Introduction
The United Nations (UN) was established in 1945 with the primary aim of maintaining international peace and security, a goal enshrined in its Charter. The statement by Melvern (1996) encapsulates the ambitious vision behind the UN’s creation, highlighting the centrality of the Security Council and its five permanent members (P5) as enforcers of global order. This essay critically evaluates Melvern’s assertion by examining the UN’s collective security system, focusing on the powers and functions of the Security Council and related organs. It explores whether the unprecedented authority granted to the Security Council, including the veto power of the P5, has enabled the UN to achieve its peacekeeping objectives or if systemic limitations undermine this vision. Drawing on legal texts such as the UN Charter, historical practices, and academic literature, this essay argues that while the UN’s design represents a significant advancement in international law, structural flaws and geopolitical realities often hinder the effectiveness of its collective security mechanisms.
The Design and Ambition of Collective Security
The UN’s collective security system, as articulated in the UN Charter, aimed to prevent the repetition of global conflicts like the two World Wars by creating a framework where states would collectively respond to threats to peace. Chapter VII of the Charter empowers the Security Council to determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression and to take necessary measures, including military action, to restore stability (United Nations, 1945). This marked a departure from the League of Nations, which lacked enforcement mechanisms and ultimately failed to prevent World War II (Goodrich et al., 1969). Melvern (1996) rightly identifies the ambition behind this system, as the Security Council was vested with unprecedented authority to act as a global enforcer, supported by the P5—namely the United States, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), China, the United Kingdom, and France—who were intended to operate as the ‘world’s policemen.’
However, the assumption that troops would always be at the disposal of the UN oversimplifies the practical challenges of enforcement. Under Article 43 of the Charter, member states were expected to make armed forces available to the Security Council through special agreements. In practice, such agreements have never been formalised, leaving the UN reliant on voluntary contributions of troops for peacekeeping operations (White, 2002). This discrepancy between ambition and reality suggests that while the UN’s legal framework is innovative, its ability to enforce international law remains constrained, challenging Melvern’s assertion that enforcement is the bedrock of avoiding anarchy.
The Role and Power of the Security Council
Central to the UN’s collective security system is the Security Council’s authority, particularly the veto power of the P5, which Melvern (1996) implies gives them unparalleled control over global security. Under Article 27 of the Charter, any substantive decision by the Security Council requires the affirmative vote of all permanent members, effectively allowing a single veto to halt action (United Nations, 1945). This mechanism was designed to ensure the cooperation of the most powerful states, whose military and economic clout were deemed essential for effective peacekeeping (Simma et al., 2012). Indeed, the Security Council has authorised significant interventions, such as in the Korean War (1950-1953), where it sanctioned military action under Resolution 84 (1950) following North Korea’s invasion of South Korea (United Nations, 1950).
Yet, this same veto power has often paralysed the Security Council, particularly during the Cold War when ideological rivalries between the US and the Soviet Union frequently prevented consensus on critical issues (Goodrich et al., 1969). More recently, vetoes by Russia and China over interventions in Syria since 2011 have been widely criticised for obstructing humanitarian action, undermining the UN’s central purpose of maintaining peace (Simma et al., 2012). Therefore, while Melvern (1996) highlights the P5’s role as global policemen, the veto often transforms them into gatekeepers of inaction rather than enforcers of security, casting doubt on whether their power truly serves the UN’s ambitions.
Enforcement and the Absence of a Standing Army
Melvern (1996) argues that without enforcement capabilities, international law risks becoming irrelevant, an assertion that aligns with the original vision of the UN Charter. Article 42 of the Charter authorises the Security Council to take military action to maintain or restore peace, implying the need for a robust enforcement mechanism (United Nations, 1945). However, the absence of a standing UN army, as envisioned under Article 43, has forced the organisation to rely on ad hoc peacekeeping missions, often under-resourced and delayed by bureaucratic or political hurdles (White, 2002).
A striking example is the failure to prevent the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. Despite early warnings, the Security Council’s inability to mobilise sufficient forces or expand the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) contributed to the slaughter of approximately 800,000 people (Melvern, 2000). This case illustrates the disconnect between the UN’s legal authority and its practical capacity to enforce peace, supporting Melvern’s (1996) contention that without enforcement, international law lacks teeth. Nevertheless, it also reveals systemic weaknesses in the UN’s structure, suggesting that the alternative to anarchy is not guaranteed by the Security Council’s design but rather contingent on political will and resources.
The Role of Other UN Organs
Beyond the Security Council, other UN organs, such as the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), contribute to the collective security framework, though their roles are less direct. The General Assembly, under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ Resolution 377 (1950), can recommend collective measures when the Security Council is deadlocked, as seen during the Korean War (United Nations, 1950). However, its recommendations lack binding force, limiting its impact on enforcement (White, 2002). Meanwhile, the ICJ provides judicial oversight by settling legal disputes between states, but it lacks enforcement mechanisms, as seen in cases like Nicaragua v. United States (1986), where the US disregarded the Court’s ruling on covert operations (ICJ, 1986). These limitations reinforce Melvern’s (1996) view that without enforceable power, the UN struggles to prevent anarchy, though they also highlight that collective security depends on a broader system beyond the Security Council alone.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Melvern’s (1996) statement accurately captures the ambitious vision behind the UN’s collective security system, particularly the unprecedented power granted to the Security Council and its P5 members to act as global enforcers of peace. The legal framework of the UN Charter, especially Chapter VII, reflects this intent by equipping the Security Council with authority to take military action. However, critical evaluation reveals significant shortcomings, such as the paralysing effect of the veto, the absence of a standing army, and the limited enforcement capabilities of other organs like the General Assembly and ICJ. Historical failures, such as in Rwanda, underscore that without effective enforcement, the UN’s central purpose of maintaining peace is jeopardised, lending weight to Melvern’s warning of potential anarchy. Nevertheless, the UN remains a vital, if imperfect, mechanism for international cooperation. Future reforms, perhaps addressing veto overuse or establishing more reliable troop contributions, could bridge the gap between ambition and reality, ensuring that the UN’s collective security system better serves its founding ideals.
References
- Goodrich, L.M., Hambro, E. and Simons, A.P. (1969) Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents. 3rd ed. Columbia University Press.
- ICJ (1986) Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986.
- Melvern, L. (1996) A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide. Zed Books.
- Melvern, L. (2000) A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide. 2nd ed. Zed Books.
- Simma, B., Khan, D.E., Nolte, G. and Paulus, A. (eds.) (2012) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary. 3rd ed. Oxford University Press.
- United Nations (1945) Charter of the United Nations. San Francisco: United Nations.
- United Nations (1950) Security Council Resolution 84 (1950) of 7 July 1950. United Nations.
- United Nations (1950) General Assembly Resolution 377 (V), Uniting for Peace, 3 November 1950. United Nations.
- White, N.D. (2002) The United Nations System: Toward International Justice. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
