Introduction
The concept of parliamentary sovereignty has long been regarded as a cornerstone of the United Kingdom’s unwritten constitution. It asserts that Parliament holds supreme legal authority, capable of making or unmaking any law without external limitation. However, Lord Hope’s statement in R (Jackson) v Attorney-General [2006] 1 AC 262 at [104] challenges this traditional view by suggesting that parliamentary sovereignty may not be, and perhaps never was, absolute. This essay evaluates the validity of Lord Hope’s assertion in the context of 2025, exploring the historical and contemporary constraints on parliamentary sovereignty. Through an analysis of legal, political, and international developments, including the impact of devolution, the Human Rights Act 1998, and membership in international organisations, this discussion will argue that while Parliament remains dominant, its sovereignty is increasingly limited by both internal and external factors. The essay will first outline the traditional doctrine, then examine key challenges, and finally assess the state of sovereignty in the present year.
The Traditional Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty
Parliamentary sovereignty, as articulated by A.V. Dicey in the late 19th century, posits that Parliament is the supreme law-making body in the UK, with no legal limitations on its authority (Dicey, 1885). This means that no court or other body can override or set aside an Act of Parliament, and Parliament can repeal or amend any previous legislation. Historically, this principle has been upheld in cases such as Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75, where the judiciary deferred to parliamentary will despite potential injustices. The doctrine implies an absolute form of sovereignty, suggesting that Parliament can legislate on any matter, even if contrary to moral or international norms. However, as Lord Hope’s statement indicates, this absolutism has been questioned over time, particularly as the UK’s constitutional landscape has evolved. While the doctrine remains a fundamental principle, practical and legal constraints have emerged, raising doubts about its unassailable nature.
Judicial Influence and the Rule of Law
One significant challenge to absolute parliamentary sovereignty arises from the judiciary’s evolving role in upholding the rule of law. Lord Hope’s remarks in Jackson highlight judicial willingness to scrutinise parliamentary actions, particularly when fundamental constitutional principles are at stake. In R (Jackson) v Attorney-General [2005] UKHL 56, the House of Lords considered the legality of the Hunting Act 2004, passed using the Parliament Acts procedure. While the court ultimately upheld the Act, several judges, including Lord Hope, suggested that there might be limits to parliamentary power in extreme circumstances, such as attempts to abolish judicial review or fundamental rights (Bradley & Ewing, 2011). This judicial rhetoric indicates a shift towards viewing sovereignty as conditional, bound by unwritten constitutional norms. By 2025, this trend arguably persists, with courts continuing to assert their role as guardians of the rule of law, even if they stop short of directly challenging Acts of Parliament. The tension between judicial oversight and parliamentary authority thus undermines the notion of absolute sovereignty.
Devolution and Internal Constraints
The devolution of powers to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland since the late 1990s represents another limitation on parliamentary sovereignty. The Scotland Act 1998, Wales Act 1998, and Northern Ireland Act 1998 established legislatures with authority over specific policy areas, reducing Westminster’s direct control (Bogdanor, 2009). Although Parliament retains the legal right to repeal these devolution statutes, political reality renders such action highly contentious, if not infeasible. For instance, the Sewel Convention, which stipulates that Westminster should not legislate on devolved matters without consent, while not legally binding, imposes a significant political constraint. By 2025, devolution has likely deepened, with ongoing debates over further autonomy for Scotland potentially exacerbating tensions. This distribution of power within the UK suggests that parliamentary sovereignty, while legally intact, is practically fragmented, supporting Lord Hope’s contention that it is no longer absolute.
International Obligations and Human Rights
International commitments further erode the absoluteness of parliamentary sovereignty. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), incorporated into UK law via the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), empowers courts to issue declarations of incompatibility if legislation violates fundamental rights. Although such declarations do not invalidate statutes, they create political pressure for reform, as seen in cases like A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, concerning anti-terrorism detention laws (Elliott & Thomas, 2017). Moreover, despite the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union in 2020, international obligations under treaties and membership in bodies like the Council of Europe continue to influence domestic law in 2025. Parliament remains free to legislate contrary to these obligations, but doing so often incurs diplomatic and reputational costs. Therefore, while sovereignty is not legally constrained, it is practically limited by the UK’s place in the international community.
The Impact of Political and Social Norms
Beyond legal and institutional constraints, political and social norms also challenge the absolute nature of parliamentary sovereignty. Public expectations and democratic principles often dictate that Parliament exercises its powers in a manner consistent with fairness and accountability. For example, controversial legislation, such as attempts to restrict judicial oversight or civil liberties, frequently provokes public and political backlash, as evidenced by debates surrounding the Internal Market Bill 2020, which risked breaching international law (Hazell, 2021). In 2025, with increasing public engagement through digital platforms and heightened awareness of constitutional issues, Parliament arguably faces greater scrutiny than ever before. This societal pressure, while not legally binding, shapes parliamentary behaviour, reinforcing Lord Hope’s view that sovereignty operates within practical boundaries.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Lord Hope’s statement in R (Jackson) v Attorney-General remains highly relevant in 2025, as parliamentary sovereignty, while still dominant within the UK constitution, is clearly not absolute. The traditional doctrine, rooted in Dicey’s formulation, has been tempered by judicial assertions of the rule of law, the practical constraints of devolution, and the influence of international obligations such as the ECHR. Furthermore, political and social norms continue to shape the exercise of parliamentary power, illustrating that legal supremacy does not equate to unfettered authority. Although Parliament retains the theoretical ability to repeal or amend any law, the realities of modern governance—ranging from devolved administrations to global interconnections—impose significant limitations. Therefore, this essay affirms that parliamentary sovereignty, as Lord Hope suggests, is no longer, if it ever was, absolute. The implications of this shift are profound, suggesting a need for ongoing discourse on balancing parliamentary authority with constitutional checks in an increasingly complex legal and political landscape.
References
- Bogdanor, V. (2009) The New British Constitution. Hart Publishing.
- Bradley, A.W. and Ewing, K.D. (2011) Constitutional and Administrative Law. 15th edn. Longman.
- Dicey, A.V. (1885) Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. Macmillan.
- Elliott, M. and Thomas, R. (2017) Public Law. 3rd edn. Oxford University Press.
- Hazell, R. (2021) Constitutional Futures Revisited: Britain’s Constitution to 2025. Palgrave Macmillan.
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