Introduction
John Locke, a foundational figure in modern political philosophy, provided influential theories on property, government, and individual rights in his seminal work, *Two Treatises of Government* (1689). Among his notable assertions is the statement that ‘…in the beginning all the World was America’ (Locke, 1988, p. 301), a metaphor suggesting that the world was once an untamed, unclaimed expanse akin to the American wilderness as perceived by Europeans in the 17th century. This essay critically assesses the significance of this statement in the context of Locke’s justification of private property. It explores how Locke uses this idea to underpin his labour theory of property, examines the implications for natural law and colonial attitudes, and evaluates the limitations of his perspective. Through this analysis, the essay aims to demonstrate the centrality of Locke’s metaphor in shaping early modern property discourse, while acknowledging the ethical and practical issues arising from his Eurocentric assumptions.
Locke’s Labour Theory of Property and the Metaphor of ‘America’
Locke’s justification of private property is rooted in his labour theory, articulated in the *Second Treatise of Government*. He argues that individuals acquire ownership of resources by mixing their labour with the natural world, thereby transforming common resources into private property (Locke, 1988, p. 287). The statement ‘…in the beginning all the World was America’ serves as a conceptual backdrop to this theory. By invoking ‘America’ as a symbol of pristine, unappropriated land, Locke implies a state of nature where resources are abundant and unclaimed, awaiting human effort to confer ownership. This imagery supports his assertion that property rights originate not from divine decree or state authority, but from individual initiative.
The metaphor is significant because it frames property as a natural right accessible to anyone willing to labour. Locke writes that God gave the earth to mankind ‘in common’ but allowed individuals to appropriate it through their work (Locke, 1988, p. 286). By likening the world to ‘America,’ he suggests a historical and geographical reality where such a state of nature could be observed, thereby lending empirical weight to his theoretical claims. However, this perspective simplifies the complex realities of indigenous land use, a point revisited later in this essay.
The Role of Natural Law and Universal Access to Property
Locke’s reference to ‘America’ also aligns with his natural law framework, which posits that certain rights and principles are inherent to human existence, independent of societal constructs. By depicting the world as an untouched wilderness, Locke reinforces the idea that property rights are a universal possibility, available to all in the state of nature. This universality is central to his argument against feudal or monarchical control over land, as it empowers individuals to claim ownership through their labour rather than through inherited privilege or royal grant (Locke, 1988, p. 290).
Furthermore, the metaphor underscores Locke’s belief in the moral limits of appropriation. He stipulates that one may only take as much as one can use without wasting resources, leaving ‘as much and as good’ for others (Locke, 1988, p. 288). In a world imagined as ‘America,’ with its vast, unexploited landscapes, this proviso appears feasible, as there is ostensibly enough land for everyone to claim. Yet, this assumption arguably fails to account for eventual scarcity or the pre-existing claims of indigenous populations, revealing a limitation in Locke’s conceptualisation of universal access.
Colonial Implications and Eurocentric Assumptions
While Locke’s statement provides a theoretical foundation for his property justification, it also carries significant colonial undertones. The depiction of ‘America’ as an empty, unclaimed space disregards the presence of indigenous peoples and their systems of land stewardship. As Tully (1993) argues, Locke’s framing effectively justifies European colonisation by presenting indigenous lands as vacant and ripe for appropriation through labour (Tully, 1993, p. 167). This perspective aligns with the broader European doctrine of *terra nullius* (nobody’s land), which facilitated territorial expansion by denying non-European land rights.
Indeed, Locke’s involvement with the Carolina colonies, where he drafted the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina in 1669, suggests a practical dimension to his theoretical work. His writings arguably provided intellectual legitimacy for colonial policies that displaced indigenous communities under the guise of ‘improving’ supposedly unused land (Armitage, 2004, p. 602). This raises ethical concerns about the application of Locke’s ideas, as his justification of property appears complicit in colonial exploitation. Therefore, while the metaphor of ‘America’ strengthens his argument for individual property rights, it simultaneously embeds a Eurocentric bias that undermines its moral universality.
Critiques and Limitations of Locke’s Perspective
The significance of Locke’s statement must also be critiqued for its historical and practical inaccuracies. Firstly, the notion of ‘America’ as a boundless commons ignores the sophisticated land management practices of indigenous peoples, including agriculture and territorial boundaries (Cronon, 1983, p. 54). Locke’s assumption of an empty landscape thus reveals a lack of engagement with non-European perspectives, limiting the applicability of his theory in diverse cultural contexts.
Secondly, the metaphor struggles to address issues of scarcity in a modern world where resources are finite. While Locke’s proviso of leaving ‘as much and as good’ seems plausible in an imagined wilderness, it becomes problematic in densely populated or resource-scarce environments (Waldron, 1988, p. 209). This discrepancy highlights a tension between Locke’s idealised state of nature and the realities of property distribution, particularly in contemporary legal systems where historical appropriations have entrenched inequality.
Despite these limitations, Locke’s statement remains significant for its enduring influence on property law and liberal thought. His ideas informed the development of Western legal frameworks, including the principle of homesteading in American property law, which echoes his labour-based justification (Epstein, 1979, p. 1225). Thus, while flawed, the metaphor of ‘America’ retains historical importance as a catalyst for debates on property rights.
Conclusion
In conclusion, John Locke’s statement that ‘…in the beginning all the World was America’ holds profound significance in his justification of private property. It serves as a powerful metaphor for the state of nature, underpinning his labour theory of property and reinforcing the natural right to ownership through individual effort. Moreover, it reflects his belief in universal access to resources under natural law, while simultaneously exposing Eurocentric biases that facilitated colonial ideologies. However, the statement’s limitations—its disregard for indigenous land use and its inapplicability to resource scarcity—reveal the boundaries of Locke’s framework. These critiques notwithstanding, the metaphor remains a cornerstone of property discourse, shaping legal and philosophical discussions to this day. Its implications extend beyond historical analysis, prompting ongoing reflection on the ethical foundations of property rights in diverse, globalised societies.
References
- Armitage, D. (2004) John Locke, Carolina, and the Two Treatises of Government. Political Theory, 32(5), pp. 602-627.
- Cronon, W. (1983) Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Epstein, R. A. (1979) Possession as the Root of Title. Georgia Law Review, 13(4), pp. 1221-1243.
- Locke, J. (1988) Two Treatises of Government. Edited by P. Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tully, J. (1993) An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Waldron, J. (1988) The Right to Private Property. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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