Introduction
The United Nations (UN) was established in 1945 with the primary aim of preventing another global conflict following the devastation of the Second World War. The statement by Melvern (1996) encapsulates the ambitious vision behind the UN’s collective security system, positioning the Security Council as the cornerstone of international peace and security. This essay critically evaluates Melvern’s assertion, focusing on the UN’s collective security framework and the roles of relevant UN organs, particularly the Security Council. It examines whether the unprecedented powers granted to the Security Council, including the veto power of its five permanent members (P5), have enabled it to act as the ‘world’s policemen’ or if structural and practical limitations have hindered this ambition. Drawing on legal texts such as the UN Charter, academic literature, and practical examples, this essay argues that while the UN’s collective security system represents a significant advancement in international law, its effectiveness is undermined by political constraints and enforcement challenges.
The UN’s Collective Security Framework: Vision and Legal Basis
At its inception, the UN sought to create a mechanism for collective security that would prevent the recurrence of global conflicts by ensuring states acted together to maintain peace. The UN Charter, adopted in 1945, serves as the foundational legal text for this system. Under Chapter VII, the Security Council is empowered to determine the existence of threats to peace, breaches of peace, or acts of aggression, and to take measures, including the use of force, to restore international security (UN Charter, 1945, Articles 39-42). This represents an unprecedented centralisation of authority in an international body, as Melvern (1996) suggests, distinguishing the UN from its predecessor, the League of Nations, which lacked enforcement mechanisms.
The vision was that the Security Council, particularly through its P5 members (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China), would act as global enforcers. The Charter’s Article 43 envisioned member states providing military forces to the Security Council for peacekeeping and enforcement actions, ensuring that international law could be upheld with tangible power. Without such enforcement, as Melvern (1996) notes, international law risks irrelevance, leaving anarchy as the alternative. However, the reality of implementing this vision has been far more complex, with political divisions often paralysing decisive action, as explored below.
The Role and Power of the Security Council: Policemen or Political Actors?
The Security Council’s authority, especially the veto power held by the P5, was intended to ensure that major powers would collaborate to maintain global stability. Indeed, the veto was a pragmatic compromise to secure the participation of powerful states in the UN system (Simma et al., 2012). However, this very mechanism has often undermined the Council’s ability to act as an effective ‘policeman.’ For instance, during the Cold War, frequent vetoes by the United States and the Soviet Union stalled responses to crises such as the Korean War (1950-1953) and the Hungarian Uprising (1956), revealing how national interests often supersede collective security goals (Goodrich et al., 1969).
Furthermore, the absence of a standing UN military force, despite the provisions of Article 43, has limited the Security Council’s enforcement capacity. Member states have historically been reluctant to commit troops, leading to reliance on ad hoc peacekeeping missions, which are often underfunded and under-resourced. The failure of the UN to prevent or adequately respond to the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 exemplifies this limitation. Despite early warnings, the Security Council’s delayed and inadequate response resulted in the deaths of approximately 800,000 people, highlighting the gap between the UN’s ambitious vision and its practical capabilities (Melvern, 2000).
Enforcement Challenges and the Role of Other UN Organs
While the Security Council is the primary organ for peace and security, other UN bodies, such as the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), also play roles within the collective security framework. The General Assembly, under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution (Resolution 377, 1950), can recommend collective measures when the Security Council is deadlocked due to vetoes. This was notably invoked during the Korean War, demonstrating a workaround to Security Council inaction. However, such measures lack the binding force of Security Council resolutions and rely on voluntary state cooperation (White, 2002).
The ICJ contributes by providing legal clarity on disputes that could threaten peace, as seen in cases like the Nicaragua v. United States (1986), where the Court ruled against U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. Yet, the ICJ’s rulings are often ignored by powerful states, reinforcing Melvern’s (1996) concern that without enforcement, international law risks irrelevance. These examples suggest that while the UN organs collectively aim to uphold security, their effectiveness is curtailed by the same political dynamics that hinder the Security Council.
Critical Evaluation: Successes, Failures, and the Risk of Anarchy
Arguably, the UN’s collective security system has had some successes, particularly in preventing another world war through diplomatic forums and peacekeeping operations. Operations in Cyprus (UNFICYP, established 1964) and more recently in Mali (MINUSMA, established 2013) demonstrate the UN’s capacity to stabilise conflict zones, albeit under limited mandates. However, these successes are overshadowed by systemic failures in cases like Rwanda and, more recently, Syria, where vetoes by Russia and China have blocked meaningful intervention since 2011 (Simma et al., 2012).
Melvern’s (1996) assertion that the alternative to a functioning UN is ‘anarchy’ carries weight, as the absence of a collective security mechanism could lead to unchecked aggression by states. Yet, the current system, while avoiding total anarchy, often results in selective enforcement, where powerful states or their allies evade accountability. This raises questions about whether the Security Council, far from being a neutral policeman, perpetuates a hierarchy that undermines the UN’s legitimacy.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Melvern’s (1996) depiction of the UN as an ambitious experiment in collective security, with the Security Council as the world’s policemen, captures the lofty ideals behind its creation. The legal framework of the UN Charter, particularly Chapter VII, grants unprecedented powers to the Security Council to maintain peace. However, the veto power of the P5, the lack of a standing military force, and political divisions have frequently paralysed effective action, as seen in crises like Rwanda and Syria. While other UN organs, such as the General Assembly and ICJ, provide supplementary mechanisms, they too face enforcement challenges. Thus, while the UN has prevented complete anarchy, its collective security system falls short of its original vision, often prioritising state interests over universal security. The implications of this critique are significant, suggesting a need for reforms—such as revising veto rules or enhancing peacekeeping resources—to bridge the gap between ambition and reality.
References
- Goodrich, L. M., Hambro, E., and Simons, A. P. (1969) Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents. 3rd ed. Columbia University Press.
- Melvern, L. (2000) A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide. Zed Books.
- Simma, B., Khan, D. E., Nolte, G., and Paulus, A. (eds.) (2012) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary. 3rd ed. Oxford University Press.
- United Nations (1945) Charter of the United Nations. United Nations.
- White, N. D. (2002) The United Nations System: Toward International Justice. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
(Note: The word count, including references, is approximately 1050 words, meeting the requirement for at least 1000 words. Due to the inability to provide verified URLs for specific editions of the cited texts, hyperlinks have been omitted as per the guidelines.)
