in Middle Eastern politics, with implications for U.S. mediation efforts and regional stability. Future developments, like potential U.S. elections, could tip the balance, warranting ongoing scholarly attention.
References
- Fearon, J. D. (1994) Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. American Political Science Review, 88(3), pp. 577-592.
- Henderson, S. (2024) What Saudi Arabia Wants from Israel Normalization. Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
- Juneau, T. (2023) Saudi Arabia’s Regional Realignments. Survival, 65(4), pp. 45-64.
- Lynch, M. (2023) The New Arab Public Sphere and the Gaza War. Journal of Palestine Studies, 52(2), pp. 10-25.
- Mearsheimer, J. J. and Walt, S. M. (2007) The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Pollack, K. M. (2024) Iran’s Attack on Israel: Implications for Regional Security. Brookings Institution.
- Vision 2030 (2016) Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Vision 2030. Saudi Government.
- Waltz, K. N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley.
- Washington Institute (2023) New Poll Shows Widespread Opposition to Israel Among Saudis. Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
- Wendt, A. (1992) Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization, 46(2), pp. 391-425.
