Introduction
This essay explores critical aspects of the Law of Evidence in Ghana, focusing on the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323). It addresses five key questions related to the concepts of relevance and admissibility, burden and standard of proof, competence of witnesses, exclusionary rules of evidence, and the admissibility of statements obtained under duress. The purpose of this analysis is to provide a sound understanding of these principles as they apply within the Ghanaian legal context, with reference to statutory provisions and relevant case law where available. The essay will first explain foundational concepts such as relevance and admissibility, then distinguish between legal and evidential burdens of proof, examine witness competence, discuss exclusionary rules, and finally apply these principles to a specific scenario involving a coerced confession. By doing so, it aims to highlight the practical implications and limitations of evidentiary rules in ensuring fair trials.
Question 1: Relevance and Admissibility of Evidence
a) Difference between Relevance and Admissibility
Relevance and admissibility are fundamental concepts in the Law of Evidence, yet they are distinct in their application. Relevance refers to the logical connection between a piece of evidence and the fact in issue. Under Section 1 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323), evidence is relevant if it makes the existence of any fact in issue more or less probable. For instance, a witness statement identifying a defendant at the crime scene is relevant as it directly relates to the question of guilt.
Admissibility, however, pertains to whether relevant evidence can be legally received by the court. Even if evidence is relevant, it may be excluded if it violates procedural or substantive rules, such as hearsay prohibitions or concerns over fairness. Section 51 of NRCD 323 provides the framework for determining admissibility, often requiring a balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect. Thus, while relevance is a prerequisite for admissibility, not all relevant evidence is admissible.
b) Tests for Determining Relevance under NRCD 323
The Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) outlines tests for relevance primarily in Sections 1 and 2. Section 1 defines relevance as evidence that tends to prove or disprove a fact in issue. The court employs a logical test: does the evidence have any tendency to make a fact more or less probable? Additionally, Section 2 introduces a materiality aspect, requiring that the fact in question be of consequence to the determination of the case. For example, evidence of a defendant’s prior threats against a victim in a murder trial would be relevant as it supports the likelihood of intent.
c) Examples of Relevant but Inadmissible Evidence
Relevant evidence may be deemed inadmissible due to exclusionary rules. One example is hearsay evidence: a statement made by a non-testifying witness regarding the defendant’s actions may be relevant to proving guilt but is generally inadmissible under Section 117 of NRCD 323 unless an exception applies (e.g., res gestae). Another instance involves illegally obtained evidence, such as a confession extracted through torture, which, despite being relevant, may be excluded under Section 120 to ensure fairness in trial proceedings. These examples illustrate the court’s role in balancing relevance with procedural integrity.
Question 2: Burden and Standard of Proof
a) Legal Burden vs. Evidential Burden
The legal burden of proof is the obligation on a party to prove the facts in issue to the required standard. In criminal cases, this burden generally rests on the prosecution to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt (Section 11, NRCD 323). Conversely, the evidential burden refers to the duty to adduce sufficient evidence to raise an issue for the court’s consideration. For instance, a defendant asserting an alibi bears the evidential burden to provide initial evidence of their absence from the crime scene, after which the legal burden remains with the prosecution to disprove it.
b) Standard of Proof in Civil and Criminal Cases
In Ghana, the standard of proof varies between civil and criminal cases. In criminal proceedings, the prosecution must prove guilt “beyond reasonable doubt” as established in cases like *R v. Kuffour* (1961), where the court emphasized that any reasonable doubt must lead to acquittal. In civil cases, the standard is on the “balance of probabilities,” meaning the plaintiff must show that their version of events is more likely than not, as illustrated in *Ababio v. Akwasi* (1994). These standards reflect the differing stakes in civil and criminal matters, with criminal law demanding greater certainty due to the potential loss of liberty.
c) Presumption of Innocence and Burden of Proof
The presumption of innocence, enshrined in Article 19(2)(c) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and reinforced by Section 11(2) of NRCD 323, holds that every accused person is innocent until proven guilty. This principle places the legal burden of proof squarely on the prosecution, ensuring that the defendant is not required to disprove their guilt. In practice, as seen in *State v. Otchere* (1963), this presumption means that any failure by the prosecution to meet the standard of proof results in acquittal, safeguarding against wrongful convictions.
Question 3: Competence of Witnesses
a) Competent Witness in a Criminal Trial
Under Section 60 of NRCD 323, a competent witness in a criminal trial is any person who understands the nature of an oath and can give rational testimony. Generally, all persons are presumed competent unless proven otherwise due to factors such as age or mental incapacity.
b) Spouse Testifying Against Partner
Section 63 of NRCD 323 provides that a spouse is competent to testify against their partner but cannot be compelled to do so, except in specific cases. Exceptions include crimes involving violence against the spouse or children, or where the spouse is a co-accused. This rule balances marital privilege with the demands of justice, ensuring that serious offenses are not shielded by personal relationships.
c) Competence of Children and Persons with Mental Disability
Children and persons with mental disabilities are competent to testify under Section 61 of NRCD 323 if they understand the duty to tell the truth and can communicate effectively. Courts may conduct a preliminary inquiry (voir dire) to assess their capacity, as seen in *Republic v. Appiah* (1980). This approach ensures that vulnerable witnesses are not arbitrarily excluded while protecting the integrity of evidence.
Question 4: Exclusionary Rules of Evidence
Three key exclusionary rules under NRCD 323 are hearsay, opinion evidence, and character evidence. First, hearsay, governed by Section 117, excludes out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted unless an exception (e.g., dying declaration under Section 118) applies. In *State v. Mensah* (1970), hearsay was excluded due to the lack of opportunity for cross-examination. Second, opinion evidence, under Section 102, is generally inadmissible unless provided by an expert whose qualifications are established, ensuring that testimony remains factual rather than speculative. Third, character evidence, regulated by Sections 52 and 53, restricts evidence of a defendant’s prior bad character unless it is relevant to the case (e.g., propensity in similar offenses), as noted in *Republic v. Boateng* (1992). These rules collectively aim to maintain fairness and reliability in evidence presentation.
Question 5: Admissibility of Statement Under Duress (AIRAC Analysis)
Area of Law
The admissibility of confessions and statements obtained under duress falls under the law of evidence, specifically rules on voluntariness and exclusionary principles as per Sections 120 and 121 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323).
Issue
The issue is whether a statement made by A to a police officer under duress is admissible as evidence in a murder trial.
Rule
Under Section 120 of NRCD 323, a confession or statement must be made voluntarily to be admissible. Voluntariness implies the absence of oppression, coercion, or inducement by a person in authority. Furthermore, Section 121 allows the court to exclude evidence if its admission would operate unfairly against the accused.
Application
Applying this to A’s case, the statement was obtained under duress, suggesting coercion by the police officer, a person in authority. Such circumstances likely render the statement involuntary under Section 120. Moreover, admitting a coerced statement risks prejudicing A’s right to a fair trial, potentially violating Section 121. Case law, such as *Republic v. Amoah* (1985), supports the exclusion of confessions obtained through threats or force, emphasizing the importance of procedural fairness. Therefore, the prosecution’s attempt to introduce this statement is likely to be challenged successfully by the defense.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the statement made by A under duress is inadmissible under Sections 120 and 121 of NRCD 323 due to lack of voluntariness and potential unfairness. The court is likely to exclude this evidence to uphold the integrity of the trial process.
Conclusion
This essay has provided a comprehensive overview of key evidentiary principles in Ghana under the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323). It has distinguished between relevance and admissibility, clarified burdens and standards of proof, examined witness competence, outlined exclusionary rules, and analyzed the inadmissibility of coerced confessions. These discussions reveal the Act’s dual focus on ensuring logical relevance and procedural fairness in legal proceedings. The analysis also highlights limitations, such as the discretionary nature of some exclusions, which may lead to inconsistent application. Overall, understanding these principles is crucial for ensuring justice, protecting rights, and maintaining the integrity of Ghanaian courts. Further exploration into judicial interpretations could enhance consistency in applying these rules.
References
- Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323). Government of Ghana.
- Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992. Government of Ghana.
- Ababio v. Akwasi (1994) Ghana Law Report. Supreme Court of Ghana.
- Republic v. Amoah (1985) Ghana Law Report. High Court of Ghana.
- Republic v. Appiah (1980) Ghana Law Report. Court of Appeal of Ghana.
- Republic v. Boateng (1992) Ghana Law Report. Supreme Court of Ghana.
- R v. Kuffour (1961) Ghana Law Report. High Court of Ghana.
- State v. Mensah (1970) Ghana Law Report. Court of Appeal of Ghana.
- State v. Otchere (1963) Ghana Law Report. Supreme Court of Ghana.
(Note: Due to the specificity of Ghanaian case law and limited access to online repositories, direct URLs to the cases could not be provided. The references are based on standard academic citation practices for legal materials in Ghana.)
