Introduction
This opinion addresses the preliminary questions referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) by a national court in the fictional EU Member State of X concerning the application of Directive 2024/2831 on improving working conditions in platform work (the ‘Platform Work Directive’). Adopted on 24 October 2024, the Directive seeks to establish harmonised rules for the classification of platform workers and to ensure fair working conditions across the European Union. However, it has proven contentious, particularly in X, which opposed its adoption within the Council of Ministers on grounds of necessity and compatibility with its national constitution. The questions posed by the national court focus on the extent to which a private individual can rely on Articles 27, 31, and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) to enforce her rights under the Directive against an intermediary, and whether alternative remedies for damages are available. This opinion will provide a reasoned analysis, grounded in established EU law principles and relevant case law, to advise the CJEU on how to respond to these queries.
Context of the Platform Work Directive and National Opposition
The Platform Work Directive represents a significant step towards addressing the precarious employment status of workers engaged in the gig economy. Its primary aim is to provide clarity on the definition of ‘worker’ within the context of digital labour platforms, ensuring that individuals are afforded appropriate social protections. Despite its adoption, opposition from Member States like X highlights deeper tensions regarding subsidiarity and national competence in employment matters. X contends that defining ‘worker’ should remain a national prerogative and argues that the Directive violates its constitutional principles, specifically Article 17, which entrusts the judiciary with determining employment relationships. Additionally, national legislation in X, enacted in September 2025, deliberately omits provisions for digital labour platforms using intermediaries and reinforces judicial autonomy in employment classifications, creating friction with the Directive’s harmonisation goals.
Reliance on Charter of Fundamental Rights: Articles 27, 31, and 47
The first preliminary question concerns the extent to which a platform worker can rely on Articles 27 (workers’ right to information and consultation), 31 (fair and just working conditions), and 47 (right to an effective remedy and fair trial) of the CFR to support her claim against an intermediary. It is well-established in EU law that the Charter applies to Member States when they are implementing EU law, as affirmed in the case of Åkerberg Fransson (C-617/10, EU:C:2013:105). Since the national law in X was adopted in the context of transposing the Platform Work Directive, the Charter is indeed relevant.
However, the direct invocation of Charter rights by individuals against private entities, such as intermediaries, is more complex. The CJEU has consistently held that Charter provisions do not generally have horizontal direct effect between private parties (see Egenberger, C-414/16, EU:C:2018:257). Therefore, Articles 27 and 31, which address substantive labour rights, cannot be directly enforced against the intermediary. Nevertheless, the national court is obliged to interpret national law in conformity with EU law, including the Charter, to the extent possible (Pfeiffer, C-397/01 to C-403/01, EU:C:2004:584). If national law fails to provide for the rights enshrined in the Directive and supported by Articles 27 and 31, the court must disapply conflicting provisions where they contravene EU obligations.
Article 47, guaranteeing an effective remedy, imposes a stronger obligation on national courts. The CJEU has emphasised that individuals must have access to judicial mechanisms to enforce EU-derived rights (Unibet, C-432/05, EU:C:2007:163). In this case, if the national law in X prevents the worker from asserting her status under the Directive due to the emphasis on judicial freedom, the court must ensure an effective remedy by prioritising EU law over incompatible national provisions, including constitutional norms, as per the principle of primacy established in Costa v ENEL (C-6/64, EU:C:1964:66). Thus, while direct reliance on Articles 27 and 31 against a private party is limited, Article 47 requires the national court to secure the worker’s access to justice in line with the Directive’s objectives.
Alternative Avenues for Seeking Damages
The second question explores whether alternative ways exist for the worker to seek damages, particularly if direct enforcement under the Directive or Charter is unavailable. One potential avenue lies in the principle of State liability, developed in Francovich (C-6/90 and C-9/90, EU:C:1991:428). If X has failed to transpose the Directive correctly—by omitting provisions on intermediaries and restricting judicial alignment with EU definitions of ‘worker’—the worker may seek damages against the State for loss suffered due to non-implementation. To succeed, she must demonstrate that the Directive confers identifiable rights, that the breach by X is sufficiently serious, and that a causal link exists between the breach and her damage. Given the clear intent of the Directive to protect platform workers, and X’s explicit exclusion of intermediaries from national law, these criteria appear arguable.
Furthermore, the principle of consistent interpretation requires national courts to construe domestic law in light of EU directives, as far as possible (Von Colson, C-14/83, EU:C:1984:153). If national provisions on employment relationships or contract law can be interpreted to align with the Directive’s protections, the worker might seek damages through existing national remedies. However, if constitutional barriers in X, such as Article 17, render this impossible, the national court must disapply such provisions to uphold EU law obligations. Lastly, while direct horizontal effect of directives is precluded (Faccini Dori, C-91/92, EU:C:1994:292), the worker could potentially invoke general principles of EU law, such as non-discrimination, if applicable to her situation, though this remains a less certain path without specific factual grounding.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this opinion advises the CJEU to respond to the national court of X as follows. On the first question, while direct reliance on Articles 27 and 31 of the Charter against a private intermediary is not possible due to the lack of horizontal effect, Article 47 imposes a duty on the national court to ensure an effective remedy by prioritising EU law over conflicting national provisions, including constitutional norms. On the second question, alternative remedies for damages may be pursued through State liability under the Francovich principle for defective transposition, or via consistent interpretation of national law to align with the Directive. If these avenues fail, the primacy of EU law must prevail to secure the worker’s rights. The implications of this approach underscore the ongoing tension between national sovereignty and EU harmonisation efforts in sensitive areas like labour law, particularly as platform work continues to grow in significance across Member States. The CJEU’s ruling will likely influence not only X’s compliance but also the broader application of the Platform Work Directive, balancing individual protections with Member State autonomy.
References
- Case C-6/64, Costa v ENEL, EU:C:1964:66.
- Case C-14/83, Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, EU:C:1984:153.
- Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori v Recreb Srl, EU:C:1994:292.
- Case C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy, EU:C:1991:428.
- Case C-397/01 to C-403/01, Pfeiffer and Others, EU:C:2004:584.
- Case C-432/05, Unibet (London) Ltd v Justitiekanslern, EU:C:2007:163.
- Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105.
- Case C-414/16, Egenberger v Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung eV, EU:C:2018:257.
