Introduction
This essay examines the principal rule of construction applied by Lord Justice Godstone in the context of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, alongside an analysis of how UK legislation approaches the interpretation of European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) law. A particular focus will be placed on the transformative impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) on principles of statutory interpretation. By exploring these interconnected areas, the essay aims to provide a clear understanding of the evolving relationship between domestic legislation and human rights obligations, supported by relevant legal principles and academic commentary. The discussion will proceed by first addressing Lord Justice Godstone’s interpretive approach, before turning to the broader framework of ECHR law construction and the HRA’s influence.
Lord Justice Godstone and the Modern Slavery Act 2015
Although specific case law directly attributable to Lord Justice Godstone concerning the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is not readily documented in accessible academic sources, it is plausible to infer that his interpretive approach would align with established judicial principles in human rights and modern slavery contexts. Typically, judges adopt a purposive approach when construing statutes like the Modern Slavery Act 2015, aiming to reflect the legislation’s intent to combat exploitation and protect vulnerable individuals. This rule of construction prioritises the statute’s overarching objectives over a strictly literal reading, ensuring the law is applied in a manner consistent with its protective goals (Elliott and Thomas, 2017). For instance, in cases involving trafficking or forced labour, courts often interpret provisions broadly to encompass diverse forms of modern slavery, thereby addressing the complex nature of these crimes. Without a specific judgment or reference to Lord Justice Godstone’s reasoning, this analysis remains speculative; however, it mirrors the general judicial trend towards purposive interpretation in human rights-related legislation.
UK Legislation and the Construction of ECHR Law
UK legislation must approach the construction of ECHR law with a commitment to compatibility, primarily guided by the principles enshrined in the Human Rights Act 1998. Section 3 of the HRA mandates that, so far as possible, primary and subordinate legislation must be interpreted in a way that aligns with ECHR rights (Clayton and Tomlinson, 2009). This provision compels courts to adopt a human rights-compliant reading, even if it requires departing from literal or traditional interpretive methods. For example, in cases involving Article 4 of the ECHR (prohibition of slavery and forced labour), UK courts have linked domestic laws like the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to international obligations, ensuring a coherent legal framework. Furthermore, if compatibility cannot be achieved through interpretation, Section 4 of the HRA allows courts to issue a declaration of incompatibility, although this does not invalidate the legislation (Hoffmann, 2002). This mechanism reflects a nuanced balance between parliamentary sovereignty and human rights protections.
The Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on Statutory Interpretation
The HRA has fundamentally reshaped statutory interpretation in the UK by institutionalising a human rights-focused lens. Prior to its enactment, statutory interpretation relied predominantly on literal and purposive approaches without a mandatory human rights dimension. The HRA, however, introduced a transformative principle: legislation must be read and given effect in a manner consistent with ECHR rights, arguably marking a shift towards a more principled and rights-oriented judiciary (Kavanagh, 2009). Indeed, cases such as R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25 illustrate how courts stretch conventional readings to avoid incompatibility, thereby prioritising rights protections. However, this approach is not without limitations; it sometimes creates tension with parliamentary intent, raising questions about judicial overreach. Nevertheless, the HRA fosters a dialogue between domestic law and ECHR obligations, ensuring that human rights remain at the forefront of legal interpretation (Elliott and Thomas, 2017).
Conclusion
In summary, while the specific contributions of Lord Justice Godstone to the interpretation of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 remain undocumented in this analysis, the purposive rule of construction likely underpins judicial approaches to such legislation, emphasising its protective aims. Moreover, UK legislation engages with ECHR law through a compatibility-driven framework established by the Human Rights Act 1998, which has profoundly influenced statutory interpretation by embedding human rights considerations into judicial practice. The HRA’s role in balancing parliamentary sovereignty with rights protections highlights its broader implications for the legal landscape, fostering a dynamic interplay between domestic and international obligations. Future developments in case law will likely continue to refine this relationship, ensuring that human rights remain a central tenet of UK statutory interpretation.
References
- Clayton, R. and Tomlinson, H. (2009) The Law of Human Rights. 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Elliott, M. and Thomas, R. (2017) Public Law. 3rd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hoffmann, L. (2002) ‘Human Rights and the House of Lords’, Modern Law Review, 65(2), pp. 246–258.
- Kavanagh, A. (2009) Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
