Introduction
This essay explores the evolving geography of American naval shipbuilding from 1890 to 1989, a century during which the United States Navy transformed from relative obscurity to global dominance. Drawing on the detailed analysis provided by Walters (2000), this study examines the shifting locations of naval construction, the economic and political factors influencing these changes, and the broader implications for regional identity and industrial development. The purpose of this inquiry is to understand how geographical patterns in shipbuilding reflect not only technological and economic trends but also the political dynamics of defense industries. The essay will first outline the historical progression of shipbuilding locations across five distinct periods, then discuss key influences such as policy and labor costs, and finally evaluate the persistence and transformation of regional hubs. By engaging with Walters’ thematic mapping and historical insights, this piece aims to illuminate the complex interplay between geography, industry, and national strategy.
Historical Shifts in Naval Shipbuilding Locations
The period from 1890 to 1989 encapsulates significant changes in the spatial distribution of American naval shipbuilding, as detailed by Walters (2000). In the initial phase (1890-1909), shipbuilding was heavily concentrated along the lower Delaware River, often referred to as the “American Clyde,” centered around Philadelphia (Walters, 2000, p. 422). This region benefited from proximity to steel production and steam-engine manufacturing, with key yards like John Roach at Chester and William Cramp and Sons in Philadelphia dominating early contracts. The technological lag compared to European counterparts was evident, yet legislative insistence on domestic manufacture ensured that American shipyards, unlike their Russian or Japanese counterparts, built nearly all naval vessels locally (Walters, 2000, p. 422). This early concentration laid the foundation for subsequent regional dominance in the Northeast.
By the period of 1910-1929, the focus remained on a few key locations, with private yards such as Bethlehem Steel’s Fore River Yard and New York Shipbuilding in Camden driving production alongside government facilities (Walters, 2000, p. 424). The surge in battleship and destroyer production during and after World War I reinforced these centers, though the 1920s saw struggles for private yards as contracts shifted to government facilities, leading to closures like that of Cramp in Philadelphia in 1927 (Walters, 2000, p. 425). The interwar years highlighted vulnerabilities in over-reliance on naval contracts, a recurring theme in later decades. During 1930-1949, encompassing World War II, the scale of construction reached unprecedented levels, with traditional Northeast yards producing the majority of large combat ships, despite new yards emerging in the South, West, and Great Lakes (Walters, 2000, p. 426). This era demonstrated a blend of locational stability and expansion driven by wartime necessity.
Post-war periods (1950-1969 and 1970-1989) saw a marked decline in traditional Northeast hubs like Philadelphia and Boston, as high labor costs and congressional decisions to cease navy yard construction shifted focus to the Gulf Coast and select Atlantic yards like Newport News (Walters, 2000, pp. 428-430). Ingalls Shipbuilding in Pascagoula, Mississippi, emerged as a key player, benefiting from political support and lower costs (Walters, 2000, p. 429). By the 1980s, specialization increased, with entire ship classes assigned to single builders, further disrupting traditional regional politics of naval construction (Walters, 2000, p. 430). These shifts illustrate how geographical patterns evolved in response to economic and strategic demands, often at the expense of historical centers.
Key Influences: Policy, Economics, and Technology
Several factors influenced the changing geography of naval shipbuilding, with government policy playing a pivotal role. From the outset, the insistence on domestic manufacture, enshrined in naval laws since the late 19th century, shaped the industry by ensuring that American yards, rather than foreign ones, received contracts (Walters, 2000, p. 422). During the 1930s, New Deal legislation mandating that half of warships be built in government yards—though never fully implemented—briefly altered locational dynamics by emphasizing facilities like Norfolk and Mare Island (Walters, 2000, p. 427). Moreover, political considerations often overshadowed economic logic, as evidenced by President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s wry comment on the intense lobbying from shipbuilding communities: “Shipbuilding yards and navy yards resort to everything, mothers, children, politics, everything else” (Roosevelt, 1972, cited in Walters, 2000, p. 427). Such statements highlight how political clout, often tied to specific regions, influenced contract allocations.
Economic considerations, particularly labor and land costs, also drove locational shifts. By the 1950s and 1960s, high-cost metropolitan areas in the Northeast struggled to compete with emerging Gulf Coast yards, where labor was cheaper and political support from southern Democrats on congressional committees provided further advantages (Walters, 2000, p. 429). Indeed, a 1984 navy report cited by Walters (2000, p. 431) noted that Pacific shipbuilding costs were 4.6% higher than on the East Coast and 9.2% higher than in the Gulf, underscoring the economic rationale behind the regional pivot southward. Technological advancements further complicated locational choices, as modern ships required extensive electronics—sometimes comprising half the cost of a destroyer by the 1970s—spreading expenditure across multiple sites rather than concentrating it in traditional shipyards (Walters, 2000, p. 430). These factors collectively reshaped the geography of naval construction over the century.
Locational Inertia and Transformation
Despite these shifts, a degree of locational inertia persisted in certain regions, reflecting the complex nature of industrial geography. Walters (2000, p. 431) notes that places like Bath, Maine, and Newport News, Virginia, remained significant centers of shipbuilding for over a century, a stability rare among American industries. Bath’s specialization in destroyers and Newport News’ focus on aircraft carriers during the Cold War exemplify how historical expertise and strategic importance could sustain regional relevance (Walters, 2000, p. 428). However, this inertia coexisted with dramatic transformations elsewhere, as the decline of big-city shipbuilding in the Northeast—evident by the 1970s when Philadelphia and Boston ceased major production—demonstrated the limits of historical dominance in the face of economic pressures (Walters, 2000, p. 428).
The rise of Gulf Coast shipyards, particularly Ingalls in Pascagoula, arguably represents the most significant transformation, driven by both cost advantages and political influence through figures like Senator John C. Stennis (Walters, 2000, p. 429). This shift challenges simplistic narratives of industrial decline, suggesting instead a reallocation of resources shaped by broader socio-economic trends. Furthermore, the diminishing role of the Pacific Coast, contributing less than 14% of tonnage by 1970-1989, illustrates how regional fortunes could decline even amid national expansion efforts like Reagan’s “600-ship navy” (Walters, 2000, p. 430). These patterns of inertia and change underscore the nuanced interplay between geography and industry, where stability in some areas masks upheaval in others.
Conclusion
In summary, the geography of American naval shipbuilding from 1890 to 1989 reveals a dynamic landscape shaped by historical, economic, and political forces, as meticulously documented by Walters (2000). Initially concentrated in the Northeast along the Delaware River, shipbuilding locations evolved through wartime expansions, post-war declines, and regional shifts toward the Gulf Coast, driven by cost differentials and policy interventions. While certain hubs like Bath and Newport News demonstrated remarkable locational inertia, others, particularly metropolitan Northeast centers, succumbed to economic challenges. The implications of these changes extend beyond mere industrial geography, reflecting broader themes of regional identity, political influence in defense industries, and the adaptability of national strategies to global demands. Further inquiry might explore how these historical shifts inform current naval policies or compare American patterns with those of other naval powers, enhancing our understanding of geography’s role in strategic industries. Ultimately, this study affirms that mapping industrial change offers critical insights into the intersection of space, economy, and power.
References
- Walters, W. D. Jr. (2000) American Naval Shipbuilding, 1890-1989. The Geographical Review, 90(3), pp. 418-431.
