Introduction
This essay examines Ghana’s compliance with Norms C and D of the 11 norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, as outlined by the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE). In the context of cybersecurity, these norms—part of a broader framework to promote stability and security in the digital domain—focus on protecting critical infrastructure (Norm C) and ensuring supply chain security (Norm D). With the increasing reliance on digital technologies across Africa, understanding Ghana’s adherence to these norms is vital for assessing its role in global cybersecurity. This essay will explore Ghana’s efforts, challenges, and progress in aligning with these principles, using available evidence to highlight strengths and limitations. The discussion will ultimately evaluate the implications of Ghana’s actions for national and regional cyber stability.
Norm C: Protection of Critical Infrastructure
Norm C urges states to take appropriate measures to protect their critical infrastructure from cyber threats, recognising its importance to national security and economic stability. In Ghana, critical infrastructure includes sectors such as energy, telecommunications, and finance, all of which are increasingly digitised. The government has demonstrated some commitment to this norm through the establishment of the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) in 2017, which coordinates efforts to safeguard key systems (Ministry of Communications, 2017). Additionally, the Cybersecurity Act of 2020 provides a legal framework for identifying and protecting critical information infrastructure (Government of Ghana, 2020).
However, challenges remain. Limited funding and technical expertise hinder comprehensive implementation. For instance, while policies exist, many critical sectors in Ghana still face vulnerabilities due to outdated systems and insufficient cybersecurity awareness. A report by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) notes that Ghana’s cybersecurity capacity, while improving, lags behind regional leaders like Kenya (ITU, 2020). Arguably, these gaps suggest that compliance with Norm C, though present in policy, is inconsistent in practice. The government must prioritise resource allocation and public-private partnerships to address these shortcomings.
Norm D: Supply Chain Security
Norm D calls for states to ensure the integrity of the supply chain to prevent the spread of malicious ICT tools and practices. For Ghana, compliance with this norm is complex due to its reliance on imported technology and limited domestic manufacturing capacity. The government has taken steps to address supply chain risks, including vetting foreign vendors and promoting awareness of secure procurement practices through the NCSC (Ministry of Communications, 2017). Furthermore, regional collaboration via the African Union’s cybersecurity frameworks provides Ghana with guidelines to align its supply chain policies with international standards (African Union, 2014).
Nevertheless, enforcement remains a significant obstacle. The lack of stringent regulatory oversight over imported hardware and software increases the risk of vulnerabilities. For example, small and medium enterprises, which form a large part of Ghana’s economy, often lack the resources to vet suppliers effectively. This gap highlights a broader limitation in Ghana’s cybersecurity ecosystem, where policy intentions do not always translate into actionable outcomes. Indeed, addressing supply chain security requires not only national efforts but also international cooperation to establish trusted vendor frameworks.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Ghana’s compliance with Norms C and D of the 11 norms of responsible state behaviour reflects a mix of progress and challenges. While policies and institutional frameworks like the NCSC and the Cybersecurity Act demonstrate a commitment to protecting critical infrastructure and securing supply chains, practical implementation is hindered by resource constraints and systemic gaps. These limitations underscore the need for greater investment in capacity building and regional collaboration. The implications of Ghana’s partial compliance are significant; without robust adherence to these norms, both national and regional cyber stability could be undermined. Therefore, sustained efforts to bridge these gaps are essential for Ghana to solidify its position as a responsible actor in the global cybersecurity landscape.
References
- African Union (2014) African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection. African Union.
- Government of Ghana (2020) Cybersecurity Act, 2020 (Act 1038). Government of Ghana.
- ITU (2020) Global Cybersecurity Index 2020. International Telecommunication Union.
- Ministry of Communications (2017) National Cyber Security Policy and Strategy. Government of Ghana.
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