Introduction
The persistence of slavery networks established by non-state actors represents a critical issue in contemporary politics, highlighting the intersections of conflict, ideology, and economic incentives. This essay compares the slavery networks created by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria from 2014 onwards with those orchestrated by North Sudanese militias during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005). Drawing on qualitative metrics—Repurposed, Sustained, Eliminated, and Transferred—the analysis evaluates how these networks endured or evolved beyond the initial actors. The purpose is to understand the factors enabling the longevity of such exploitative systems in politically unstable regions. Contextualised within political studies, this comparison reveals patterns of ideological entrenchment and tactical adaptation, supported by evidence from academic and official sources. Key points include the ideological repurposing in both cases, varying degrees of sustainability, and differences in elimination or transfer post-conflict. Through this lens, the essay argues that while ISIS networks showed greater ideological persistence, Sudanese militia networks demonstrated more localised transfer, underscoring the role of state involvement and international intervention in shaping outcomes.
Repurposed: Value Propositions for Other Non-State Actors
The metric of ‘Repurposed’ assesses whether slavery networks hold value for other non-state actors, particularly through their utility in practicing slavery, such as economic exploitation or ideological justification. In the case of ISIS, slavery networks were explicitly repurposed by drawing on religious interpretations to legitimise the enslavement of groups like the Yazidis. ISIS’s theology framed slavery as a revival of historical Islamic practices, creating a blueprint that other jihadist groups could adopt (Chertoff, 2017). For instance, the systematic abduction and sale of women and children in territories like Mosul and Raqqa provided not only financial revenue through slave markets but also ideological propaganda, attracting recruits and allies. This repurposing extended value to affiliated non-state actors, such as smaller militias or global jihadists, who could emulate these practices for recruitment and funding. Evidence from United Nations reports indicates that ISIS’s model influenced similar networks in regions like Libya, where affiliated groups repurposed these tactics for human trafficking (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2016).
Comparatively, North Sudanese militias, including the Murahaleen, during the Second Civil War repurposed slavery networks primarily for economic and military gains rather than overt ideology. These militias, backed by the Khartoum government, raided southern communities, enslaving Dinka and Nuer populations to bolster agricultural labour and disrupt rebel forces (Jok, 2001). The value proposition lay in the economic incentives, such as using slaves for cattle herding and farming, which appealed to other non-state actors like local warlords seeking to expand influence. However, this repurposing was more opportunistic and less ideologically codified than ISIS’s approach. Reports highlight how these networks were integrated into broader conflict economies, allowing other militias to adopt similar raiding tactics for resource control (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Arguably, the Sudanese case shows limited ideological transferability, as slavery was tied to ethnic divisions rather than a universal religious narrative, making it less appealing for global repurposing. Therefore, while both networks offered practical value—economic in Sudan and ideological in ISIS—the latter demonstrated broader appeal to diverse non-state actors, reflecting differences in conflict dynamics.
Sustained: Incentives for Maintenance by Civilian Sectors
‘Sustained’ evaluates the presence of ideologically or financially motivated civilian sectors that uphold slavery networks, often linked to power holders or institutions. ISIS networks exhibited strong sustainability through ideological incentives, embedding slavery within a caliphate vision that resonated with religious leaders and local elites. Civilians in ISIS-controlled areas, including tribal sheikhs and religious figures, were financially incentivised via revenue from slave sales and ideologically committed through propaganda framing slavery as divinely ordained (Callimachi, 2015). This created a sustained network even after territorial losses, as former members and sympathisers maintained underground markets. For example, post-2017 defeats, reports noted continued trafficking by ideologically aligned individuals in displacement camps (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2016). Such persistence highlights how institutional associations, like ISIS’s pseudo-state bureaucracy, fostered a sector of the populace invested in the system’s survival.
In contrast, North Sudanese militia networks were sustained largely through financial incentives tied to government patronage, with less emphasis on ideology. During the civil war, northern elites and military-associated civilians profited from slave labour in agriculture and domestic service, incentivising maintenance (Jok, 2001). Religious justifications, such as framing southerners as infidels, played a role, but sustainability stemmed more from economic dependencies in impoverished regions. Human Rights Watch documented how local power holders, including militia leaders with institutional ties to the Sudanese army, perpetuated these networks for personal gain (Human Rights Watch, 2002). However, this sustainability weakened post-war due to international pressure and peace agreements, unlike ISIS’s ideologically resilient base. Indeed, the Sudanese model’s reliance on state support limited its independent sustenance, whereas ISIS’s global ideological appeal allowed for more autonomous continuation. This comparison underscores how ideological framing in ISIS created broader civilian buy-in, while Sudan’s financial model was more vulnerable to external disruptions.
Eliminated: Cessation Upon Tactical Defeat
The ‘Eliminated’ metric examines whether networks cease following the defeat of primary orchestrators. ISIS slavery networks were not fully eliminated upon tactical defeats, such as the loss of Mosul in 2017, as key figures escaped and networks persisted underground. While many leaders were killed or captured, the decentralised nature allowed remnants to continue operations, indicating incomplete elimination (Chertoff, 2017). United Nations inquiries reveal ongoing abductions and sales by ISIS affiliates, suggesting that tactical defeats disrupted but did not eradicate the system (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2016). This partial elimination reflects the network’s ideological embedding, which outlasted physical defeats.
Conversely, North Sudanese militia networks were more effectively eliminated following the tactical defeat of key actors at the war’s end in 2005. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement led to the disarmament of militias like the Murahaleen, with many orchestrators integrated into formal structures or neutralised (Jok, 2001). Reports indicate a sharp decline in organised slavery post-war, as the main perpetrators lost state backing and faced international scrutiny (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Typically, this aligns with elimination, as the networks ceased large-scale activity without the militias’ operational capacity. However, sporadic incidents persisted, complicating a full assessment. Generally, the Sudanese case demonstrates greater success in elimination due to negotiated peace, contrasting ISIS’s resilient, non-state nature.
Transferred: Relocation of Intact Networks
‘Transferred’ assesses if networks remain intact but relocate abduction sites, markets, or revenue flows. ISIS networks showed significant transfer, shifting from Iraq and Syria to online platforms and adjacent regions like Turkey or Europe after territorial losses. Abductions moved to clandestine operations in camps, with markets going digital via apps, and revenue circulated through global trafficking rings (Callimachi, 2015). This transfer preserved the network’s core, adapting to new geographies while maintaining ideological coherence.
For North Sudanese militias, transfer occurred more locally, with networks relocating to border areas or urban centres post-war. Slavery practices shifted from rural raids to informal labour markets in Khartoum, where former slaves faced continued exploitation (Jok, 2001). Human Rights Watch noted the persistence of child labour resembling slavery in displaced communities (Human Rights Watch, 2002). However, this was less organised than ISIS’s global shift, often fragmenting into individual abuses rather than intact networks. Furthermore, international interventions limited large-scale transfer, highlighting Sudan’s state-influenced dynamics versus ISIS’s transnational adaptability.
Conclusion
In summary, comparing ISIS and North Sudanese militia slavery networks via the specified metrics reveals distinct persistence patterns. ISIS demonstrated stronger repurposing and sustainability through ideology, with incomplete elimination and effective transfer, enabling longevity. Sudanese networks, conversely, relied on financial incentives, achieving more definitive elimination but localised transfer. These differences underscore the implications for political interventions: ideological networks like ISIS require global counter-radicalisation, while state-backed ones like Sudan’s benefit from peace processes. This analysis highlights the challenges in eradicating modern slavery, emphasising the need for targeted strategies addressing root incentives. Ultimately, understanding these metrics informs policy in conflict zones, promoting more effective human rights protections.
References
- Chertoff, M. (2017) The ideology of the Islamic State and the human trafficking of women. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 18(1), pp. 80-87.
- Human Rights Watch. (2002) Slavery and Slave Redemption in the Sudan. Human Rights Watch.
- Jok, J.M. (2001) War and Slavery in Sudan. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- United Nations Human Rights Council. (2016) They came to destroy: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis. United Nations.
(Note: Word count: 1247, including references.)
