Introduction
The rise of the Nazi Party in Germany between 1929 and 1932 remains one of the most significant and troubling phenomena in twentieth-century history. During this period, the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) transformed from a marginal political group into a major force, culminating in Adolf Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor in January 1933. Two contrasting interpretations offer insights into the reasons for this rapid growth in support. Interpretation 1, from Hite and Hinton (2000), emphasises Hitler’s charismatic leadership and the effective use of propaganda as central to the Nazi success. In contrast, Interpretation 2, from Kershaw (1998), argues that external events, particularly the economic depression following the Wall Street Crash, were more decisive than Hitler’s personal actions in propelling the Nazis to power. This essay evaluates the extent to which Interpretation 2 provides a convincing explanation for the Nazi Party’s rise, drawing on both interpretations and historical context. While acknowledging Hitler’s role, it will argue that chance events, such as the economic crisis, were indeed the primary catalysts for the surge in Nazi support during these years.
Economic Crisis as a Catalyst for Nazi Support
Interpretation 2 asserts that the growth in Nazi support between 1929 and 1932 was largely due to chance events, notably the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the subsequent Great Depression. This perspective holds substantial weight when viewed against the historical backdrop. The Wall Street Crash triggered a global economic downturn, which severely impacted Germany, a nation already burdened by reparations from the Treaty of Versailles and dependent on American loans. By 1930, German unemployment soared to over 3 million, peaking at around 6 million by 1932 (Overy, 1996). This economic hardship created widespread disillusionment with the Weimar Republic, as successive governments failed to address the crisis effectively.
The Nazi Party capitalised on this discontent. In the Reichstag elections of 1928, the Nazis held a mere 12 seats, reflecting their status as a fringe party. However, by the 1930 election—amidst the deepening depression—they secured 107 seats, becoming the second-largest party (Kershaw, 1998). This dramatic increase suggests that economic despair drove many Germans to seek radical alternatives. Furthermore, as Interpretation 2 highlights, the depression was a chance event, outside Hitler’s control, yet it provided a fertile ground for Nazi propaganda. The party promised economic recovery and national rejuvenation, resonating with a population desperate for solutions. Thus, the economic crisis arguably played a more significant role than any individual action by Hitler in boosting Nazi support, lending strong credibility to Interpretation 2.
Shift Towards Extremist Politics
Another critical factor supporting Interpretation 2 is the broader shift in German political preferences during the early 1930s. The economic crisis not only undermined faith in the Weimar government but also in moderate political parties, such as the Social Democrats (SPD), which appeared ineffective in addressing unemployment and poverty. As a result, many voters turned to extremist parties on both the left and right. In 1928, extremist parties, including the Nazis and the Communist Party (KPD), accounted for roughly 20% of the vote in the Reichstag. By 1932, however, their combined share had risen to nearly 50% (Peukert, 1991). This polarisation underscores the impact of external events on political behaviour.
For many middle- and upper-class Germans, fearful of a communist takeover due to the KPD’s growing influence, the Nazis emerged as the lesser of two evils. The party’s anti-communist stance, coupled with promises to restore order and traditional values, appealed to these groups, further swelling their support base (Overy, 1996). This trend aligns with Interpretation 2’s argument that external circumstances, rather than Hitler’s personal initiatives, shaped the political landscape in the Nazis’ favour. While Hitler’s leadership provided direction, it was the context of economic and social instability that created the demand for extremist solutions.
Hitler’s Role and Limitations of Interpretation 2
While Interpretation 2 convincingly highlights the importance of chance events, it underplays the role of Hitler’s leadership and propaganda, as outlined in Interpretation 1. Hitler’s powerful oratory skills and ability to connect emotionally with audiences were undeniably significant. His speeches often addressed specific grievances—unemployment, national humiliation, and the perceived weaknesses of Weimar democracy—offering hope for a revitalised Germany (Hite and Hinton, 2000). Moreover, under the guidance of Joseph Goebbels, Nazi propaganda effectively exploited modern media, such as radio and mass rallies, targeting diverse social groups with tailored messages. This strategic use of communication amplified the party’s visibility and influence during a time of crisis.
However, the limitations of Hitler’s personal impact must be acknowledged, as Interpretation 2 suggests. Hitler became the leader of the NSDAP in 1921, yet for nearly a decade, the party remained politically insignificant, despite his consistent delivery of powerful speeches. It was only after the economic collapse of 1929 that the Nazis gained traction, indicating that Hitler’s charisma alone was insufficient without a receptive audience created by external events (Kershaw, 1998). Therefore, while Hitler’s role was important, it was arguably secondary to the broader context of economic and social upheaval, reinforcing the central premise of Interpretation 2.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Interpretation 2, as articulated by Kershaw (1998), provides a compelling explanation for the growth in support for the Nazi Party between 1929 and 1932, emphasising the decisive role of chance events such as the Wall Street Crash and the Great Depression. The economic crisis created widespread discontent, eroded trust in the Weimar Republic, and drove voters towards extremist parties, with the Nazis benefiting significantly from this polarisation. While Interpretation 1 rightly highlights Hitler’s charismatic leadership and the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda, these factors were ultimately enabled by the external conditions of economic hardship and political instability. Therefore, I largely agree with Interpretation 2, as the evidence suggests that without the catalyst of the depression, the Nazi Party would likely have remained a marginal force, regardless of Hitler’s personal qualities. This analysis underlines the importance of historical context in shaping political outcomes, demonstrating how unforeseen events can dramatically alter the trajectory of a nation. It also serves as a reminder of the vulnerability of democratic systems during times of crisis, a lesson that remains relevant in understanding political extremism today.
References
- Hite, J. and Hinton, C. (2000) Weimar and Nazi Germany. London: Hodder Education.
- Kershaw, I. (1998) Hitler 1889–1936: Hubris. London: Allen Lane.
- Overy, R. (1996) The Nazi Economic Recovery 1932–1938. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Peukert, D. J. K. (1991) The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity. London: Penguin Books.
