Introduction
International law has historically been a state-centric system, focusing on the rights and obligations of sovereign entities rather than individuals. However, the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have witnessed significant developments in human rights and international criminal law, prompting arguments that the individual has been placed at the centre of international legal frameworks. This essay critically analyses the proposition that, despite these advancements, the individual remains a secondary and largely ineffective subject of international law, with their legal status still heavily dependent on the will of states. To illustrate contemporary relevance, reference will be made to a notable international incident in 2024. The discussion will explore the evolution of the individual’s role in international law, assess the limitations of this purported ‘revolution,’ and argue that state sovereignty continues to overshadow individual agency in the international legal order.
The Evolution of the Individual in International Law
The traditional view of international law as a framework governing interstate relations was fundamentally challenged by the atrocities of the twentieth century, particularly during and after the Second World War. The establishment of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 marked a pivotal moment, articulating universal standards for individual rights irrespective of state boundaries (Morsink, 1999). Subsequently, mechanisms such as the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) entrenched the notion that individuals possess rights under international law, even against their own governments.
Moreover, the emergence of international criminal law, exemplified by the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002 under the Rome Statute, appeared to affirm the individual’s status as a subject of international law. Individuals could now be held directly accountable for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, bypassing state intermediaries (Cryer et al., 2019). These developments suggest a revolutionary shift, positioning the individual as a central figure in international legal discourse. Yet, while these frameworks are undeniably progressive, their effectiveness and the true extent of the individual’s legal status remain open to question.
Contemporary Illustration: The 2024 Sudan Humanitarian Crisis
To ground this analysis in a current context, the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Sudan during 2024 provides a pertinent case study. Since the outbreak of conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in April 2023, the situation has deteriorated, with reports in 2024 documenting widespread atrocities, including targeted attacks on civilians and sexual violence (United Nations, 2024). The international community, through the United Nations and regional bodies, has invoked human rights law to demand accountability for individual perpetrators and protection for affected civilians. Discussions of ICC investigations into war crimes in Sudan have gained traction, highlighting the potential for international criminal law to address individual responsibility.
However, the practical impact of these legal mechanisms remains limited. Despite international pressure, the Sudanese government and conflicting parties have largely resisted external intervention, citing state sovereignty. Furthermore, the enforcement of human rights protections and criminal accountability depends on state cooperation, which is often withheld (Human Rights Watch, 2024). This incident illustrates the persistent tension between the theoretical centrality of the individual in international law and the practical reality of state dominance, a theme that will be explored further.
Critical Analysis: Limitations of the Individual’s Legal Status
Despite the apparent revolution in international law, several critical limitations undermine the individual’s status as a central subject. Firstly, the enforcement of human rights and international criminal law is heavily reliant on state consent and cooperation. International treaties, while binding in theory, often lack effective mechanisms for enforcement when states refuse to comply. For instance, the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to states that have ratified the Rome Statute or cases referred by the UN Security Council, where veto power can obstruct action (Cryer et al., 2019). This dependence on state will inherently relegates the individual to a secondary position.
Secondly, the concept of state sovereignty remains a formidable barrier. Under the UN Charter, particularly Article 2(7), the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs protects states from external intervention, even in cases of severe human rights violations (United Nations, 1945). This principle, while arguably necessary for maintaining international stability, often shields oppressive regimes from accountability, leaving individuals vulnerable. The Sudan crisis in 2024 exemplifies this issue, as international calls for justice and humanitarian intervention have been met with limited success due to assertions of sovereignty.
Furthermore, the individual’s ability to directly engage with international legal mechanisms is restricted. While certain systems, such as the European Court of Human Rights, allow individuals to bring claims, these are exceptions rather than the norm. In most cases, individuals must rely on their state to represent their interests or seek diplomatic protection, reinforcing their dependency on state goodwill (Shaw, 2017). Thus, although international law has evolved to recognise the individual, their agency remains curtailed by structural and political realities.
Counterarguments: Progress in Individual-Centric Law
It is worth considering opposing views that highlight the genuine progress made in centring the individual within international law. The development of concepts such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, endorsed by the UN in 2005, suggests a shift in prioritising individual protection over absolute sovereignty (Bellamy, 2015). Additionally, landmark cases at the ICC, such as the conviction of Dominic Ongwen in 2021 for war crimes, demonstrate that individuals can be held accountable on the international stage, irrespective of state consent in some contexts (Cryer et al., 2019).
However, these advancements are not without caveats. R2P remains a contested principle, often paralysed by geopolitical interests, as seen in Security Council deadlocks over interventions. Similarly, the ICC’s effectiveness is limited by non-cooperation from powerful states and the challenge of enforcing judgments. Therefore, while progress is undeniable, it does not equate to a full revolution in the individual’s legal status.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while international law has made significant strides in recognising the individual through human rights and criminal law frameworks, the proposition of a revolution placing the individual at the centre appears overstated. As demonstrated by the 2024 Sudan crisis, the individual’s legal status remains secondary and largely ineffective, overshadowed by the enduring primacy of state sovereignty and the practical limitations of enforcement mechanisms. Although developments like the ICC and R2P signal progress, they are insufficient to fundamentally alter the state-centric nature of international law. This analysis suggests that for the individual to truly become a central subject, further reforms are needed to prioritise enforcement over state consent and to enhance direct access to international remedies. Until then, the individual’s role in international law will remain dependent on the often-unreliable will of states.
References
- Bellamy, A. J. (2015) The Responsibility to Protect: A Defense. Oxford University Press.
- Cryer, R., Friman, H., Robinson, D., & Wilmshurst, E. (2019) An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure. 4th ed. Cambridge University Press.
- Human Rights Watch (2024) Sudan: One Year of War Crimes Against Civilians. Human Rights Watch.
- Morsink, J. (1999) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent. University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Shaw, M. N. (2017) International Law. 8th ed. Cambridge University Press.
- United Nations (1945) Charter of the United Nations. United Nations.
- United Nations (2024) Situation in Sudan. United Nations.
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