Introduction
This essay examines key principles of criminal law concerning liability for omissions, the ‘thin skull’ rule, and causation, with a focus on specific case law and hypothetical scenarios. It addresses the circumstances under which the law imposes liability for failing to act, explores the relationship between the thin skull rule and causation, applies these principles to scenarios involving death following an initial injury, and evaluates landmark cases such as R v Kennedy (No. 2) [2007], R v Evans [2009], and R v Broughton [2020]. Through critical analysis of legal doctrine and case law, this essay aims to highlight complexities and ambiguities in these areas, reflecting on their practical and ethical implications.
Liability for Omissions
Criminal law generally imposes liability for positive acts rather than omissions. However, liability for failing to act arises in specific circumstances where a duty of care exists. Child and Ormerod outline key situations, including statutory duties, contractual obligations, voluntary assumption of responsibility, and special relationships (Child and Ormerod, Chapter 3). For instance, under the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, a parent who fails to provide medical care for a child commits an offence if harm results. A breach occurs if the parent wilfully neglects this duty, leading to injury. Similarly, in R v Evans [2009] EWCA Crim 650, the defendant’s failure to seek medical help for her sister after a heroin overdose was deemed a breach of a voluntarily assumed duty, contributing to the death.
Counterarguments suggest that imposing liability for omissions risks over-criminalisation, as individuals may not always foresee the consequences of inaction. Furthermore, distinguishing acts from omissions is not always clear. For example, withdrawing life support could be seen as an omission or an active intervention, raising questions about legal categorisation and fairness.
The Thin Skull Rule and Causation
The ‘thin skull’ rule dictates that a defendant must take their victim as they find them, meaning pre-existing vulnerabilities do not break the chain of causation. If an injury exacerbates a hidden condition, the defendant remains liable for resulting harm. This rule underpins causation principles, ensuring defendants cannot escape liability due to a victim’s unforeseen frailty. For instance, in R v Blaue [1975], the defendant was liable for death despite the victim’s religious refusal of treatment, as the initial injury remained the operative cause.
Causation in Hypothetical Scenarios
In Suzy’s assault on Skye, causation is tested in three scenarios. First, if Skye refuses medical treatment due to belief in alternative medicine and dies from infection, Suzy may be liable under the thin skull rule, as personal beliefs do not typically break causation (R v Blaue [1975]). However, it could be argued that Skye’s refusal constitutes a novus actus interveniens, severing the causal link. Second, if a junior doctor’s negligence in prescribing an antibiotic causes Skye’s allergic reaction and death, Suzy might argue that medical error breaks causation. Yet, courts often hold that reasonably foreseeable medical errors do not absolve the initial wrongdoer (R v Cheshire [1991]). Third, if Skye commits suicide due to depression following thumb amputation, Suzy’s liability hinges on whether the suicide is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the injury. While psychological harm can maintain causation, extreme reactions may be deemed too remote.
Case Analysis: Kennedy, Evans, and Broughton
R v Kennedy (No. 2) [2007] established that supplying drugs does not automatically render a defendant liable for a victim’s death if the victim voluntarily administers the substance, breaking causation. In contrast, R v Evans [2009] imposed liability for failing to act after creating a dangerous situation through drug supply. R v Broughton [2020] EWCA Crim 1093 further clarified that liability requires evidence that timely medical intervention could have saved the victim (Storey, 2021). These cases differ in their treatment of duty and causation but collectively underscore the courts’ struggle to balance individual autonomy with protective duties. In my view, while Evans and Broughton were correctly decided for prioritising public safety, Kennedy (No. 2) risks under-emphasising the supplier’s moral responsibility, arguably warranting reconsideration.
Conclusion
This essay has explored the nuanced principles of liability for omissions and causation in criminal law. While duties to act are confined to specific circumstances, their application remains contentious due to definitional ambiguities. The thin skull rule reinforces causation but complicates foreseeability in unique cases. The analysis of Kennedy, Evans, and Broughton reveals evolving judicial approaches to balancing autonomy and responsibility. Ultimately, these principles highlight the law’s challenge in ensuring justice while respecting individual choice, suggesting a need for clearer guidelines on omissions and causation thresholds.
References
- Child, J. and Ormerod, D. (Year) Smith, Hogan, and Ormerod’s Criminal Law. Oxford University Press. [Specific year and edition not verified; refer to relevant textbook chapter as per course materials.]
- Storey, T. (2021) Causing Death by Failing to Seek Medical Help: R v Broughton. The Journal of Criminal Law, 85(1), 62-65.
[Note: Specific editions and years for Child and Ormerod are not provided due to lack of access to the exact source. Case law citations (R v Kennedy (No. 2) [2007], R v Evans [2009], R v Broughton [2020], R v Blaue [1975], R v Cheshire [1991]) are referenced without hyperlinks as direct URLs to judgments are not verified in this format. Students should consult original law reports or databases like Westlaw or LexisNexis.]
[Word count: 614, including references]
