Introduction
International law has historically been a state-centric system, with states as the primary subjects possessing rights and obligations. However, over the past century, the emergence of international human rights law and international criminal law has led some scholars to argue that a revolution has occurred, placing the individual at the heart of the international legal order. This essay critically analyses the proposition that despite these developments, individuals remain secondary and largely ineffective subjects of international law, with their legal status dependent on the will of states. By examining the theoretical framework of individual rights in international law, referencing contemporary incidents from 2024, and challenging the notion of a revolution, this essay argues that while individuals have gained some recognition, their position is still subordinate to state sovereignty. The discussion will be structured into three main sections: the theoretical shift towards individuals, the limitations of this shift using a recent international incident for illustration, and a critical evaluation of the effectiveness of individual rights in practice.
Theoretical Shift Towards the Individual in International Law
The development of international human rights law, particularly post-World War II, marked a significant shift in the focus of international law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 laid the foundation for recognising individuals as bearers of rights independent of their states (Donnelly, 2013). Treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both adopted in 1966, further entrenched these rights by creating obligations for states to protect individuals (Steiner et al., 2007). Additionally, the establishment of international criminal law through mechanisms like the International Criminal Court (ICC), created by the Rome Statute in 1998, aimed to hold individuals accountable for grave crimes such as genocide and war crimes, irrespective of state consent (Schabas, 2011). These developments suggest a transformation where individuals are no longer mere objects of international law but subjects with rights and responsibilities. However, whether this constitutes a true revolution remains debatable, as the enforcement of these rights often hinges on state cooperation.
Limitations of Individual-Centric Law: A 2024 Incident as Illustration
Despite these advancements, the practical application of individual rights in international law reveals significant limitations, often rendering individuals secondary to state interests. A relevant incident in 2024 that illustrates this is the ongoing conflict in Gaza, where reports have highlighted severe violations of human rights, including allegations of war crimes and restrictions on humanitarian aid. According to various international news outlets and human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International, civilians have faced disproportionate harm amid escalations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict throughout 2024 (Amnesty International, 2024). While international human rights law, including the Geneva Conventions, imposes obligations on states and non-state actors to protect individuals during armed conflict, the enforcement of these protections remains inconsistent. For instance, calls for accountability and investigations into alleged violations often face vetoes or political resistance at the United Nations Security Council, demonstrating how state interests can override individual rights. This incident underscores the argument that individuals lack effective legal status without state willingness to uphold or enforce international norms. It challenges the notion of a revolution, as states continue to mediate access to justice and protection for individuals.
Critical Evaluation: Individuals as Secondary Subjects
The apparent shift towards individuals in international law must be critically evaluated against the enduring dominance of state sovereignty. One key argument is that individuals lack direct access to many international legal mechanisms. For example, under the ICC framework, while individuals can be prosecuted for international crimes, the court’s jurisdiction often depends on state acceptance or Security Council referral, as seen in cases like Darfur (Schabas, 2011). Indeed, non-state parties or unwilling states can shield individuals from accountability, highlighting the secondary nature of individual agency. Furthermore, in the human rights domain, mechanisms like the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) allow individuals to bring claims against states, yet the implementation of rulings relies on state compliance, which is not always forthcoming (Greer, 2006). Cases such as *Hirst v United Kingdom (No. 2)* (2005) illustrate this, where the UK delayed implementing the court’s ruling on prisoner voting rights for years due to domestic political opposition, showing how state will can undermine individual rights.
Moreover, the principle of state immunity often prevents individuals from seeking redress against states for human rights violations in international courts. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) case Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy) (2012) reaffirmed that state immunity can bar claims by individuals, even for grave breaches like war crimes, prioritising state sovereignty over individual justice. Therefore, while international law appears to have evolved to protect individuals, the mechanisms for enforcement remain state-dependent, rendering individuals largely ineffective as subjects in their own right. Arguably, this suggests that the so-called revolution is incomplete or overstated.
On the other hand, some scholars contend that the growth of individual rights represents significant progress, even if imperfect. The ability of individuals to petition bodies like the UN Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR demonstrates a growing platform for individual voices (Steiner et al., 2007). However, the non-binding nature of many such recommendations further illustrates the gap between theoretical rights and practical outcomes. Thus, while there is evidence of progress, the overarching reliance on states for enforcement limits the transformative impact on individuals’ legal status.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while international law has made notable strides in recognising individuals through human rights and criminal law frameworks, the proposition of a revolution placing individuals at the centre remains unconvincing. The theoretical advancements are undermined by practical limitations, as demonstrated by incidents in 2024 like the Gaza conflict, where state interests continue to overshadow individual protections. Furthermore, critical analysis reveals that individuals remain secondary subjects, with their legal status heavily contingent on state will, as seen in enforcement challenges and principles like state immunity. The implications of this are significant: without structural reforms to prioritise individual agency over state sovereignty, the effectiveness of international law in protecting individuals will remain constrained. Future developments must focus on strengthening enforcement mechanisms and reducing state-centric barriers to truly elevate the individual’s status in international law.
References
- Amnesty International (2024) Israel/OPT: Latest News on Human Rights Violations. Amnesty International.
- Donnelly, J. (2013) Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. 3rd ed. Cornell University Press.
- Greer, S. (2006) The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects. Cambridge University Press.
- Schabas, W. A. (2011) An Introduction to the International Criminal Court. 4th ed. Cambridge University Press.
- Steiner, H. J., Alston, P., and Goodman, R. (2007) International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals. 3rd ed. Oxford University Press.
[Word count: 1023, including references]
