Introduction
The concept of legal responsibility often intersects with moral obligations, raising questions about whether the law should compel individuals to act ethically by assisting those in need. This essay examines the extent to which criminal law on omissions in the UK reflects the view that the law should encourage citizens to fulfil their civic duty to do ‘the right thing.’ It will explore the legal framework surrounding omissions, particularly in relation to duty of care, and evaluate whether this framework aligns with moral expectations. Key cases and statutory provisions will be analysed to assess the balance between individual freedom and societal responsibility. The discussion will also consider the limitations of imposing liability for inaction and the implications for broader civic duty.
The Legal Framework of Omissions in Criminal Law
In English criminal law, liability for omissions—failing to act when there is a legal duty to do so—is a narrower concept than positive acts. Generally, the law does not impose a duty to assist others unless specific circumstances apply. For instance, a duty of care may arise from a contractual relationship, a familial bond, or a voluntary assumption of responsibility. The case of R v Stone and Dobinson (1977) illustrates this principle, where defendants were held liable for manslaughter due to their failure to care for a vulnerable relative who depended on them (Ashworth, 2013). This suggests that the law partially reflects a moral imperative to help those in immediate need, at least within defined relationships.
However, the scope of such duties remains limited. Unlike some European jurisdictions, such as France, which enforce a general duty to rescue under Article 223-6 of the Penal Code, English law does not penalise bystanders who fail to assist strangers in peril. This was evident in R v Miller (1983), where liability for omission was contingent on the defendant having created a dangerous situation, rather than a broader civic duty to act (Herring, 2020). Thus, the law prioritises individual autonomy over a universal moral obligation to help, indicating a divergence from the view that citizens should always be encouraged to do ‘the right thing.’
Balancing Moral Expectations and Legal Practicality
Critics argue that expanding liability for omissions could better align criminal law with moral standards. Ashworth (2013) suggests that a limited duty to rescue, applicable in situations of minimal risk to the rescuer, could encourage civic responsibility without unduly burdening individuals. Indeed, such a reform might address public concern over cases where inaction leads to preventable harm. However, opponents contend that imposing broader duties risks legal overreach, potentially infringing on personal freedoms and creating uncertainty about when intervention is required (Herring, 2020). Furthermore, enforcing moral behaviour through law raises practical challenges, such as defining the scope of ‘need’ and assessing individual capacity to act.
The current legal stance, therefore, appears cautious, reflecting a pragmatic approach rather than a fully moralistic one. While cases like R v Dytham (1979)—where a police officer was convicted of misconduct for failing to intervene in a violent incident—demonstrate that specific roles carry enforceable duties, this is not extended to the general public. Arguably, this selective imposition of liability fails to fully encourage a universal civic duty to act in a moral sense.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the criminal law on omissions in the UK only partially reflects the view that the law should encourage citizens to do ‘the right thing’ in a moral sense. While certain duties of care exist within specific relationships or roles, as seen in R v Stone and Dobinson and R v Dytham, the absence of a general duty to rescue limits the law’s alignment with broader civic obligations. This cautious approach prioritises individual autonomy and practicality over a universal moral imperative, highlighting a key tension between legal and ethical expectations. Future reforms might consider a limited duty to assist, balancing personal freedom with societal needs, though such changes would require careful deliberation to avoid unintended consequences. Ultimately, while the law acknowledges some moral duties, it falls short of fully promoting a culture of active civic responsibility.
References
- Ashworth, A. (2013) Principles of Criminal Law. 7th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Herring, J. (2020) Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials. 9th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
