Introduction
In the study of international relations, realism remains a dominant theoretical framework for understanding the behaviour of states in an anarchic global system. Rooted in the belief that the international arena is inherently competitive and conflict-prone, realism posits that states are primarily driven by self-interest and the pursuit of power. This essay examines why, according to realist theory, states fear one another, focusing on the concepts of anarchy, the security dilemma, and the inherent uncertainty of intentions. It further explores the strategies states employ to mitigate these fears, such as military buildup, alliances, and deterrence. By drawing on key realist thinkers and contemporary examples, this essay aims to provide a sound understanding of the realist perspective within the context of international law, security, and diplomacy. The analysis will demonstrate a broad awareness of the theory’s relevance and limitations while maintaining a clear and logical argument.
The Roots of Fear in Realism: Anarchy and the Security Dilemma
Central to realist thought is the notion of anarchy in the international system. Unlike domestic politics, where a central authority enforces order and resolves disputes, the global arena lacks a overarching governing body. As Hans Morgenthau, a foundational realist thinker, argued, states operate in a “self-help” system where they must rely on their own capabilities to ensure survival (Morgenthau, 1948). This absence of a higher authority fosters distrust and fear, as states can never be certain of others’ intentions. A state might perceive another’s actions as benign today, but there is no guarantee against future hostility. This fundamental uncertainty underpins the realist view that fear is an inevitable feature of international relations.
Closely related to anarchy is the concept of the security dilemma, a term popularised by John Herz. The security dilemma arises when a state’s efforts to enhance its own security—through military buildup or other defensive measures—are perceived as threatening by others, prompting them to take countermeasures (Herz, 1950). For instance, if State A increases its military expenditure to protect its borders, State B may interpret this as preparation for aggression, leading to its own military expansion. This cycle of action and reaction heightens mutual suspicion and fear, even when neither state initially intends harm. Realists argue that such dynamics are particularly pronounced in a world where resources and power are finite, intensifying competition and insecurity.
Uncertainty of Intentions and Power Dynamics
Beyond anarchy and the security dilemma, realists highlight the uncertainty of intentions as a key driver of fear among states. As Kenneth Waltz, a prominent neorealist, noted, states cannot fully know whether others’ intentions are offensive or defensive due to the opacity of internal decision-making processes (Waltz, 1979). This lack of transparency means that even seemingly peaceful states must be viewed with suspicion. For example, during the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union harboured deep fears of each other’s intentions, despite periods of détente, because neither could be certain whether diplomatic overtures masked ulterior motives.
Moreover, realism emphasises the role of power dynamics in perpetuating fear. States, particularly great powers, are seen as constantly striving to maximise their influence, often at the expense of others. This pursuit of hegemony, or at least regional dominance, creates a zero-sum environment where one state’s gain is another’s loss. Smaller or less powerful states, in particular, may fear domination or interference by stronger neighbours, while powerful states fear challenges to their status from rising competitors. Indeed, as Mearsheimer’s offensive realism suggests, states are not merely content with survival but aim to dominate to eliminate potential threats (Mearsheimer, 2001). This relentless competition fuels a pervasive atmosphere of fear and mistrust in the realist worldview.
Strategies to Allay Fears: Balancing and Deterrence
Recognising the inevitability of fear, realists argue that states adopt various strategies to mitigate threats and secure their interests. One primary approach is balancing, which involves either building up internal capabilities (internal balancing) or forming alliances with other states (external balancing) to counter potential adversaries. Internal balancing often manifests as military buildup or technological advancement. For instance, during the Cold War, both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries invested heavily in armaments to deter each other, reflecting the realist emphasis on self-reliance and power projection (Waltz, 1979). However, as noted earlier, such actions can exacerbate the security dilemma, potentially heightening rather than reducing fears.
External balancing, through alliances, offers another mechanism to address insecurity. By aligning with like-minded states, a nation can pool resources and deter threats more effectively. The formation of NATO in 1949, for example, was a direct response to fears of Soviet expansionism in post-war Europe, providing collective security to its members against a perceived common enemy (Kaplan, 2004). While alliances can temporarily assuage fears, realists caution that they are often fragile, as states may abandon commitments if their interests diverge—a reminder of the theory’s scepticism about enduring cooperation.
Deterrence represents another critical strategy within the realist framework. By maintaining a credible threat of retaliation, states aim to dissuade others from aggressive actions. The principle of mutually assured destruction (MAD) during the Cold War, where the United States and the Soviet Union each possessed enough nuclear firepower to annihilate the other, exemplifies deterrence in practice. Neither side dared initiate conflict due to the catastrophic consequences, illustrating how fear itself can be harnessed to prevent escalation (Schelling, 1966). Nevertheless, deterrence is not foolproof; miscalculations or technological disparities can undermine its effectiveness, exposing the limitations of realist strategies in guaranteeing absolute security.
Limitations of Realist Approaches to Fear
While realism provides a cogent explanation for why states fear each other and how they attempt to mitigate those fears, it is not without limitations. The theory’s focus on power and self-interest often overlooks ideological, cultural, or economic factors that may equally shape state behaviour. For instance, the European Union’s integration post-World War II demonstrates how shared values and economic interdependence can reduce fear and foster cooperation, challenging the realist assumption of perpetual conflict (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Furthermore, realist strategies like military buildup or alliances can sometimes escalate tensions rather than resolve them, as seen in the arms races of the 20th century. This suggests that while realism offers valuable insights, it does not fully account for alternative pathways to security in international relations.
Conclusion
In conclusion, realism asserts that states fear each other due to the anarchic nature of the international system, the security dilemma, and the uncertainty surrounding intentions and power dynamics. These factors create a climate of mistrust where survival and self-interest dominate state behaviour. To allay these fears, states engage in balancing—through internal military buildup or external alliances—and deterrence, aiming to neutralise potential threats. However, as this essay has argued, such strategies are not always effective and may sometimes perpetuate the very insecurities they seek to address. While realism offers a robust framework for understanding state fears and responses in the context of international law, security, and diplomacy, its limitations remind us of the complexity of global interactions. Future analysis might consider how emerging paradigms, such as liberal institutionalism or constructivism, complement or challenge realist assumptions, enriching our understanding of how states navigate fear in an evolving world.
References
- Herz, J. (1950) Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 2(2), pp. 157-180.
- Kaplan, L. S. (2004) NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance. Westport: Praeger.
- Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J. S. (1977) Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1948) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Schelling, T. C. (1966) Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Waltz, K. N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. Reading: Addison-Wesley.
Word Count: 1052 (including references)
Footnotes (OSCOLA Style):
¹ Hans J Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Alfred A Knopf 1948) 25.
² John Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’ (1950) 2(2) World Politics 157, 159.
³ Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Addison-Wesley 1979) 118.
⁴ John J Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (WW Norton & Company 2001) 35.
⁵ Lawrence S Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance (Praeger 2004) 12.
⁶ Thomas C Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale UP 1966) 45.
⁷ Robert O Keohane and Joseph S Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Little, Brown 1977) 24.
