Introduction
The United Nations (UN) was established in 1945 with the ambitious aim of maintaining international peace and security, yet its effectiveness in the post-Cold War era has been repeatedly questioned. The proliferation of intra-state conflicts, human rights abuses, and the persistence of great power rivalries have fuelled arguments that the UN remains a symbolic “talking shop” lacking real coercive authority. This essay critically examines this assertion by focusing on the UN’s role in managing conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Syria, using empirical evidence to explore intra-state conflict dynamics, the impact of veto power and state sovereignty, and the issue of voluntary compliance. Employing realist and liberal perspectives, the essay argues that while the UN often appears powerless in enforcing peace—supporting realist critiques—its normative and humanitarian contributions align more closely with liberal views, suggesting a nuanced role beyond mere symbolism. Ultimately, this analysis contends that although the UN lacks hard power, it retains significant institutional influence, challenging the dismissive “talking shop” label.
Intra-State Conflict and UN Limitations: Cases of Congo and Syria
Intra-state conflicts, which dominate the post-Cold War landscape, expose the UN’s structural inability to intervene decisively. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Second Congo War (1998–2003) and subsequent violence have resulted in an estimated 5.4 million deaths, largely due to conflict, disease, and displacement (Coghlan et al., 2006). Despite the deployment of MONUSCO, the UN’s largest peacekeeping mission since 1999, violence persists in eastern DRC, driven by militias and resource exploitation. Realist scholars argue that the UN’s failure to end such conflicts stems from its lack of independent military might and enforcement mechanisms, rendering it a bystander to atrocities (Mearsheimer, 1994). Indeed, peacekeeping forces often lack the mandate or resources to engage aggressively, highlighting the UN’s symbolic rather than practical power.
Conversely, a liberal perspective suggests that the UN’s role in Congo, while limited, has had stabilising effects over time. MONUSCO has protected civilians in specific regions and supported democratic processes, such as elections in 2006 and 2011, demonstrating a gradual impact (Englebert and Tull, 2008). This aligns with liberal views that the UN’s strength lies in fostering long-term norms of cooperation and humanitarian assistance rather than immediate coercive action. Nevertheless, the persistence of violence underscores the realist critique that without hard power, the UN remains a platform for discussion, unable to enforce peace decisively.
In Syria, the civil war since 2011 has claimed over 500,000 lives and displaced millions, with documented war crimes and chemical weapon use (UN Human Rights Council, 2021). The UN’s inability to broker a ceasefire or protect civilians further illustrates its limitations in intra-state conflicts exacerbated by external powers. Realists would argue this reflects the UN’s role as a talking shop, whereSecurity Council resolutions are debated endlessly without action (Waltz, 2000). However, liberals counter that initiatives like the UN-led Geneva peace talks, though unsuccessful, provide a critical space for dialogue and maintain pressure for accountability through investigations into human rights abuses (Weiss, 2009). Still, the lack of tangible outcomes reinforces the notion of symbolic rather than substantive influence.
Veto Power and State Sovereignty: Structural Paralysis
The UN Security Council’s veto power, wielded by the five permanent members (P5), coupled with the principle of state sovereignty, often paralyses action in critical conflicts, reinforcing the “talking shop” critique. In Syria, vetoes by Russia and China have blocked resolutions aimed at sanctioning the Assad regime or authorising intervention, with Russia casting 19 vetoes on Syria-related measures between 2011 and 2021 (Security Council Report, 2021). Realist theory interprets this as evidence that the UN serves the interests of powerful states rather than collective security, lacking the authority to override national agendas (Mearsheimer, 1994). State sovereignty, enshrined in the UN Charter, further limits intervention, as governments can reject external interference, rendering the UN a forum for rhetoric over action.
From a liberal standpoint, veto power and sovereignty, while problematic, preserve the UN as a space for negotiation among rival powers, preventing escalation into broader conflicts. The veto mechanism, though frustrating, ensures great power engagement in the UN system, arguably maintaining a fragile global order (Weiss, 2009). Furthermore, liberals might note that non-coercive tools, such as UN commissions of inquiry in Syria, document abuses and build a case for future accountability, even if immediate enforcement is absent. Yet, the consistent blockage of action in crises like Syria fuels the realist view that the UN’s power is symbolic, undermined by structural flaws.
Voluntary Compliance and the Limits of Enforcement
The UN’s reliance on voluntary compliance by member states further underscores its lack of coercive authority, often reducing it to a platform for dialogue. In Congo, the effectiveness of MONUSCO hinges on the cooperation of the DRC government and regional actors, which has often been inconsistent. For instance, government forces have been implicated in abuses alongside militias, yet the UN lacks the power to enforce compliance or disarm factions unilaterally (Englebert and Tull, 2008). Realists argue this dependence on goodwill highlights the UN’s weakness as a governance mechanism; without enforcement tools, it remains a talking shop where resolutions are ignored (Waltz, 2000).
Liberals, however, contend that voluntary compliance reflects the UN’s strength in building consensus and fostering international norms over time. The UN’s mediation in Congo, such as facilitating peace agreements like the 2003 Sun City Agreement, illustrates its capacity to encourage cooperation, even if imperfectly (Autesserre, 2010). Similarly, in Syria, while compliance with UN resolutions on humanitarian access remains elusive, the organisation’s persistence in advocating for aid delivery through cross-border mechanisms has saved lives. This suggests a normative influence that transcends mere symbolism, aligning with liberal views of the UN as an institutional force, albeit one constrained by the absence of hard power.
Conclusion
The post-Cold War era, marked by persistent wars and human rights abuses, highlights the UN’s complex role in global governance. Syria demonstrates how great power rivalry can paralyse the UN, reinforcing realist claims that it lacks real coercive authority. Congo shows long-term peacekeeping limits but also gradual stabilising effects. The UN is not a world government and cannot independently enforce peace. It is therefore accurate to say it lacks hard power. However, dismissing it as merely a “talking shop” overlooks its institutional, humanitarian, and normative influence, fitting more with the liberal approach. Empirical evidence from intra-state conflicts, veto-driven paralysis, and reliance on voluntary compliance reveals a persistent thread: the UN’s symbolic power often overshadows tangible outcomes, yet its role in shaping norms and providing platforms for dialogue retains value. While realists rightly critique its lack of enforcement capacity, the liberal perspective offers a more balanced view, recognising the UN’s enduring, if imperfect, contributions to global stability. This suggests that future reforms, rather than dismissal, may better harness its potential.
References
- Autesserre, S. (2010) The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding. Cambridge University Press.
- Coghlan, B., Brennan, R. J., Ngoy, P., Dofara, D., Otto, B., Clements, M., and Stewart, T. (2006) Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A nationwide survey. The Lancet, 367(9504), 44-51.
- Englebert, P., and Tull, D. M. (2008) Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States. International Security, 32(4), 106-139.
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (1994) The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security, 19(3), 5-49.
- Security Council Report (2021) UN Security Council Working Methods: Veto. Security Council Report.
- UN Human Rights Council (2021) Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. United Nations.
- Waltz, K. N. (2000) Structural Realism after the Cold War. International Security, 25(1), 5-41.
- Weiss, T. G. (2009) What’s Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix It. Polity Press.
