Introduction
This essay examines the assertion that Alfred the Great’s military reforms were his greatest achievement, focusing specifically on the construction and impact of the network of burhs. Alfred, King of Wessex from 871 to 899, is often celebrated for his role in defending his kingdom against Viking invasions and laying the foundations for a unified England. This analysis will explore the political and administrative reforms associated with the burhs as a key element of his military strategy, assessing how far these reforms support the view of their primacy among his achievements. The essay will address this through a thematic evaluation, supported by historical evidence and scholarly perspectives, ultimately arguing that while the burhs were a significant military innovation, their broader impact and Alfred’s sole credit for them remain subjects of debate.
Political and Administrative Reforms of the Burhs
This section introduces the political and administrative reforms linked to Alfred’s network of burhs, evaluating the extent to which these support the claim that his military reforms were his greatest achievement. The burhs were not merely fortified towns but also represented a sophisticated system of governance and resource management that underpinned Wessex’s defence strategy. The evidence suggests that while these administrative efforts were pivotal to the burhs’ success, their attribution solely to Alfred raises questions that partially challenge the assertion in question.
A key element of the burhs’ administrative framework was the system of obligations tied to the Burghal Hidage, an Anglo-Saxon document likely compiled shortly after Alfred’s death around 914. This text lists over thirty burhs across Wessex and details the hidage (a unit of land measurement) required to maintain each fortification, indicating a structured approach to manpower and resource allocation. As historian Marc Morris notes, ‘the burh was a revolutionary concept introduced by Alfred himself: a fortified town’ (Morris, 2011, p. 225). This perspective is somewhat persuasive, suggesting Alfred’s initiative in establishing a network where no burh was more than 20 miles from another, ensuring rapid mobilisation of troops and refuge for civilians. However, while Morris credits Alfred with originality, it is arguable that he adapted pre-existing concepts of fortification rather than inventing them outright. Indeed, the administrative precision in planning—evident in the grid layouts of major burhs such as Wallingford, Oxford, and Cricklade along the River Thames—demonstrates a level of centralised control and vision, supporting the idea of Alfred as a strategic leader.
Furthermore, the political significance of the burhs lay in their role as tools of royal authority. Alfred likely used them to consolidate power, requiring local nobles and communities to contribute to their construction and maintenance, as outlined in the Burghal Hidage. This fostered a sense of collective responsibility, arguably strengthening Wessex’s internal cohesion against external threats. Yet, there are limitations to viewing this as entirely Alfred’s achievement. The Burghal Hidage, dated after his death in 899, mentions burhs constructed as late as 914, raising the possibility that successors like his son Edward the Elder played a significant role in their expansion (Keynes and Lapidge, 1983, p. 193). Additionally, historical evidence suggests that earlier Mercian kings in the eighth century mandated the construction of royal fortresses, implying Alfred built upon an established tradition rather than creating a novel system (Stenton, 1971, p. 292). Therefore, while the administrative and political reforms associated with the burhs were critical to their military efficacy, the attribution of sole credit to Alfred is questionable.
Moreover, the reliability of sources like the Burghal Hidage itself must be considered. Although supported by archaeological evidence confirming the existence of many listed burhs, the document was damaged in a 1731 fire at Ashburnham House, with surviving transcripts such as Laurence Nowell’s 1562 copy providing the primary text (Keynes and Lapidge, 1983, p. 194). This introduces potential gaps in understanding the full scope of Alfred’s involvement. Generally, while the political and administrative mechanisms of the burhs highlight Alfred’s capability as a ruler, they also underscore the collaborative and evolutionary nature of such reforms, diluting the assertion of unparalleled personal achievement.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while Alfred the Great’s military reforms, particularly the network of burhs, stand as a cornerstone of his reign, the extent to which they constitute his greatest achievement is nuanced. The political and administrative reforms underpinning the burhs demonstrate significant innovation in governance and defence, supporting the view of Alfred as a visionary leader. However, questions around originality and posthumous contributions by successors suggest that his role may be overstated. Ultimately, although the burhs were a remarkable military and administrative feat, a balanced assessment indicates that Alfred’s legacy likely rests on a broader combination of reforms, with the burhs as a critical but not singular achievement.
References
- Keynes, S. and Lapidge, M. (1983) Alfred the Great: Asser’s Life of King Alfred and Other Contemporary Sources. Penguin Classics.
- Morris, M. (2011) The Norman Conquest. Windmill Books.
- Stenton, F. M. (1971) Anglo-Saxon England. Oxford University Press.
