Introduction
The liberal international order (LIO) emerged as a dominant framework in global politics following World War II, shaping international relations through institutions, norms, and economic interdependence until the early 2000s. This essay explains the expansion of the LIO during this period and its linkage to modernization theory, which posited that economic development would naturally lead to liberal democratic progress. It then identifies two contemporary phenomena—democratic backsliding and de-globalization—as potential indicators of a new transformative era in politics. By examining their emergence and implications, the essay evaluates whether these signal a major transformation, and discusses if they represent a continuation, reversal, or new phase relative to the post-WWII order. Finally, it explores underlying factors such as economic inequality and technological shifts driving these changes. Drawing on political science literature, the argument suggests these developments mark a new phase of transformation, challenging but not fully reversing the LIO’s foundations.
The Liberal International Order Post-WWII to the Early 2000s
The LIO, often described as a rules-based system promoting liberal values, expanded significantly from the post-WWII era to the early 2000s. Established primarily under U.S. leadership, it aimed to prevent future conflicts through multilateral institutions, free trade, and democratic governance. Key elements included the United Nations (UN) for collective security, the Bretton Woods institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank for economic stability, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), later the World Trade Organization (WTO), for promoting open markets (Ikenberry, 2011). This order was not merely institutional; it embedded norms of human rights, rule of law, and sovereignty, arguably fostering a period of relative peace and prosperity known as the “long peace” in Europe and beyond.
From the 1940s to the 1990s, the LIO grew amid the Cold War, with Western alliances like NATO countering Soviet influence while integrating former adversaries through economic aid, such as the Marshall Plan. The end of the Cold War in 1991 accelerated its expansion, as Eastern European states adopted liberal reforms and joined institutions like the European Union (EU). By the early 2000s, globalization had deepened interdependence, with trade volumes surging and democratic transitions occurring in regions like Latin America and Asia (Frieden, 2006). However, this expansion was uneven; critics note it often served Western interests, leading to interventions like those in Iraq, which strained its legitimacy. Generally, the LIO represented a hegemonic yet consensual order, blending power with shared rules.
Relationship Between the Liberal International Order and Modernization Theory
Modernization theory, prominent in the mid-20th century, provided an intellectual underpinning for the LIO by linking economic development to political liberalization. Theorists like Walt Rostow argued that societies progress through stages from traditional to modern economies, culminating in high-mass consumption and democratic stability (Rostow, 1960). This resonated with the LIO’s promotion of capitalism and democracy as universal paths to progress. For instance, Lipset’s hypothesis connected rising wealth and education to democratic consolidation, suggesting that LIO institutions could facilitate this by aiding development in the Global South (Lipset, 1959).
The relationship was symbiotic: the LIO operationalized modernization by channeling aid and trade to foster growth, assuming it would erode authoritarianism. Programs like the IMF’s structural adjustments encouraged market reforms, aligning with the theory’s emphasis on industrialization and urbanization. However, limitations emerged; modernization often overlooked cultural contexts, leading to uneven outcomes, such as authoritarian capitalism in places like Singapore. Thus, while the LIO drew legitimacy from modernization theory’s optimistic teleology, it also exposed the theory’s flaws when economic growth did not always yield liberal democracy.
Contemporary Phenomena: Democratic Backsliding and De-Globalization
Two key contemporary phenomena—democratic backsliding and de-globalization—can be interpreted as evidence of a new era of transformation. Democratic backsliding refers to the erosion of democratic norms in established democracies, marked by weakened institutions, populism, and executive overreach. For example, in Hungary under Viktor Orbán, reforms have curtailed judicial independence and media freedom since 2010 (Bermeo, 2016). De-globalization, meanwhile, involves retreating from global integration, seen in rising protectionism, such as the U.S.-China trade wars initiated in 2018 and Brexit in 2016, which disrupted EU unity (James, 2018).
These developments emerged due to intertwined factors like economic discontent and cultural anxieties. Democratic backsliding often stems from globalization’s losers—those affected by job losses in deindustrialized areas—fueling populist appeals (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). De-globalization arises from similar grievances, exacerbated by events like the 2008 financial crisis, which exposed inequalities in global trade. They explain transformative changes in politics by shifting power from liberal elites to nationalist leaders, reorienting policies toward sovereignty over interdependence.
Emergence and Implications for Political Transformation
These phenomena have emerged primarily due to globalization’s unintended consequences, such as rising inequality and cultural backlash. The 2008 crisis highlighted how LIO-driven financial liberalization disproportionately benefited elites, eroding trust in institutions (Rodrik, 2018). Identity politics, intertwined with backsliding, revives “us versus them” narratives, as seen in anti-immigrant sentiments. Digital technology amplifies this by enabling misinformation, further polarizing societies.
They explain transformative political changes by challenging the LIO’s assumptions. Backsliding undermines democratic diffusion, while de-globalization fragments economic ties, potentially leading to multipolar rivalries. For instance, China’s Belt and Road Initiative represents an alternative order, signaling a shift from Western hegemony.
Evaluation of a New Major Transformation
Contemporary developments arguably indicate a new major transformation, though not a complete collapse. Metrics from organizations like Freedom House show global democracy declining since 2006, with 2022 marking the 17th consecutive year of erosion (Freedom House, 2023). De-globalization is evident in trade fragmentation, with global trade growth slowing post-2010. However, this transformation is partial; institutions like the WTO persist, suggesting adaptation rather than demise. Critically, while these signal change, they may not rival the post-WWII shift’s scale, lacking a unifying ideology.
Continuation, Reversal, or New Phase Relative to the Post-WWII Order
Drawing on the LIO’s foundations and its modernization ties, these phenomena indicate a new phase of transformation rather than continuation or full reversal. The post-WWII order assumed linear progress toward liberalism, but backsliding and de-globalization reflect a backlash, reversing elements like open borders without dismantling core institutions. This new phase involves hybridization, where liberal norms coexist with illiberal practices, as in “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Unlike a reversal to pre-WWII isolationism, it adapts to multipolarity.
Underlying Factors Driving the Potential New Transformation
The primary underlying factor is economic inequality, amplified by technological disruption. Globalization’s benefits accrued unevenly, fostering resentment that populists exploit (Piketty, 2014). Digital technology accelerates this by enabling rapid mobilization, though it also offers tools for resistance. These drivers, rooted in the LIO’s own contradictions, propel a transformation toward a more contested, less universal order.
Conclusion
In summary, the LIO expanded post-WWII through institutions and norms, intertwined with modernization theory’s developmental optimism. Contemporary phenomena like democratic backsliding and de-globalization signal a new transformative phase, driven by inequality and backlash. While not a full reversal, they challenge the order’s hegemony, implying a need for adaptive reforms to sustain liberal values. This analysis underscores the LIO’s resilience amid change, with implications for future global stability.
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References
- Bermeo, N. (2016) On democratic backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 27(1), pp. 5-19.
- Freedom House (2023) Freedom in the World 2023: The democratic decline continues. Freedom House.
- Frieden, J. A. (2006) Global capitalism: Its fall and rise in the twentieth century. W.W. Norton & Company.
- Ikenberry, G. J. (2011) Liberal leviathan: The origins, crisis, and transformation of the American world order. Princeton University Press.
- James, H. (2018) Deglobalization: The rise of disembedded unilateralism. Annual Review of Financial Economics, 10, pp. 219-237.
- Levitsky, S. and Way, L. A. (2010) Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge University Press.
- Lipset, S. M. (1959) Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53(1), pp. 69-105.
- Norris, P. and Inglehart, R. (2019) Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press.
- Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the twenty-first century. Harvard University Press.
- Rodrik, D. (2018) Populism and the economics of globalization. Journal of International Business Policy, 1(1-2), pp. 12-33.
- Rostow, W. W. (1960) The stages of economic growth: A non-communist manifesto. Cambridge University Press.
