Introduction
The philosophical concept of agency, often understood as the capacity of individuals to act intentionally and effect change in the world, has been a central concern in both metaphysics and practical philosophy. A particularly intriguing interpretation of agency is the notion of it as a ‘two-way power’—a capacity to both act and refrain from acting, thus embodying a fundamental freedom of choice. This essay explores the utility and implications of conceptualising agency as a two-way power, with a particular focus on its relevance beyond the narrative scale of human experience and its grounding in the philosophy of time. It examines the contemporary revivals of this concept by Alvarez, Steward, and Frost, addressing the criticisms faced by Alvarez and Steward for their purportedly ‘mysterious’ or ‘nonsensical’ accounts, and considers Frost’s (2019) proposal to reframe two-way power within the sphere of practical reason. Through this analysis, the essay aims to evaluate whether two-way power offers a robust framework for understanding agency across different temporal scales and philosophical dimensions.
Agency as a Two-Way Power: Conceptual Foundations
The idea of agency as a two-way power originates from the recognition that human agents possess not only the ability to act but also the capacity to refrain from acting, a distinction that sets human agency apart from mere causality or determinism. This dual capacity implies a form of control over one’s actions that is neither wholly determined by external forces nor reducible to random chance. As elaborated by historical thinkers such as Aristotle, who distinguished between voluntary and involuntary actions, two-way power reflects an essential aspect of rational deliberation (Aristotle, 2009). In contemporary philosophy, this conception has been revived to address questions of free will, moral responsibility, and intentionality, offering a nuanced perspective on what it means to be an agent.
The value of conceptualising agency in this way lies in its emphasis on freedom and accountability. By possessing a two-way power, agents are not merely reactors to stimuli but are capable of exercising control through deliberate choice. This framework is particularly useful in ethics, where the ability to choose between action and inaction underpins moral responsibility. For instance, an individual’s decision to intervene in a situation—or to abstain—can carry significant ethical weight, highlighting the practical implications of this power.
Contemporary Revivals: Alvarez, Steward, and Criticisms
In recent years, philosophers such as Maria Alvarez and Helen Steward have revisited the concept of two-way power, seeking to refine its application in understanding agency. Alvarez (2013) argues that two-way power is intrinsic to human agency, as it captures the ability to act intentionally across a range of possible outcomes. Similarly, Steward (2012) posits that this dual capacity is fundamental to distinguishing human agents from non-agentive entities, grounding agency in the ability to settle matters of choice. However, both accounts have faced criticism for their perceived opacity. Critics argue that the notion of two-way power, as presented by Alvarez and Steward, appears ‘mysterious, or even nonsensical,’ due to a lack of clarity in explaining how this power operates at a mechanistic or psychological level (Lavin, 2013). For example, it remains unclear how two-way power differs from mere indeterminacy or whether it can be empirically validated.
These criticisms point to a broader challenge in grounding two-way power as a coherent philosophical concept. While Alvarez and Steward offer compelling theoretical insights, their frameworks arguably fail to provide a sufficiently concrete basis for understanding how two-way power functions in real-world decision-making. This has led to calls for alternative approaches, with some suggesting that a more practical or normative lens might better elucidate the concept.
Frost’s Solution: Two-Way Power and Practical Reason
Addressing the shortcomings of Alvarez and Steward, Kevin Frost (2019) proposes a reorientation of two-way power within the domain of practical reason. Frost contends that agency, as a two-way power, is best understood not as a metaphysical puzzle but as a capacity exercised through rational deliberation and normative judgement. By framing two-way power as a feature of practical reasoning, Frost aims to demystify the concept, grounding it in the everyday processes by which agents weigh reasons, evaluate options, and make decisions (Frost, 2019). This approach aligns agency with the ability to respond to normative demands—such as moral obligations or prudential concerns—rather than positing an abstract or elusive capacity.
Frost’s proposal offers a promising resolution to the criticisms faced by Alvarez and Steward. For instance, by linking two-way power to practical reason, it becomes possible to explore how this capacity manifests in deliberative processes, such as when an individual chooses to act altruistically despite competing self-interests. Moreover, this perspective provides a framework for empirical investigation, as practical reasoning can be studied through psychological and sociological methods. However, Frost’s account is not without limitations; it arguably narrows the scope of agency by focusing on rational processes, potentially sidelining non-rational or instinctive aspects of human action.
Agency, Two-Way Power, and the Philosophy of Time
A further dimension to consider is how two-way power relates to the philosophy of time, particularly across narrative and elemental scales. The narrative scale concerns the overarching story of an agent’s life, encompassing long-term goals, identity, and personal development. Within this framework, two-way power is readily apparent, as agents shape their narratives through choices that span years or decades—such as career decisions or relational commitments. However, the question remains whether two-way power can be meaningfully applied outside the narrative scale, at the elemental level of fleeting moments or instantaneous decisions.
At the elemental scale, where time is experienced as discrete instances, agency as a two-way power appears less intuitive. For example, in split-second decisions—such as reacting to a sudden danger—it is unclear whether the agent genuinely exercises a dual capacity to act or refrain. Indeed, such moments may be driven by instinct rather than deliberation, challenging the applicability of two-way power. Nevertheless, Frost’s emphasis on practical reason offers a potential bridge, suggesting that even in momentary decisions, agents engage with reasons (albeit implicitly) that reflect a capacity for choice. This perspective, while speculative, indicates that two-way power might still ground agency across temporal scales, provided it is understood as embedded in rational processes rather than as a detached metaphysical property.
Critical Evaluation and Implications
The concept of agency as a two-way power is undoubtedly valuable for understanding human freedom and responsibility, particularly within ethical and practical contexts. However, as the criticisms of Alvarez and Steward demonstrate, its explanatory power is limited by challenges of clarity and concreteness. Frost’s (2019) reframing of two-way power through practical reason offers a constructive way forward, though it risks overlooking non-rational dimensions of agency. Furthermore, while two-way power aligns well with agency at the narrative scale of time, its application at the elemental level remains contentious, highlighting the need for further philosophical exploration.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the concept of agency as a two-way power provides a compelling framework for understanding human action, emphasising the dual capacity to act and refrain as central to freedom and responsibility. While contemporary accounts by Alvarez and Steward have revitalised interest in this idea, their approaches have been critiqued for lacking clarity, prompting alternative solutions such as Frost’s integration of two-way power with practical reason. Additionally, the relationship between two-way power and the philosophy of time reveals both its strengths and limitations, particularly in grounding agency beyond the narrative scale. Ultimately, while two-way power remains a useful philosophical tool, its full potential depends on addressing these ongoing challenges through continued critical engagement and interdisciplinary dialogue. This exploration not only enriches our understanding of agency but also underscores the complexity of human decision-making across diverse temporal and practical contexts.
References
- Alvarez, M. (2013) Agency and Two-Way Powers. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 113(1), pp. 101-121.
- Aristotle (2009) Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by D. Ross. Oxford University Press.
- Frost, K. (2019) Agency, Two-Way Powers, and Practical Reason. European Journal of Philosophy, 27(3), pp. 592-607.
- Lavin, D. (2013) Must There Be Basic Action? Noûs, 47(2), pp. 273-301.
- Steward, H. (2012) A Metaphysics for Freedom. Oxford University Press.
