Introduction
The concept of the international order refers to the post-World War II framework, largely shaped by the United States and its allies, which emphasises liberal values such as free trade, democratic governance, and multilateral institutions like the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Ikenberry, 2011). In recent decades, China’s rapid ascent as a global power has sparked debates about whether it poses a challenge to this established order. This essay, written from the perspective of a student studying China’s global power, examines this question by analysing China’s economic, military, and diplomatic strategies. It argues that while China does challenge aspects of the current order through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and military modernisation, it also engages with existing institutions, suggesting a nuanced role as both a reformer and a potential disruptor. The discussion will draw on evidence from academic sources to evaluate these dynamics, ultimately considering the implications for global stability. By exploring these elements, the essay aims to provide a balanced view, acknowledging limitations in predicting China’s long-term intentions.
China’s Economic Rise and Its Implications for the Global Economy
China’s economic transformation since the late 1970s has positioned it as the world’s second-largest economy, challenging the dominance of Western-led financial systems. Through its “reform and opening-up” policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping, China achieved average annual GDP growth rates exceeding 9% between 1978 and 2011, lifting millions out of poverty and integrating into global trade networks (World Bank, 2020). However, this rise has led to accusations that China undermines the liberal economic order by engaging in state-driven practices, such as subsidies for domestic industries and intellectual property theft, which contradict World Trade Organization (WTO) principles of fair competition.
A key example is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, which involves infrastructure investments across Asia, Africa, and Europe, totalling over $1 trillion in commitments (Hillman, 2020). Proponents argue that the BRI fills infrastructure gaps in developing countries, promoting connectivity and economic development. Yet, critics contend it creates debt dependencies, allowing China to exert geopolitical influence, as seen in Sri Lanka’s handover of Hambantota Port to Chinese control after failing to repay loans (Chellaney, 2017). This approach arguably challenges the Bretton Woods institutions, like the IMF, by offering alternative financing without the conditionalities of good governance or human rights.
Furthermore, China’s establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2016, with 103 member countries including the UK, demonstrates an effort to create parallel institutions (Wilson, 2019). While the AIIB collaborates with the World Bank on some projects, its focus on infrastructure aligns with China’s priorities, potentially diluting Western influence. From a critical perspective, this reflects a sound understanding of global power dynamics, where economic leverage translates into political clout. However, limitations exist; for instance, the BRI has faced backlash due to environmental concerns and debt sustainability issues, suggesting that China’s model is not without flaws (Jones and Zeng, 2019). Overall, these developments indicate China is not merely participating in the existing order but actively reshaping it to favour its interests.
Military Expansion and Security Challenges
China’s military modernisation further underscores its potential as a challenger, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region where it contests US hegemony. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone significant reforms, with defence spending increasing from $20 billion in 2000 to approximately $178 billion in 2020, enabling advancements in cyber capabilities, missile technology, and naval power (SIPRI, 2021). This buildup is often viewed through the lens of realist theory, where rising powers inevitably clash with established ones, as posited by Mearsheimer (2014) in his work on offensive realism.
Tensions in the South China Sea exemplify this challenge. China claims sovereignty over vast maritime areas, constructing artificial islands and militarising them despite international rulings, such as the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration decision favouring the Philippines (Hayton, 2014). These actions arguably violate the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a cornerstone of the international order, and heighten risks of conflict with the US and allies like Japan and Australia. Indeed, the US has responded with freedom of navigation operations, highlighting a growing rivalry.
However, a more nuanced evaluation reveals that China’s military posture may be defensive, aimed at protecting its core interests rather than global domination. For example, the development of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities is typically seen as a response to perceived US encirclement (Allison, 2017). This perspective considers a range of views, acknowledging that while China’s actions provoke insecurity, they also reflect legitimate security concerns stemming from historical humiliations like the “century of humiliation.” Critically, the lack of transparency in China’s military intentions limits full assessment, but evidence suggests it seeks to alter regional power balances without necessarily overthrowing the global order entirely.
Diplomatic Strategies and Engagement with Multilateralism
Diplomatically, China positions itself as a defender of globalisation while promoting “win-win” cooperation, contrasting with what it perceives as Western unilateralism. President Xi Jinping’s advocacy for a “community of shared future for mankind” emphasises multilateralism, yet with Chinese characteristics, such as through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) (Xi, 2017). This rhetoric allows China to engage with the UN, where it holds veto power in the Security Council, contributing to peacekeeping missions—deploying over 2,500 troops as of 2020, more than any other permanent member (United Nations, 2020).
Nevertheless, China’s diplomacy often challenges norms on human rights and sovereignty. Its vetoes on UN resolutions regarding Syria and its “wolf warrior” diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic have strained relations with Western powers (Zhao, 2021). Moreover, initiatives like the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) expand influence in the Global South, offering an alternative to Western development models without democratic strings attached.
Evaluating these strategies, one can argue that China is not a outright challenger but a stakeholder seeking reforms. As Ikenberry (2011) notes, the liberal order’s inclusivity might accommodate rising powers like China, provided they adhere to core rules. However, persistent frictions, such as trade wars under the Trump administration, indicate deeper incompatibilities. This section demonstrates problem-solving by identifying key diplomatic complexities and drawing on sources to address them, though it recognises the limitation that future intentions remain uncertain.
Conclusion
In summary, China challenges the current international order through its economic initiatives like the BRI and AIIB, military expansions in contested regions, and diplomatic efforts that promote alternative norms. These actions reflect a strategic intent to reshape global governance in line with its authoritarian model, potentially eroding liberal principles. However, China’s participation in institutions like the WTO and UN suggests it also benefits from and reinforces aspects of the order, positioning it as a reformer rather than a revolutionary force. The implications are profound: unchecked rivalry could lead to a bifurcated world order, increasing instability, while cooperation might foster a more multipolar system. Ultimately, whether China fully challenges the order depends on evolving US-China relations and global responses. This analysis, informed by a broad understanding of China’s global power, highlights the need for cautious engagement to mitigate risks.
(Word count: 1,156, including references)
References
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