Introduction
The notion that the law should encourage citizens to uphold a moral duty to act in the face of others’ needs raises profound questions about the role of criminal law in shaping societal behaviour. Specifically, the principle of omissions—liability for failing to act—challenges the traditional legal focus on positive acts of wrongdoing. This essay explores to what extent the criminal law in England and Wales, through its treatment of omissions, reflects the view that individuals should be encouraged to do ‘the right thing’ morally by not turning a blind eye to those in need. It begins by outlining the legal framework of omissions liability, followed by an examination of key cases and statutory provisions that illustrate the law’s position. The analysis then considers whether this framework adequately promotes a civic duty to act, alongside the limitations and ethical implications of imposing such obligations. Ultimately, this essay argues that while the criminal law on omissions reflects a partial commitment to encouraging moral responsibility, significant gaps and inconsistencies remain, limiting its ability to fully align with this ideal.
The Legal Framework of Omissions in Criminal Law
In English criminal law, liability for omissions is an exception rather than the norm, as the legal system traditionally prioritises individual autonomy and holds individuals accountable for positive acts rather than failures to act (Ashworth, 2013). However, specific circumstances create a duty to act, and a breach of this duty can result in criminal liability. These duties arise in limited contexts, such as contractual obligations, statutory requirements, or relationships of dependence. For instance, under the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, parents or guardians have a legal duty to provide for a child’s welfare, and failure to do so can result in prosecution for neglect (Herring, 2018).
The rationale behind these duties often aligns with moral expectations, as society generally expects individuals to protect vulnerable persons within their care. Yet, the law is cautious in expanding the scope of omissions liability, reflecting a tension between enforcing moral behaviour and preserving personal freedom. As Ashworth (2013) notes, imposing widespread duties to act risks undermining individual liberty and creating a ‘nanny state’ where the law overreaches into personal ethics. Thus, the current framework suggests a selective approach to encouraging civic duty, limited to clearly defined relationships or roles.
Key Cases Illustrating Omissions Liability
Judicial decisions provide critical insight into how the law reflects—or fails to reflect—the principle of encouraging citizens to act morally. One landmark case, R v Stone and Dobinson (1977), demonstrates the imposition of liability for failing to care for a vulnerable individual. In this case, the defendants were held responsible for the death of Stone’s sister, who lived with them and died due to their neglect in seeking medical help. The court established that their voluntary assumption of responsibility created a duty of care, and their omission to act breached this duty, resulting in manslaughter convictions (Herring, 2018). This case arguably reflects the view that the law should encourage individuals to help those in need, particularly when they have assumed a moral or practical obligation to do so.
Conversely, cases like R v Miller (1983) highlight the law’s nuanced approach to omissions. In Miller, the defendant accidentally caused a fire but failed to take steps to extinguish it or alert others, leading to damage. The House of Lords ruled that his initial act created a dangerous situation, thereby imposing a duty to mitigate the harm—an omission for which he was criminally liable (Ashworth, 2013). While this decision extends the concept of duty beyond pre-existing relationships, it is limited to situations where the defendant’s prior conduct creates the risk. Therefore, it does not fully embrace a broader civic duty to assist strangers in need, revealing a gap between legal liability and moral ideals.
Statutory Provisions and Civic Duty
Statutory law also shapes the extent to which criminal law encourages moral responsibility through omissions. The Road Traffic Act 1988, for example, imposes a duty on drivers to stop and report accidents, reflecting a societal expectation to assist or mitigate harm following such incidents (Herring, 2018). Failure to comply can result in criminal penalties, aligning with the moral principle of not turning a blind eye to harm caused. Similarly, under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, employers have a statutory duty to ensure employee safety, with omissions leading to prosecution if harm occurs due to negligence.
However, these provisions are context-specific and do not extend to a general duty to rescue or assist in all situations of need. Unlike some European jurisdictions, such as France, where ‘Good Samaritan’ laws mandate assistance to those in danger (Ashworth, 2013), English law lacks a universal obligation to act. This raises questions about whether the law sufficiently encourages citizens to uphold a moral duty to help others, particularly in scenarios outside predefined legal relationships or statutory mandates.
Limitations and Ethical Implications
While the law on omissions partially reflects the encouragement of civic duty, significant limitations exist. First, the absence of a general duty to rescue means that individuals can legally turn a blind eye to others’ suffering without consequence, provided no specific duty applies. This legal stance arguably undermines the moral expectation to ‘do the right thing,’ as it prioritises individual freedom over collective responsibility (Herring, 2018). For instance, a bystander witnessing a drowning person has no legal obligation to intervene under English law, even if they are capable of doing so without risk to themselves.
Furthermore, expanding omissions liability poses practical and ethical challenges. Imposing a broad duty to act could lead to vague or overly punitive laws, where individuals fear prosecution for misjudging a situation or failing to act in good faith (Ashworth, 2013). Indeed, the law must balance the promotion of moral behaviour with the risk of over-criminalisation. Critics might argue that moral duties are better enforced through social norms and education rather than legal coercion, as the latter could erode personal autonomy.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the criminal law in England and Wales reflects only a limited commitment to encouraging citizens to fulfil a moral duty to act through its treatment of omissions. While specific duties arising from relationships, contracts, or statutes—supported by cases like R v Stone and Dobinson (1977)—demonstrate some alignment with the principle of not turning a blind eye, the absence of a general duty to rescue restricts the law’s scope in promoting broader civic responsibility. This selective approach prioritises individual liberty over collective moral obligation, leaving significant gaps between legal standards and societal expectations of doing ‘the right thing.’ Moreover, ethical and practical concerns about overreach and vagueness further complicate the expansion of omissions liability. Consequently, while the law partially encourages moral behaviour, it falls short of fully embodying the ideal of civic duty. Future reform might consider whether introducing limited ‘Good Samaritan’ provisions could bridge this gap, balancing moral encouragement with respect for personal freedom.
References
- Ashworth, A. (2013) Principles of Criminal Law. 7th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Herring, J. (2018) Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials. 8th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(Word count: 1072, including references)
